

Veritas

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- ♣ Cover photo and photo on page 7 in “Airborne Signal: The 112th (Special Operations) Signal Battalion in World War II,” identified these four paratroopers of the 551st Parachute Infantry Battalion as glider troops en route to their company assembly area. Left to right they are A Company PFCs Flavian Hook, Floyd H. Fisher, and John J. Pieniazek (later KIA), and PFC Stanley Pakal, the 551st PIB medic attached to the company.
- ♣ Page 19 photo caption in “From Ledo to Leeches: The 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional),” should read “discarded their fatigue shirts early,” not “jackets” as cited in the last sentence.
- ♣ Page 22 in “The End Run of Galahad: The Battle of Myitkyina.” The capture of the Myitkyina airfield would reduce the Japanese fighter threat to allied transports flying aerial resupply missions to China via the “Hump” route.
- ♣ Page 42 photo in “SF Detachment 39: SFLE in Korea,” identified the H-21 helicopter as the *Choctaw*. The H-21 “flying banana” was Army-designated *Shawnee*. The distinct “banana” shape of this early 1945-vintage tandem-rotor Piasecki H-21 helicopter photo can be seen in this photo.



In This Issue:

In the past sixty years, ARSOF units and personnel have made history in diverse places throughout the world. Locations highlighted in this issue of *Veritas* are indicated on the map.

- ♣ *Italy*—In World War II, the Canadian-American First Special Service Force was the first allied unit into the city of Rome.
- ♣ *Korea*—The Joint Activities Commission, Korea (JACK) and the soldiers of the newly formed Special Forces saw action conducting clandestine missions during the Korean War.
- ♣ *Grenada*—The 1983 invasion of the Caribbean island of Grenada was the first combat test of the Army’s new special operations aviation capability.
- ♣ *El Salvador*—The 11-year war in El Salvador resulted in many individuals requiring prosthetic limbs. In an inspiring story, the combined efforts of American and El Salvadorans brought modern technology and assistance to many of the injured and opened the way for the emergence of a national amputee soccer program.
- ♣ *Afghanistan*—In Gardez, Afghanistan, the establishment of a vigorous Civil Affairs program took a concerted effort by the U.S. Army Reserve Soldiers assigned this complex mission.

Veritas



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by Charles H. Briscoe



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COVER: MH-6 from Task Force 160 on the deck of the USS *Guam* during Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada, October 1983.

The Azimuth of the USASOC History Office

Veritas, phonetically pronounced (vair'-eh-toss), is Latin for "truth."

This title was taken from the 1960s and 1970s public affairs newspaper published by the 4th PSYOP Group at Fort Bragg.

The positive feedback from active and retired soldiers and the civilian community indicates that we are "right on azimuth." We appreciate constructive criticism and comments.

All Roads Lead to Baghdad: ARSOF in Iraq was distributed in late April 2006. Copies may be obtained from the USASOC History Office. *Weapon of Choice: ARSOF in Afghanistan* was reprinted by the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Paladin Press will reprint *Weapon of Choice* as *U.S. Army Special Operations in Afghanistan* for commercial sale. It will have a new cover.

Since "ARSOF in El Salvador, 1982–1993" will be published in 2007, a veterans reunion is planned for 24–26 August 2006 at Fort Bragg, NC. The USASOC History Office is soliciting assistance from the veterans (interviews, documents, photos, and memorabilia) on specific events that require more substantiation and/or supporting materials. Interviews will be scheduled by

USASOC historians during the reunion as well as times to scan reports, photos, and memorabilia.

Future USASOC book writing projects are "ARSOF in Korea, 1950–1953," the "History of Camp Mackall," and "ARSOF in Somalia." An "ARSOF in Iraq" poster is in production. The next campaign issue of *Veritas* focuses on Colombia. It will be the fourth issue 2006. Roles and missions of SOCSOUTH, USMILGP-Colombia, and current ARSOF operations will be covered. Retired MSG Lowell Stevens, a driving force behind "History of Camp Mackall," is leading an effort to identify headquarters and areas of ARSOF commands located on Smoke Bomb Hill in the early years (lowell.w.stevensr@us.army.mil).

Thanks to all veterans—WWII–GWOT—for promoting accurate presentations of Army SOF history. The USASOC History Office always needs photographs, documents, and supporting memorabilia to "bring more life" to and promote interest in ARSOF history articles. We only scan and copy materials; we do not "keep." ARSOF history articles from the field are always welcome.

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Rome-Arno Battlestreamer



The Race to Rome

by Robert W. Jones Jr.

JUNE 1944 was a watershed month for the Allies in World War II. The 6 June 1944 D-Day landing in Normandy to spearhead the assault on Fortress Europe has received the lion's share of attention by military historians overshadowing the seizure of Rome, Italy, on 4 June 1944. The Allied offensive, Operation DIADEM, which covered the breakout from Anzio and a general attack along the southern Italian front in May 1944, ended an eight-month stalemate of bitter fighting in the Italian mountains, south of Rome. Suddenly, the German lines broke and the race for the Italian capital was on. In Lieutenant General Mark Clark's Fifth Army it seemed as if every unit commander from corps down to company level and platoon leaders wanted to be the first into Rome.¹

Leading part of the assault into Rome from the Anzio beachhead was the U.S.-Canadian First Special Service Force (FSSF). The Fifth Army effort included two corps consisting of six infantry and one armored division, all with the goal to capture the capital city.² However, the distinction of being the first unit into Rome goes to a special patrol composed of handpicked soldiers led by an officer from the First Special Service Force, Captain T. Mark Radcliffe (see sidebar on the following page).³

Given only four hours to clear Fort Benning, Georgia, T. Mark Radcliffe joined the FSSF as one of its first officers (a second lieutenant) at Fort William Henry Harrison, near Helena, Montana, on 18 July 1942.⁴ Outstanding performance in the Aleutian campaign and in Italy caused him to be selected to command 3rd Company, 3rd Regiment. After bitter fighting in Italy, which included daring mountain assaults on Monte La Difensa, Majo, and La Remetana, the casualty-ridden FSSF was thrown into the Anzio defense on 1 February 1944. Despite having a strength of only 1,300 combat troops (down from the original 2,300), the Force was to defend a thirteen-kilometer front, one-fourth of the Anzio perimeter. To put this in perspective, the 10,000 man 3rd Infantry Division had a seven-kilometer front).⁵ On 14 March 1944, while leading a five-man reconnaissance patrol in front of the

FSSF sector, Radcliffe was captured. Bound and gagged, the Germans took him to Littoria for interrogation. After being hit on the left side of his throat with a rubber club, Radcliffe escaped and made his way back to the Anzio perimeter. A patrol from his own company found him and brought him back through the lines. (See "Prisoner for a Day: A First Special Service Force Soldier's Short-lived POW Experience" in *Veritas* 1:2.) Wounded while evading, Radcliffe was initially taken to the regimental aid station. Field hospital doctors on the Anzio beach felt that the shrapnel wounds in his foot and left leg were



Lieutenant General Mark Clark, Fifth Army commanding general, was responsible for the Italian campaign fighting up the western side of Italy while the British-led Eighth Army fought up the eastern side. The FSSF was assigned to the Fifth Army while in Italy.

First Special Service Force

IN the spring of 1942 the British Chief of Combined Operations, Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, introduced General George C. Marshall, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, to "Project PLOUGH." Geoffrey Pike, an eccentric British scientist suggested the creation of a unique force specifically recruited and trained to parachute into occupied Norway to attack enemy installations and infrastructure critical to the war effort, namely hydroelectric plants and railways. Using a specially developed snow vehicle called "The Weasel" to traverse the snow, this force would execute attacks and the resulting chaos would tie up large numbers of German soldiers.



North Americans would man the special unit as a combined force of the United States and Canada. General George C. Marshall, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, recruited Lieutenant Colonel Robert T. Frederick to command and organize the new unit. On 20 April 1942, the First Special Service Force was organized at Fort William Henry Harrison, Montana. The individually selected men, of whom approximately one third were Canadian, were organized into three, 600-man regiments (each with two battalions) with a service battalion. After fifteen months of intense winter combat, mountaineering, airborne, demolition, and close combat skills training, the 2,300 Canadian and American soldiers were ready for combat.

As the Force completed its training, the Allied Command had second thoughts about the Norway mission. When initially ordered to be disbanded to provide infantry replacements to other units, COL Frederick was able to convince the Army leadership to keep the well-trained FSSF intact. To capitalize on its winter combat skills, he suggested that the FSSF led the assault on the Aleutian Islands off the south-western coast of Alaska. The Force led this assault and secured Kiska Island on 15 August 1943. Following the Aleutians Campaign, the FSSF was transferred to the Fifth Army in the mountains of southern Italy.

As they fought their way up the Italian "boot" from November 1943 through June 1944, the soldiers of the FSSF endured sustained combat and pitched battles at such places as Monte la Difensa, Monte Majo, and Monte la Remetanea. The attack on Monte la Difensa helped break the German "Winter Line" and was popularized in the 1968 movie *The Devil's Brigade*. At Anzio, the FSSF became so feared that the Germans dubbed it "The Devil's Brigade." The FSSF led the breakout from the Anzio beachhead, thereby effecting the capture of Rome.

... continued on page 11



A FSSF patrol breaks contact after a successful ambush at Anzio 14 April 1944.

beyond their expertise and shipped him to the 36th Combat Hospital near Naples. Radcliffe had been recuperating for almost a month after a successful operation to his foot, when he heard that recovered wounded soldiers were being sent to the replacement depot for reassignment. Most did not return to their original units.⁶


For those soldiers assigned to elite units like the FSSF and the Ranger battalions, being reassigned to another unit was considered a "slap in the face" rejection. The veteran would lose the camaraderie and friendship developed in training, hardened in the Aleutians, and proven during the Southern Italy campaign. Rather than run the risk of being reassigned elsewhere, Captain Radcliffe sneaked away from the hospital to rejoin his unit. This proved to be his second escape and evasion in less than a month, albeit this time from the Americans. However, once in the city of Naples, getting to Anzio posed a problem: he had no access to official transportation. By chance, Radcliffe ran into a friend from Salt Lake City, Utah, in Naples. This friend was a Piper Cub liaison/spotter plane (probably an L-4 aircraft) pilot that flew into the Anzio beachhead as part of a courier service.⁷ Every flight was dangerous because German artillery fire bracketed the beachhead. Small planes could only land and take off at dawn and dusk. Radcliffe convinced his friend to take him along, but fearful of a courts martial for carrying an unauthorized passenger, they effected a plan. Once the plane landed and turned to taxi to the parking area, Radcliffe was to roll out of the plane in the dust cloud thrown up by the engine. He then simply walked to the road and hitched a ride to the 3rd Regiment headquarters. Shortly after being greeted by Colonel Edwin Walker, Radcliffe was summoned to the First Special Service Force headquarters.⁸

Brigadier General Robert Frederick rewarded Radcliffe by assigning him a special mission. "Welcome back!" he said, "I'm sorry, but I can't send you back to your company, there is too much at stake. We are going to be pushing off at this place in about two days. I figured that I would put you on a special mission. Report to General Keyes, the II

Corps commander, at his headquarters.”⁹

The II Corps special mission was to lead an advance patrol into Rome. The force consisted of sixty handpicked men from II Corps units, including three from the FSSF. They were to “. . . in any way possible get into Rome ahead of other Allied forces, send back the enemy situation within the City, and at the same time post II Corps route signs along prominent streets and in public squares.”¹⁰ Mounted in eighteen jeeps and two M-8 armored cars, the advance force would rush ahead into Rome for the liberation. The ad hoc assault force needed little training because all were combat veterans; each had been handpicked for his outstanding performances in combat and his personal courage.¹¹ The three FSSF soldiers selected for the assault force were Sergeant Thomas W. Philips (Seguin, Texas, assigned to 1st Regiment), Staff Sergeant K.R.S. Micklejohn (Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, assigned to 2nd Regiment), and Sergeant J.E. Brannon (Princeton, New Jersey, from 3rd Regiment). To document this success at being first into Rome the force had “. . . one movie camera man, two still camera men, and a news reporter, attached for media coverage.”¹²

Operation BUFFALO, the initial breakout from the Anzio beachhead, was preceded by a tremendous artillery barrage and naval gunfire at 0545 on 23 May.¹³ In the breakout, the FSSF mission was to screen the right flank of VI Corps as it moved north toward Valmontone and Highway 7. To accomplish the screening mission, the FSSF had several heavy units: the 645th Tank Destroyer Battalion (-) and two companies of M-4 Sherman tanks from the 191st Tank Battalion were attached.¹⁴ The 463rd Parachute Field Artillery Battalion’s 75mm howitzers provided direct-fire support.¹⁵ As the FSSF moved northward, the Japanese-American 100th Battalion screened its far right flank.¹⁶ Ten days after the breakout, the FSSF was



The First Special Service Force arrived at Anzio on 1 February 1944. On 23 May 1944, the units in Anzio began to break out and head to Rome.



II Corps shoulder patch

To make up for combat losses the FSSF was assigned about 400 Rangers following the dissolution of the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Ranger Battalions after the Cisterna debacle. The Ranger replacements brought the FSSF up to about 2,000 soldiers (bringing the unit to about 86 percent strength). Equally important, the Ranger Cannon Company (four M-3 half-tracks mounting 75mm cannon) was transferred to the FSSF headquarters bringing much needed firepower.¹⁷



100th Infantry Battalion



Tank Destroyers



191st Tank Battalion



463rd Parachute Artillery Battalion

Units attached to the FSSF for the assault on Rome.

transferred from VI Corps to II Corps for the final push to Rome. When the reinforced FSSF began its final attack toward Rome, CPT Radcliffe was preparing his force for its mission.

Even though he had a force of experienced veteran soldiers, CPT Radcliffe took time to plan and rehearse actions since none of the soldiers had worked together. His primary concern was immediate reaction to German ambushes and roadblocks. In case of enemy contact he wanted to make sure that the force reacted as a whole, not sixty individual soldiers. Their main strategy was to eliminate or bypass the enemy as quickly as possible and continue to race for Rome. If the enemy were too strong they would call for armor and bypass the obstacle letting the heavier armed units take care of the problem.¹⁸

The advance patrol departed II Corps headquarters at 1400 on 3 June 1944. Tucked into CPT Radcliffe's pocket was a pass issued by Major General Geoffrey Keyes giving his element top priority on all roads in the II Corps sector. As he prepared to leave the headquarters area, CPT Radcliffe was handed some signs that read "Follow the Blue to Speedy Two!" The signs had two purposes: first, to guide II Corps units to Rome; second, perhaps more importantly, they were designed to needle the VI Corps commander, Major General Lucian Truscott, whose forces were also racing toward the Italian capital.¹⁹

Part of Radcliffe's mission was to link up with an armored column, Task Force Howze, under the command of Colonel Hamilton Howze, who was to spearhead the II Corps drive to Rome.²⁰ The combined arms task force composed of M-4 Sherman tanks, tank destroyers, and armored infantry would protect the lightly armed advance patrol enabling Radcliffe to dash into Rome.²¹ When Radcliffe's group reached Frascati, he was told by the 2nd Battalion, 338th Infantry (85th Infantry Division), that an armored task force had already passed by an hour earlier. "So much for a coordinated effort," thought Radcliffe. In the rush to catch up with Task Force Howze his group passed an unidentified armored column, seemingly stalled on the side of the road. As they went by, CPT Radcliffe noticed a perplexed look on the lead tank commander's face.²²

Giving it little thought, Radcliffe concentrated on his mission and future actions. Only a few miles down the road, they ran into a German roadblock. The veteran

fighters easily eliminated the roadblock. Temporarily halted by the roadblock, the armor task force caught up with Radcliffe. The first words of the captain in the lead tank were, "What in the hell are you doing here? Are you crazy or lost?"²³ It was then that Radcliffe realized that his lightly armed patrol had inadvertently become the point of Task Force Ellis (91st Reconnaissance Squadron), a rival of Task Force Howze. Task Force Ellis was advancing up Via Tuscolana, parallel and to the left to the of Task Force



Soldiers of II Corps put up a sign on the side of the Colosseum in Rome. This sign was similar to the smaller signs that Radcliffe's patrol put up on the way to Rome.

Howze's advance on Highway 6. All along the Fifth Army front similar task forces were leading their divisions in the quest to be the first unit into Rome.²⁴

Undaunted, Radcliffe's group continued to press toward its objective—Rome. By nightfall, the group was within sight of the city, but some German tanks near a series of radio towers blocked its way. After a short, but




Task Force Ellis (91st Reconnaissance Squadron), a competitor to Task Force Howze, drives into the outskirts of Rome on 4 June 1944. In the center of the photo is an M-4 Sherman tank hit by a German 88mm self-propelled gun. Standard practice would have the tanks, tank destroyers, and armored cars support by fire while infantry flanked the position. In the assault on Rome, as soon as the enemy was destroyed or withdrew, the task force would resume its drive toward the Italian capital.



Armored cars of Task Force Howze move past a burning American M3 Stuart light tank that was just knocked out in the push to Rome on 4 June 1944. Several competing task forces wanted to be the first into the Italian capital.

fierce fight, the Germans withdrew under cover of darkness. This enabled Radcliffe to quarter his patrol for the night in a movie studio complex off Via Tuscolana in the Appio Latino section of Rome. The soldiers discovered afterwards that they had camped in the "Hollywood of Italy," the Cinecitta movie studio, built in the late 1930s. While Radcliffe's force rested, lead elements of Task Force Howze continued to attack.²⁵ By dawn, the tanks and tank destroyers of Task Force Howze had opened a route into Rome.²⁶

Thus, just before dawn, as Radcliffe's patrol raced along Via Tuscolana toward Rome, the First Special Service Force was spearheading the primary II Corps assault along Highway 6 (Via Casilina) supported by elements of Task Force Howze. One of the key missions of the Force was to prevent the Germans from blowing six of the northern bridges across the Tiber River. Without the bridges Rome would be divided and more defensible. At 0100 on 4 June, Major General Keyes told Brigadier General Frederick, "Secure the bridges over the Tiber River above Sixty-eight Northing (a map reference indicating the six Tiber River bridges north of the Vatican City) within the City of Rome."²⁷ General Frederick drove Colonel Alfred C. Marshall's 1st Regiment down Via Casilina



Map of bridges in Rome and route Radcliffe's patrol took into Rome. The bridges numbered 12–17 were the FSSF's objectives.



From right to left: Brigadier General Robert Frederick, First Special Service Force; Lieutenant General Mark Clark, Fifth Army commander; Brigadier General Donald Brann, Fifth Army G-3; and Major General Geoffrey Keyes, II Corps commanding general (the others are unidentified), study a map on the outskirts of Rome early on the morning of 4 June 1944.

toward Rome and the six bridges.

As Frederick and Marshall forged ahead to capture the Tiber River bridges, Radcliffe's assault group, operating independently, was searching for the best and fastest way into the city. Just outside the city limits it came across a railway overpass prepared for demolition. The group's rapid advance had apparently caught the enemy by surprise. The scouts quickly cut the demolition charge wires and slipped into Rome at 0600 4 June 1944 using the Porta San Giovanni (the San Giovanni gate) on Via Tuscolana, part of the ancient Roman city wall. As they did so, the cameramen documented the event on film. They were the first Americans (and Canadian) to enter Rome.²⁸ In the midst of filming the historic moment, a group of German defenders surprised them, stopping the photo shoot.²⁹

The patrol was hit by intense machine gun and rifle fire, forcing it to withdraw to the railway overpass. The soldiers had just gotten into a defensive position when some tanks and tank destroyers from Task Force Howze joined in the fight. The firefight lasted from 0600 to 1100. During a short lull in the firing, CPT Radcliffe rallied his element to make another attempt into the city³⁰

The patrol passed through the Porta San Giovanni for a second time. Five hundred meters into the city, some friendly Italian civilians stopped the patrol to warn them of German tanks ahead. Radcliffe's scouts confirmed one Tiger tank, but as the main force turned to pull back, a second Tiger tank suddenly blocked its withdrawal. The soldiers were trapped, caught like a baseball runner between home plate and third base in a squeeze play! With no anti-tank weapons capable of knocking out a Tiger tank, their only defense was to use the tight urban terrain to mask the tank fire. They did have a twelve-foot high wall to their rear and an embankment to the front which limited tank movement. The soldiers scattered to hide in the buildings. Whenever the vehicles attempted



Route Radcliffe's patrol took into Rome with railway overpass area highlighted. The patrol cut demolition charge wires before entering Rome.

to move, the two Tiger tanks fired their 88mm cannon and machine guns at the lightly armed vehicles.³¹

To make matters worse, two platoons of German infantry arrived to root out Radcliffe's patrol. They were easily driven off by concentrated machine gun and small arms fire. The tanks, however, were not so easily diverted. One of the M-8 armored cars positioned itself at a corner in a desperate attempt to hit one of the tanks with its 37mm cannon. In Radcliffe's words, "This would have been . . . like a bee against an elephant."³² Then for some unknown reason, two tank crewmen lifted their hatches and climbed out (perhaps for a reconnaissance) and the patrol cut them down. The remaining tank crewmen retaliated with random cannon and machine gun fire. But the embankment and wall provided sufficient cover; the shells flew ineffectively over their heads. Radcliffe's radio calls for tank support only produced two more M-8 armored cars.³³

The patrol spent most of 4 June trying to break contact. Some Italian partisans even joined in the fight. As luck would have it, the partisans saved the day. When Radcliffe saw another tank joining the fray, he alerted his men to abandon their vehicles and then evade the enemy through the labyrinth of houses and walled yards of the city. But that tank stopped short of the patrol next to a three-story house. Just as the German tank commander opened his hatch to get a better view, a third floor window opened above him and a hand slowly emerged clutching a hand grenade. Unseen by the German tank commander below, an Italian partisan leaned out of the window and dropped the grenade right into the tank's open hatch. A muffled explosion followed shortly and smoke rose from



Radcliffe's group temporarily leaves Rome on 4 June 1994 after meeting heavy German resistance. The group exits through the Porta San Giovanni on Via Tuscolana.

the tank hatch. Seizing the opportunity, the jeeps and armored cars broke out of the trap. During the patrol's hasty withdrawal, the remaining tank scored a direct hit on one jeep killing the soldiers and three Italian partisans who had joined in the fight.³⁴ CPT Radcliffe radioed the location of the German elements to Task Force Howze and returned to the movie studio to rest and refit after the daylong firefight. They needed a few hours of sleep before trying to enter the city again.

In the meantime, the FSSF was speeding toward the Rome bridges on the Tiber River. The 2nd and 3rd Regiments, advancing up Highway 6 (Via Casilina), reached the Roman suburb of Tor Sapienza by 0530 on 4 June.³⁵ Twenty-five minutes after Radcliffe's patrol first entered the city, a FSSF scouting patrol entered the Pietralata railroad yard aboard the tanks of Task Force Howze.³⁶ During the day of fighting on 4 June, Brigadier General



The first American tank (An M-4 Sherman tank from Task Force Howze) to enter Rome burns after a German ambush near the Pietralata rail yards on 4 June 1994.

Frederick, leading from the front in his inimitable style, was wounded three times. His third wound came as the Force seized the Margherita Bridge.³⁷ By 2300 that night, all six of the bridges assigned to the FSSF were secured. Radcliffe's ad hoc unit got credit for being the first Allied soldiers to enter Rome from the south while the FSSF and Task Force Howze seized the northern part of the city.³⁸

Rapidly the situation in the city changed as the Germans and Italian Fascists fled northward. After the initial hard day's fighting into the Italian capital, the FSSF soldiers were then greeted by crowds of Romans cheering them as liberators. A FSSF soldier, seeing the ancient Colosseum for the first time commented, "The Germans sure blew the hell out of that place!"³⁹

After capturing Rome, the battle for Italy was over for the FSSF, but not for the Allies. They would fight another ten months to drive the Germans from the northern mountains.⁴⁰ On 7 June 1944 the FSSF was relieved of



Radcliffe's patrol is greeted by cheering Romans. Radcliffe is the soldier in the passenger's seat of the jeep (the soldier in the center of the photograph with the rifle and the Italian hugging him).



Jubilant Romans flashing the "V" for "Victory" sign. The photo shows the M-8 "Greyhound" armored car. Radcliffe had two assigned to his patrol.

Italian Campaign Timeline

1 October 1943	The Allies become stalled by the German defensive Carl Gustav Line (sometimes called the "Hitler Line"). The Allied campaign slowed down and the winter settled in effectively stopping Allied offensive operations.
22 January 1944	Operation SHINGLE, the landing at Anzio, was meant to be an end run around German defenses. Instead, the VI Corps was stuck in a defensive perimeter for the next four months.
30 January 1944	Ranger attack on Cisterna. The Rangers lost almost the entire 1st and 3rd Ranger Battalions in the battle with 767 taken prisoner by the Germans.
1 February 1944	The First Special Service Force landed at Anzio taking over thirteen kilometers of the eastern perimeter. At this point, over 100,000 allied troops were in the Anzio beachhead.
23 May 1944	Operation BUFFALO, the breakout from the Anzio beachhead, began with a massive artillery and naval gunfire barrage.
25–27 May 1944	The FSSF took Monte Arrestina (25th), Cori (26th), and Rocca Massina (27th).
2 June 1944	FSSF transferred from VI Corps to II Corps control for the final assault on Rome.
3 June 1944	Radcliffe's patrol left II Corps headquarters for Rome.
4 June 1944	Radcliffe's patrol entered Rome at 0600 through the gate at Via Tuscolana. The FSSF moved to secure six bridges over the Tiber River. Frederick was wounded three times during the day.
5 June 1944	Rome was seized by the various elements of the II and VI Corps.
7 June 1944	The FSSF moved to Lake Albano to rest and refit.



Lieutenant General Mark Clark in Rome.

front line duty and sent to Lake Albano, south of Rome, near the Pope's summer residence. There, they enjoyed three weeks of rest and recuperation.⁴¹ When CPT Radcliffe returned to the FSSF after his special assignment, he was promoted to Major and made the executive officer of 1st Battalion, 3rd Regiment; the rewards for a determined effort.⁴²

Much of the Italian campaign was focused on the capture of the capital and assumed that with its fall, the war in the peninsula would end. This was not the case. The campaign was far from over. Tough fighting continued all the way up the Italian boot until the Germans surrendered on 2 May 1945.⁴³ The frenzied quest to capture Rome was repeated by the Eighth U.S. Army units when they charged past the 38th parallel to capture the North Korean capital, P'yongyang, in October 1950. Fifty-nine years later in Iraq, in the effort to topple the regime of Sadaam Hussein, the 3rd Infantry Division and the 1st Marine Division raced to capture Baghdad, bypassing large areas of resistance in March–April 2003 during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. In all three cases the capture of an enemy capital did not end a campaign or war, merely protracted it. Still, it was an important part of the offensive strategy. Winning "bragging rights" drove the efforts. ♠

This article would not have been possible without the support of Colonel (Retired) T. Mark Radcliffe.

While resting and recuperating at Lake Albano, the Forcemen received unwelcome news: Brigadier General Frederick was leaving to command the 1st Airborne Task Force. Colonel Edwin Walker, 3rd Regiment commander, would be his successor. Ironically, the next campaign for the FSSF, southern France, would open with Operation DRAGOON, led by their former commander.



A Fifth Army reconnaissance patrol outside of Saint Peter's Cathedral.

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- 2 The II and VI Corps controlled the 1st Armored and 3rd, 34th, 36th, 45th, 85th, and 88th Infantry Divisions, plus supporting units. Ernest F. Fisher Jr., *United States Army in World War II. The Mediterranean Theater of Operations. Cassino to the Alps* (Washington DC: Center for Military History, 1977), 192–94.
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- 26 Springer, *The Black Devil Brigade*, 225.
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- 28 Burhans, *The First Special Service Force*, 242; Springer, *The Black Devil Brigade*, 225; Adleman and Walton, *Rome Fell Today*, 252.
- 29 Radcliffe interview; First Special Service Force, "Patrol to Rome," 2.
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Soldier-Sailors in Korea:

JACK Maritime Operations

by Charles H. Briscoe



DURING the Korean War, special operations were conducted by all American military services, United Nations (UN) forces, Korean civilian and military elements, and a fledgling Central Intelligence Agency. In addition to being surprised by the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950, neither General Douglas MacArthur, his Far East Command (FEC), nor the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had developed strategic, operational, or tactical special operations contingency plans for Korea. Roles in behind-the-lines operations had not been defined.¹ The only special operations asset available in the Pacific was a B-29 Superfortress “carpetbagger” (Psywar leaflet) squadron based in the Philippines.

General MacArthur had “stonewalled” any civilian agency that sought to conduct military or paramilitary operations in his theater of war. During World War II, he kept the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) out of the Southwest Pacific, although it performed quite well in Europe, the Mediterranean, Burma, and China. MacArthur did not want the OSS successor setting up shop in Korea, even though the Agency had been running agents into Communist China and North Korea since the end of WWII and had accrued a substantial amount of regional knowledge.²

With the exception of the small 971st Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment in Seoul, the FEC commander in Japan had no covert intelligence collection capability in Korea. Despite 971st reports of North Korean divisions in the Lee Hong-won Branch of the Chinese 8th Route Army in Manchuria before the war, Major Gen-

eral Charles Willoughby, the FEC G-2 (security), chose to ignore the implications.³ Shortly before the North Koreans invaded South Korea and drove the Americans and

Koreans into a final defensive perimeter around Pusan, General MacArthur reluctantly agreed to allow the CIA to establish a small office in Japan. It was fortuitous that Colonel Richard G. Stilwell, detailed from the Army, was serving as the Director of Far East Operations. The Agency became an independent player, not only because MacArthur disliked and distrusted anything he could not control, but also because of its unique global strategic mission. The FEC had a regional view and focused on the strategic implications of Korean events.⁴

Still, when North Korea invaded in June 1950, the new agency had done little to define its role in behind-the-lines operations anywhere.⁵ It was not until the Red Chinese intervention shattered UN Command illusions of a quick victory that U.S. military planners began to seriously consider guerrilla operations. Guerrilla operations could relieve some pressure on frontline UN units by destabilizing enemy rear areas.⁶ And they were an inexpensive force multiplier for the Eighth Army.⁷

Though peace talks in the summer of 1951 served to halt the UN advance on or near the 38th parallel, there was no ceasefire. No longer distracted by intelligence

crises of the moment because the main line of resistance was somewhat stabilized, all military intelligence elements and the CIA began to expand covert operations and to build a support structure to deal with a new form of warfare. It became a wider secret war because it was



*Unofficial post-war
Korean JACK Guerrilla
Operations patch*



*Unofficial post-war
Yong-do partisan unit
patch*

the only combat arena in which efforts could be intensified. It was waged widely, but with minimal coordination.⁸ On the seas surrounding Korea, the U.S. Navy and Marines, British Commandos, and the CIA raided coastal targets, seized military personnel, and destroyed rail and road infrastructure. Submarine and surface ships carried Marine Force Reconnaissance Teams, Underwater Demolition Teams, British Commandos, Army-advised partisans, and CIA guerrilla raiders.⁹

The purpose of this article is four-fold: first, to remind our readers that USASOC has an “Army Special Operations Forces in Korea, 1950–1953” history in progress; second, to separate the CIA covert maritime operations from military special operations activities during the Korean War; third, to reveal the critical role U.S. Army sergeants had in special operations while detailed to the CIA; and lastly, to capitalize on recent primary research—veteran interviews. This article uses an Army paratrooper who conducted paramilitary operations with JACK (Joint Activities Commission, Korea) during the Korean War—former Sergeant First Class Thomas G. Fosmire—to explain some maritime missions from his perspective as an operative. JACK was the CIA cover for status in Korea.

With the dissolution of the OSS after World War II, most U.S. military operatives returned to their parent services or civilian life. Thus JACK, like the Ranger Airborne Infantry companies formed for combat in Korea and Special Forces in 1952, recruited veterans from the OSS and SOE (Special Operations Executive), Rangers, Marauders, paratroopers, Para-Marines and Raiders, and Navy Underwater Demolition Team personnel for “details” with the Agency. An “old boy” network of former connections was used to identify military personnel for JACK.¹⁰ With Colonel William DePuy, Colonel William Peers (OSS Detachment 101–Burma), and Colonel Stilwell detailed to the CIA, Major John K. “Jack” Singlaub (OSS Europe and Indochina) was selected to be the military deputy of JACK in Korea. That *modus operandi* of recruiting was popular . . . much to the chagrin of some WWII parachute infantry officers trying to serve with the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team.¹¹

Numerous U.S. military (all Defense services) officers and sergeants “served” in JACK, yet few knew about

all activities due to compartmentalization by a “need to know.” JACK paramilitary operations were conducted simultaneously while the U.S. military services, the UN, and the South Koreans ran special operations activities. The limited naval and air assets in and around Korea had to support everyone. Thus, special operations conducted during the Korean War have been regularly intertwined by military analysts to promote the existence of a grand special operations strategy by simply joining together the most enterprising and successful tactical operations achieved by several commands and a variety of elements. To compound the grand strategy illusion, General Matthew Ridgway, who succeeded MacArthur

in 1951, directed that a new Army-controlled command be formed to oversee and coordinate all covert operations in theater. This was the Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities, Korea (CCRAK).¹²

CCRAK was to coordinate all special operations in Korea. Every Army, Navy, Marine, Air Force, and allied unit; South Korean military and intelligence elements; and the CIA doing behind-the-lines operations were to be represented in the command. However, CCRAK was a coordinating headquarters; it had no command authority. FEC appointed the commander while the Document Research Division (CIA liaison office) provided the deputy director. Army Major Singlaub, the deputy JACK commander and deputy station chief for Korea, also filled that position. The CIA reported directly to Washington. Its worldwide strategic mission transcended that of Far East Command. In his memoirs Singlaub simply stated “that JACK had neither the responsibility nor inclination to coordinate its independent covert activities with CCRAK.”¹³

CCRAK had no explicit command authority over JACK. It expected JACK to coordinate but JACK was not required to do so.¹⁴ Though CCRAK was really a “paper command,” Singlaub considered it as a rival for personnel, funding, air support, and above all, mission authorization.¹⁵ Scarce air and naval resources would be allocated based on availability, not mission need.¹⁶ Need was CCRAK’s source of power. However, the greatest flaw was that covert activities in FEC had been relegated to a staff rather than a command function.¹⁷

Typical of special operations today, the military and



Corporal Oscar “Pete” Johnson, JACK parachute rigger, with Sergeant Tom Fosmire collecting supplies from the British post exchange at Pusan before shipping out on K-333.

Photo courtesy of T. Fosmire

civilian working relationships at the tactical level were marked by a very distinct cooperative attitude among case officers and field operatives.¹⁸ JACK special operatives in the maritime branch overcame dysfunctional command, control, and coordination to become quite successful during the Korean War. Some JACK maritime operations conducted from Wonsan to the Tumen River (northeast border with China) from 1952 through 1953 will be explained by a veteran.



U.S. Army glider badge

Former Sergeant First Class Thomas George Fosmire from Wisconsin joined the Army as an airborne enlistee on 31 August 1948 to “catch up” with his older brother. Chuck Fosmire, a draftee, had fought with the 9th Infantry Division in Europe during WWII. After the war he reenlisted for Airborne School and was subsequently assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division. During the winter of 1948–1949, Private Tom Fosmire received basic infantry training with the 7th Infantry Regiment (Cottonbalers) at Fort Devens, Massachusetts, before leaving for jump school at Fort Benning, Georgia. In 1949, glider qualification was accomplished during the first week. Three weeks of parachute training followed.

It was June 1949 when Corporal Fosmire joined D Company, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, as a 81mm mortar man. By then, his brother Chuck was serving in the 82nd Airborne Division Reconnaissance Company. A year later, after some finagling by both, Tom joined his brother in the 82nd Reconnaissance Company. When war broke out in Korea in June 1950, Tom hoped that the two could fight together. After several months on alert, it became apparent that the All-American division was not Korea-bound. The newly-promoted Sergeant (SGT) Tom Fosmire volunteered for the Rangers, but like many others, his first sergeant would not release him.¹⁹

Totally frustrated in his efforts to get into the war by the fall of 1951, and with Chuck gone to become a warrant officer in counter-intelligence, Tom re-enlisted for Korea. He was determined to earn his Combat Infantryman Badge as his brother had in WWII. Military service was a family tradition. His father had been gassed and wounded while fighting as an infantryman in the 32nd Division in France during WWI, and wore the German bullet as a tie clasp.²⁰ Re-enlisting for Korea was the only way to get into the war.

While aboard the USTS *Marine Adder* traveling from Seattle, Washington, to Sasebo, Japan, SGT Fosmire never imagined that his Combat Infantryman Badge dream would go unfulfilled. When he got to the replacement depot (“Repo” Depot) at Camp Drake, Japan, virtually all combat arms soldiers were being processed and shipped to Korea in less than forty-eight hours. Casualties had been very heavy during the winter of 1951–1952. When he reached the head of the in-processing line, Fosmire was more than ready to “grab his gear” and get on the

bus to the airfield.²¹

Instead, he was told to report for an interview in an office of the Far East Air Forces Technical Analysis Group (FEAF/TAG) in downtown Tokyo. When Fosmire objected to this diversion from combat, the replacement company commander advised, “You ought to take the assignment, but you can come back. Then, you will definitely go to Korea as an infantryman.”²² Curiosity more than anything prompted him to get on the troop bus to Tokyo.

The FEAF/TAG office was located in the old NYK Shipping Company building up the street from the Dai’ichi building, the Far East Command headquarters. As Fosmire entered the building carrying his duffle, he was quite amazed to see American women working there. The man in charge was an Army first sergeant wearing “every valor decoration except the Medal of Honor.” Fosmire was given a battery of aptitude tests. After checking his scores, the first sergeant said that he was being assigned to JACK, the Joint Activities Commission, Korea. Then, he was told to take another bus to Atsugi Airbase (outside of Tokyo) to catch a plane to Korea. At Atsugi, SGT Fosmire found a Civil Air Transport twin-engine C-46 Commando that was bound for Pusan and boarded.²³

A jeep driver awaited the flight and took Fosmire to a forward operating headquarters of JACK in Tongnae, a spa village just outside of Pusan. JACK headquarters was in the Traymore Hotel in Seoul. This field headquarters was in an old Japanese hotel in Tongnae. Instead of sleeping in a pup tent like most infantrymen in Korea, Fosmire was assigned a bunk bed in a hotel room. There was a central hot bath and a very nice mess hall. While “checking around,” Fosmire noticed that there were Army, Navy, and Marines assigned and most were WWII veterans.²⁴

JACK maritime operations at Tongnae had a wealth of experience from all services. The Marine Raiders, Underwater Demolition Teams, Amphibious Corps Scout-Observers, and U.S. Naval Group China hands were Lieutenant Colonel Robert “Rip” Robinson, Major Vincent R. “Dutch” Kramer, and First Lieutenant Thomas L. Curtis. The WWII paratroopers were Colonel Benjamin

Civil Air Transport C-47 Dakota aircraft with JACK Navy Lieutenant George Atcheson (left), Korean Captain Han Chul-min (center), and Marine Major Vincent A. “Dutch” Kramer (right) standing by their jeep.



In 1951, Lieutenant Colonel John H. McGee, G-3 (Operations) Far East Command, sought similar soldiers to raise, train, equip, and direct guerrilla operations in Korea. McGee was a veteran of guerrilla war in the Philippines. He wanted:

*a cadre of enlisted men who really knew their jobs thoroughly, were capable of working with Koreans under isolated conditions for relatively long periods of time, were accustomed to doing without amenities considered normal for the American soldier, and were wild and woolly enough to inspire confidence with their deeds alone.*¹

His recommendations attracted little interest in FEC. When the Ranger companies were disbanded in the fall of 1951, McGee's staff study was reexamined. But it was not until 1953 that the Army sent ninety-nine Special Forces officers and sergeants to Korea. They were not employed as teams; the vast majority were assigned to the 8240th Army Unit as advisors to the UN partisans on both coasts and the Tactical Liaison Office as "line-crosser" agent handlers with the conventional units. They became part of a myriad of American, British, Korean, and JACK elements conducting special operations in Korea.

McGee understood that the geography of Korea made air and naval support critical to unconventional warfare operations behind enemy lines; limited assets would have to be shared by many.² When he established Task Force Kirkland (8240th Army Unit) on Nan-do, a fifteen-acre rock atoll six miles offshore and ten miles south of Wonsan to conduct partisan raids on east coast targets and assist downed UN pilots, he knew that JACK and other American and South Korean elements were already operating in the area. CCRAK intervened to reduce the Task Force Kirkland area of operations from Wonsan to the main line of resistance near the 38th parallel when JACK protested. Task Force Kirkland guerrilla operations were restricted to a fifty-mile radius of Wonsan.³ Still, McGee worked closely with JACK maritime elements. He sought their advice because they had the most combat experience and constantly sought training opportunities.⁴

1 Major Shaun M. Darragh, "Where Special Operations Began: Hwanghae-do: The War of the Donkeys," *Army*, November 1984, 72.

2 Michael E. Haas, *In the Devil's Shadow: UN Special Operations During the Korean War* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), 33–34.

3 Haas, *In the Devil's Shadow*, 49.

4 John B. Dwyer, *Commandos From the Sea: The History of Amphibious Special Warfare in World War II and the Korean War* (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1998), 251–52.



The island war zones.

Vandervoort, legendary battalion commander of the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment in France and Holland, and Captain John "Skip" Sadler, 11th Airborne, Philippines. The Korean War veterans were Navy Lieutenant (LTJG) George A. Atcheson and Captain (CPT) Robert L. Kingston. Vandervoort succeeded Colonel Albert R. Haney, the first JACK commander.²⁵

Junior intelligence officers were the weakest link. Most agent case officers were brand-new Reserve Officers Training Corps second lieutenants. Straight from Ivy League colleges, they were given three months of basic paramilitary skills and parachute training at Fort Benning, while at Training Center One.²⁶ A select cadre of strong, experienced sergeants was teamed with seasoned officers in the field. They trained and advised the operational elements of JACK. Vandervoort knew first-hand the value of airborne noncommissioned officers.²⁷ In lieu of special training most of the sergeants were sent to agent camps to assist the JACK advisors in training volunteers.²⁸

Sergeants Fosmire and Walter Hoffman were assigned to one of the most senior lieutenants in the Marine Corps: First Lieutenant Tom Curtis. This "maverick" officer (enlisted to warrant to battlefield commission) was a highly decorated veteran from Atlantic Fleet Scout–Observer Group and the OSS Operational Groups in Greece and China. The three men were sent to Kadok-to, an island northeast of Koje-do and west-southwest of Pusan. When they arrived, it housed thirty North Koreans (Captain Han Chul-min's cadre that had trained JACK escape and evasion net personnel). Seventy more guerrillas training on Saipan were to arrive shortly. Curtis' group was to build a 1,000-inch zero range as well as small arms, machine gun, and crew-served ranges (57mm recoilless rifle and 60mm mortar).²⁹

Supplies and foodstuffs were delivered weekly by a thirty-ton Chinese junk that JACK elements had captured. It was large enough to carry an Army jeep to the island. However, the strong currents and prevailing westerly winds made the trip to and from Pusan an all-day affair.



Southern Korea and Kadok-to, northeast of Koje-do, west-southwest of Pusan.

Afterward Fosmire and Hoffman helped Curtis to train the guerrillas in marksmanship (American, Chinese, and Russian weapons); hand grenades, mines, and booby traps; and first aid, map reading, and small unit infantry tactics with particular emphasis on raids and ambushes. Curtis taught instinctive shooting, a skill that he had mas-

UN naval forces blockaded the Korean coasts with a carrier task force shortly after the North Korean invasion in June 1950. Naval air and surface vessels bombarded enemy ports, railroads, roads, and known troop assembly areas daily while minesweeper craft protected the patrolling vessels. Chinese intervention in late November 1950 enabled the North Koreans to shift artillery and anti-aircraft weapons systems to protect cities and seaports. Artillery barrages on guerrilla bases offshore and UN navy ships increased and became more effective.¹

1 Department of the Navy. Naval Historical Center Web Page. Wars and Conflicts of the U.S. Navy. "Korean War: Chronology of U.S. Pacific Fleet Operations, January 1951–April 1953," <http://www.history.navy.mil/wars/korea/chron51a.htm>, <http://www.history.navy.mil/wars/korea/chron51b.htm>, <http://www.history.navy.mil/wars/korea/chron52a.htm>, <http://www.history.navy.mil/wars/korea/chron52b.htm>, and <http://www.history.navy.mil/wars/korea/chron53c.htm>, hereafter Korean War Chronology with internet citation.

Lieutenant Tom Curtis (left front wearing an OG bomber jacket, soft cap, and low quarters) and Sergeant First Class Walter Hoffman (hatless center front wearing an army knit sweater) with Korean crew aboard K-333.



Photo courtesy of T. Fosmire

tered in the OSS. After three months working on Kadok-to (January through March 1952), Curtis and his new charges returned to Tongnae for a weekend R&R (rest and relaxation). That very short respite at headquarters landed Fosmire in JACK maritime operations.³⁰

After a night of hard drinking, Curtis decided that a prank would "loosen up" a few "stiff-backed" officers. He used a fire extinguisher to wake them up in the early morning hours. The next morning Curtis was "standing before the mast" in Vandervoort's office. Luckily, the two senior Marines—Lieutenant Colonel Rip Robinson, a fellow Atlantic Fleet scout-observer, and Major Dutch Kramer, a kindred China OSS man—spoke up in his behalf. They suggested that instead of being immediately reassigned, Curtis should be sent to command the Japanese trawler that would cover the northeast coast of Korea.³¹

An 85-foot Japanese-built trawler, K-333, crewed by Koreans, would be the first JACK vessel to operate from Wonsan harbor in the winter. Curtis' acceptance was conditional; both Fosmire and Hoffman must volunteer to join him. Both paratroopers agreed and became sailors aboard a 1940s, diesel-powered, 80-ton fishing trawler that would operate offshore in the dead of the Korean winter.³²

K-333 and its 12-man Korean crew were berthed at Pusan awaiting the mounting of weapons and interior modifications to accommodate forty passengers. Capable of a top speed of twelve knots (twelve nautical miles per hour) and a cruising speed of eight to ten knots, trawler K-333 had four hatch-covered foredeck holds to conceal forty guerrilla raiders. Light machine gun mounts (.30 caliber) had to be welded on both sides of the forward hold section and a .50 caliber heavy machine gun was to be installed behind the captain's cockpit.³³ Radio antennas were hidden in the masts and cranes to preclude long




JACK trawler K-444, sister ship of K-333, berthed at Pusan.

distance identification.³⁴

Fosmire and Hoffman collected weapons, supervised the fabrication and installation of shielded machine gun mounts, and accumulated ammunition to test fire everything. Curtis signed for liquor and cigarettes, both of which were used as pay for the crew and as barter goods for food and supplies only available on the black market. After several multi-day shakedown cruises well beyond Pusan harbor, the K-333 team received its operations brief. Afterwards, they sailed northeast up the coast to Yo-do, the largest island in Wonsan harbor.

This island, garrisoned by Korean Marines, had been used as a special operations base by the Royal Marine 41 Commando. A small cemetery contained three fallen Commandos. Navy and Marine Corps fire control ("spotter") teams, a 581st Air Force RH-5 Sikorsky rescue helicopter element, and JACK had used the island as an agent base and launch site for raiding forces since late summer 1950. A short strip could accommodate twin Beechcraft C-45s and C-47 Dakotas.³⁵

Although some 400 Republic of Korea Marines guarded Yo-do, the K-333 team and crew slept aboard their trawler



*The islands in Wonsan harbor were occupied by a variety of special operations elements. Task Force Kirkland, headquartered on Nan-do, a fifteen-acre rocky atoll six miles offshore and ten miles south of Wonsan, had a helicopter pad and a communications center. Kirkland's Miryang Battalion had an outpost on Alsom-do island. It was half the size of Nan-do and just eight hundred meters from the North Korean mainland. (Michael E. Haas, *In the Devil's Shadow: UN Special Operations During the Korean War* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), 49, 51.) The UN naval blockade workhorses were the carrier task force screening elements that worked close in—the destroyers, destroyer escorts, frigates, and corvettes—whose patrol areas were being cleared daily by minesweepers.*

at night, only eating meals in the sandbagged messhall.³⁶ This was a wise precaution because the Wonsan offshore islands (held by Task Force Kirkland partisans, Air Force air-sea rescue helicopters, Tactical Liaison Office line crossers, JACK, Navy and Marine air and naval gunfire spotter teams, and signal intercept elements) and UN minesweepers and blockade ships (since January 1951)

British Royal Marine 41 Commandos destroy a North Korean railroad on the east coast.





Unofficial post-war
Task Force Kirkland insignia

Unofficial post-war
Line Crossers
badge



were targeted daily by North Korean shore batteries, ranging from mortars to 155mm howitzers.

The firing exchanges varied from single harassment rounds to more than a hundred rounds and alternated between ships and the islands. The ships countered the fire when UN forces on the islands called for air and naval gunfire support. Thus, destroyers, minesweepers, and UN ground forces stationed on the islands were daily hit by barrages that resulted in deaths, wounded, and damaged vessels monthly.³⁷

The mission of the K-333 team was to rescue downed UN airmen, to land and extract JACK agents, to support Special Mission Group (SMG) raids and Special Activities Force missions, and to direct naval gunfire against targets of opportunity along the coast from Wonsan to the Tumen River, the Soviet Union and Red China border. These tasks supported the overall JACK mission to collect intelligence, to sabotage enemy infrastructure, to kidnap North Korean government officials, to dispatch agents into North Korea to organize resistance groups, and to establish an escape and evasion network for shot down UN pilots.³⁸ Responsibility for the east coast below Wonsan belonged to Eighth Army.³⁹

Danish-American Hans Tofte (OSS Europe), the first CIA station chief in Japan, started to create an elaborate escape and evasion net for downed fliers with a designated island on each coast above the 38th parallel to serve as destinations for downed airman. Captain Han Chul-min initially recruited North Koreans to be trained as guerrillas to serve as guides for the escape and evasion network. Trained on Yong-do, these guerrilla groups were inserted to establish fixed bases on the mainland. Two fishing fleets involved in smuggling were to serve as a secondary net for downed airmen.⁴⁰ K-333 was to plug the holes in this net—lack of JACK control over the sea smugglers, absence of resistance groups on the mainland, and the general lack of support in the Communist-controlled interior.⁴¹

The three Americans on the K-333 team were always armed with .38 caliber pistols, .45 caliber automatics, and .45 caliber Thompson sub-machine guns. All carried six 30-round magazines for the Thompsons taped in reverse pairs for quick reloads. They were alternately loaded with .45 caliber ball and tracer ammunition (for the psychological effect that the large fireballs had at night). The Americans also had a separate arms locker with several M1 .30 caliber Garand sniper rifles, M2 .30 caliber carbines, M3 .45 caliber sub-machine guns ("Grease guns"), a 57mm recoilless rifle, and spare .30 caliber and .50 caliber machine guns and barrels. The Korean crew was regularly drilled in the use of the crew-served weapons aboard ship and marksmanship practice was routine. They were expected to man those weapons. Seamen not manning a crew-served weapon (gunner and loader) were issued small arms only during "battle stations."¹

1 Thomas G. Fosmire, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 6 September 2005, Florence, SC, tape recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

Though JACK infiltrated hundreds of agents into North Korea to organize resistance operations, success was rare—whether they parachuted in, transferred to local boats offshore, or simply walked in overland. At night aboard K-333, SFC Fosmire put agents over the side of the trawler into small *sampan* "wiggle boats" for the trip to the shore. The *sampans* were crewed by local fishermen.⁴² But, this was not a new infiltration concept.

Confronted by unacceptable North Korean "line crosser" losses in late 1950, Tactical Liaison Office teams attached to the 3rd and 25th Infantry Divisions began to insert agents by small boats on the west coast. The 441st Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment (Far East Command) started a grander amphibious espionage operation codenamed SALAMANDER. They also used Korean-manned fishing boats to insert agents deep in enemy territory, initially from the numerous islands off the west coast of Korea above the 38th parallel. The islands were relatively free from enemy attack because of the UN naval blockade and some were occupied by anti-Communist North Korean partisans. Later, the 441st moved north from Paengyong-do to Cho-do island with better access north to the Yalu River. An east coast SALAMANDER base was established in 1951 on Yo-do, further increasing the special operations population there. Then, agents could infiltrate one coast and exfiltrate from the other. The size and limited deep sea-worthiness of Korean fishing boats caused the 441st to introduce fast American sea craft.⁴³

The North Koreans were not sitting idle. By mid-1951,



Map depicting west coast operations area.

military and government officials had established tight internal population controls, linked military to home defense elements with fixed communications, and tasked coastal communities with nightly “shore watch” and repair of roads, bridges, and railroads damaged by air and commando attacks. Daily coastal bombardment by the UN blockade ships destroyed interest in supporting guerrilla resistance elements. Only the derailment of trains inside tunnels created sufficient chaos and wreckage to close major sections of the Hungnam-Kojo-Yangyang line for long periods.⁴⁴ Neither the U.S. military, UN, nor JACK factored how Asian Communists controlled their populations. North Korean internal security was even tighter after cease-fire talks began in 1951 and the main line of resistance became semi-fixed.⁴⁵

This was the environment in which Sergeant Fosmire and the JACK maritime element operated. It was very hostile and there was no coordinated UN effort. However, the success that came from employing one trawler led to the assignment of another to the Wonsan operation. The following story illustrates the difficulties faced by JACK operatives.

The mission to capture a group of Russian officers meeting with the North Korean Armed Forces (NKA) near Dok-jin-ri (North Hamgyong), North Korea, had been assigned to the SMG in mid-October 1952. Instead of using their trawlers (K-333 and K-444) to carry the SMG force offshore, Lieutenant Curtis and Sergeants Fosmire



Sergeant First Class Walter Hoffman (far left rear with military sweater) with both Korean trawler crews aboard K-444.

and Hoffman were to assist LT Atcheson and SFC William Hanscombe aboard Navy whaleboats (twenty-six-foot plywood motor launches used for general duty and as auxiliary lifeboats). The three-man east coast maritime team transloaded the SMG raiders from their trawlers to the Buckley-class destroyer escort (DE-699) *Marsh*. This was done at night on the seaward side of Yo-do island to improve security. When the trawlers returned to the other side of Yo-do island to anchor, the *Marsh* slipped away to the north on 17 October 1952.⁴⁶

Shortly after midnight 18 October 1952, the *Marsh* arrived offshore the beach landing site pinpointed by ship radar. Two whaleboats were lowered into the dark

North Korean order of battle intelligence staff officers faced major challenges when trying to sort Marine Reconnaissance–Underwater Demolition Team Special Operations Group from JACK Special Mission Group and Special Activities Force, British 41 Commandos [part of UN Special Action Group], and the Republic of Korea Marines . . . especially since all used the same limited UN naval assets and U.S. Air Force and Navy aircraft for ingress and egress of partisan, guerrilla, and military forces. By mid-1952, when peace talks were well underway, practically every command in Korea was conducting covert special operations. And simultaneously, North Korea was busy inserting agents, raiding coastal targets, and sowing ship mines.¹

1 Korean War Chronology, <http://www.history.navy.mil/wars/korea/chron52c.htm>; Dwyer, *Commandos from the Sea*, 257.

sea. Rubber boat lines were tossed to each and the assault boats were slid over the side. Then, the SMG raiders climbed down cargo nets to board their eight bobbing rubber craft. The two whaleboats, each towing four boats, were to tug them 600 meters offshore, and then stand-by idling, to tow them back after the raid. LT Curtis and

Sergeant Hoffman accompanied LT Atcheson in the command whaleboat while SGT Fosmire was teamed with SFC Hanscombe. The *Marsh* had radio communications with the two Navy whaleboat coxswains to guide them ashore with radar vectors and to call for protective fire if needed.⁴⁷

Interestingly, the time of the alleged meeting with the Russians (according to the defector with them) happened to coincide with the dark of the moon when the SMG preferred to conduct operations. But the meeting was to take place not close to the beach, rather in a village two miles inland. The whaleboat ingress went smoothly. Only the muffled engines and phosphorescent boat wakes signaled their presence. Upon reaching shore safely, the scout swimmers quickly checked the area. Afterward, using their light sticks, they signaled "all clear."⁴⁸ The flank security and assault elements began to paddle into shore.

As the beach security element disembarked and ran to take up their flank positions, the situation changed drastically. Both flank security forces began receiving effective small arms fire. Then a heavy machine gun firing tracers engaged from the north. Instead of "laying low," the SMG, "itching for a fight," returned fire to give away their positions. The firefight quickly intensified.⁴⁹

By the time LT Atcheson fired his flare gun to signal an immediate withdrawal, several rubber boats had been hit. Hearing the increased volume of fire and seeing the heavy machine gun tracers moving closer to the beach landing site, the two whaleboats headed in to grab the rubber boat tow lines. Fosmire and Hanscombe got in first

and they grabbed four boat lines. As they headed back out with four boats in tow they saw that the other whaleboat was "dead in the water." Its propeller had become fouled in some fishing nets. Fosmire had the coxswain swing alongside and he passed the towline to Lieutenant Curtis. Then, under even heavier small arms fire, Fosmire and Hanscombe turned about and raced back to the beach for the remaining rubber boats, two of which were partially deflated.

In the confusion, neither coxswain called

The destroyer escort USS *Marsh* DE-699 had the distinction of being the UN ship that had steamed farthest north into Korea—up the Yalu River.¹ Before that the *Marsh* supplied electrical power to Pusan for two weeks in September 1950, did area defense of Inchon Harbor, and then served as a ship-to-shore power source again until March 1952. DE-699 came back on station in Korea in mid-May 1952 to perform blockade duty until mid-November, shelling troop and transportation centers identified by Navy and Marine Corps spotters on islands near Songin and Wonsan as well as coastal targets identified by JACK trawlers and UN aircraft.²

1 1950 unnamed newspaper article, "Four Warships Here After Dueling With Reds in Korea," http://www.desausa.org/images/uss_lewis_and_uss_marsh_5.htm.

2 "USS Marsh (DE-699)," [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Marsh_\(DE-699\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Marsh_(DE-699)).

USS Marsh (DE-699), one of the U.S. Navy's floating power stations, supported the JACK Special Mission Group during October 1952. Its 26-foot plywood whaleboats towed SMG raiders in rubber boats offshore of the selected beach landing site at night.



USS Marsh DE-699 unit insignia

The Special Mission Group was the “muscle commando force” of JACK. Its members had been recruited from die-hard anti-Communist North Korean refugees. On Yong-do they received amphibious warfare and marksmanship training with Russian, Chinese, North Korean, and American weapons—small arms, machine guns, 57mm anti-tank recoilless rifles, and 60mm mortars. To support the behind-the-lines missions, the element wore black, North Korean, or Chinese uniforms and equipment and carried North Korean weapons.¹ The SMG area of operations ranged from Pohang above the 38th parallel on the northeast coast to the Tumen River estuary—the southern border of the Soviet Union and Manchuria—extremely rugged, mountainous terrain where the railroad and road hugged the narrow coastline.²

1 James C. Pagnella, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 17 March 2006, Pacific Grove, CA, tape recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

2 John B. Dwyer “Behind the Lines: Secret Naval Raids in Korea,” *Military History* (December 2002), 69.

the *Marsh* for suppressive fires. Both seamen were intent on their tasks—steering and freeing the whaleboats. “The coxswains were hell bent on breaking contact and getting out of small arms range,” remembered Fosmire. “In the time it took us to return, the remaining SMG raiders had gotten their wounded in the boats and cleared the shore. They were paddling frantically to get beyond small arms range. When we closed on them, Hanscombe and I grabbed the tow lines and lashed them to the stern of the whaleboat as the coxswain turned back out to sea. In the meantime, the second whaleboat had ‘cleared’ its propeller and was headed back to the *Marsh*. The action didn’t last more than ten minutes . . . or so it seemed, but it was extremely exciting.”⁵⁰

The wounded SMG raiders were treated in the sick bay while DE-699 steamed south to Yo-do island. Fortunately, no one had been killed. The SMG was transferred to the trawlers for the return trip to Yong-do. SFC Fosmire was later decorated for his heroic actions.⁵¹ Another SMG-trawler raid mission was more successful.

An SMG raiding party captured a North Korean lieutenant and several soldiers. With

Major Dutch Kramer observes SMG rubber boat training. The rubber boats are being towed by LCPRs offshore of a beach landing site.



Marine Raiders and Underwater Demolition Teams had proved the utility of the four thirty-six-foot landing craft personnel, ramped (LCPR) carried aboard APDs (high-speed destroyer escorts) during WWII in the Pacific. The three APDs that supported JACK with LCPR were the Horace A. Bass (APD-124), Wantuck (APD-125) and Begor (APD-127).



The 36-foot LCPR had two .30-caliber shielded machine guns on the sides of the bow, could reach nine knots fully-loaded, carried three crew, and thirty-six combat-loaded troops or 8,100 lbs. of cargo. The three and one-quarter-inch marine plywood hull afforded little protection, but its underwater exhaust system muffled the 225 hp Gray Diesel engine to facilitate covert infiltrations.



Photo courtesy of B. Dwyer

Photo courtesy of U.S. Naval Historical Office



Photo courtesy of U.S. Naval Historical Office

The carrying capacity of the U.S. Navy twenty-six-foot Mark II plywood whaleboat was limited. The coxswain normally stood to steer the craft. It is easy to understand why the coxswains were eager to break contact and get out of small arms range.

the rotation of LT Tom Curtis, Fosmire and Hoffman became trawler commanders. Both men were aboard K-333 when they slipped in close to a rocky section of the east coast to offload an SMG platoon in rubber boats.⁵² Gently sloped beaches provided sea access to railroad bridges, tunnels, and the coastal road. But nearly all beaches abutted fishing villages and coastal currents, and the absence of harbors or inlets, made them dangerous landing zones.⁵³

The SMG platoon ambushed a small truck convoy on the coastal highway. The raiders triggered the ambush by simultaneously disabling the lead and trail vehicles of the convoy with 57mm anti-tank recoilless rifles. Credit for proficiency with the 57mm should be given SFC Joe Pagnella, the noncommissioned officer advisor who preceded Hanscombe. Pagnella had relentlessly drilled the SMG on 57mm marksmanship and personally demonstrated its effectiveness on several missions.⁵⁴ This time, a badly stunned North Korean lieutenant and several soldiers were quickly captured and hustled down to the rubber boats. The raiders had to escape before reinforcements arrived.⁵⁵

With the SMG raiders and enemy prisoners stowed safely aboard the trawler, the crew fired their machine guns toward the ambush site to cover their withdrawal from the coast. This was also done to prevent any patrolling UN blockade vessels from mistaking them for enemy. Afterward, the North Korean lieutenant brazenly climbed out of the hold to smoke a cigarette on deck. To remove any ideas that he might have had about being a

Sergeant First Class Joe Pagnella coaches Lieutenant George Atcheson on the 57mm anti-tank recoilless rifle.



Photo courtesy of B. Dwyer



Photo courtesy of B. Dwyer

JACK advisors (center to left): Major Dutch Kramer, Lieutenant Tom Curtis, Major Jack Singlaub, and Lieutenant George Atcheson observe SMG rubber raft training.

VIP prisoner, Sergeant Hoffman knocked him down and shoved him back into the hold, retrieving the lieutenant's fur-lined hat from the deck. The frigid cold of Korean winter was a constant aboard the trawler.⁵⁶

Between the harsh weather and limited coordination with UN naval vessels constantly patrolling the coasts, life aboard the trawlers was tough, primitive, and dangerous for all hands—Korean and American. The engine room was the only place to get warm. Two weeks of below zero temperatures in the winter of 1952–1953 instantly turned sea spray to ice, coating everything. Crewman used sledgehammers and worked the pumps constantly to prevent ice buildup on the all-iron vessels. The accumulated weight of ice topside could cause the boat to “turn turtle” unexpectedly, trapping crew inside or throwing them overboard into the freezing cold water.⁵⁷ Cold weather survival suits were things of the future.

Korea and Japan were also regularly hit by typhoons in the summer. In June 1952, Typhoon Dinah had forced the UN blockade ships to seek safe harbor for nearly ten days. Air operations were severely reduced. UN ground forces had only artillery to counter the enemy attacks along the line. “Sheltered in a small cove of Yo-do, we had all three K-333 anchors out and kept the engine running slow forward for thirty-six hours to keep from being

SMG interpreter Chong Do-hyun sighting the 57mm recoilless rifle. He was later killed on an SMG mission.



Photo courtesy of B. Dwyer

driven ashore. Every time the stern scraped bottom we'd 'rev up' the engine. It was a hairy time," remembered Fosmire.⁵⁸

Recognition as a friendly by UN blockade ships posed another constant danger. Visual signals identifying the JACK trawlers as "friendly" vessels to UN aircraft and ships changed monthly. These were simple signals to support a "fishing vessel" cover. They varied from flying three rice sacks to hanging two glass-ball fishing floats on the mast during daylight to using colored identification lights and firing flares at night. Since the two trawlers regularly hugged the coast at night to observe enemy activity (truck convoys on the coastal highways or trains that ventured out of railroad tunnel daylight hide sites—steam locomotive fireboxes were easily spotted), offload SMG raiding parties, slip agents on board North Korean *sampan*, or loiter close-in to pick up returning commandos, the two JACK vessels looked suspicious on ship radars.⁵⁹

They were challenged regularly. In dark-of-the-moon nights, UN ships on "flycatcher" patrol (searching for mine-carrying *sampans*) would slip in quietly and "light them up" with searchlights. "A 'light up' was brighter than a Hollywood set," recalled Fosmire. "When we turned to face the searchlights and appropriately respond to the challenge, I saw that virtually every gun on the ship was trained on us."⁶⁰ Even when recognized as friendly, Fosmire was usually told to turn seaward ninety degrees and go to the five-mile limit. If they were idling, awaiting the return of a SMG raiding party, the JACK commandos had a long paddle in store while K-333 or K-444 obeyed orders. After the flycatcher vessel cleared the area, the trawler would slip back in for the SMG pickup.⁶¹

Coordination aboard Navy ships (arranging naval gunfire support and delivery of SMG elements) offered respite from the harsh daily routine on the trawlers. It gave American advisors an opportunity for a hot meal, shower, and sometimes, a change of clothes. Clean uniforms accompanied the weekly aerial resupplies from Pusan. Aircraft supporting JACK would drop C-rations, fresh water, rice, and fuel on the Yo-do island airstrip before heading to other drop sites. Sometimes a Navy helicopter (Sikorsky RH-5) would ferry the Americans to planning sessions aboard ship. One RH-5 helicopter lifted a pilot from the wing of his downed Corsair in Wonsan harbor "without him getting his shoes wet," remembered Fosmire. "We idled between the pilot and the shore to protect him while the helicopter effected the rescue. The nearby blockade ships were reluctant to assume the position because of the threat posed by innumerable floating mines in the harbor."⁶²

By late summer 1953, Fosmire had accumulated sufficient points to rotate back to the United States, but he agreed to another assignment despite the peace talks. By then, Curtis and Hoffman were long gone; Department of the Army civilian Michael Nolan, former fullback for the Los Angeles *Rams*, had taken charge of K-333. Now SFC Fosmire joined SSG John Blake at the Saipan training base to give six weeks of paramilitary training to

forty Chendo Gyo, a radical religious group living in the mountains to the north of Wonsan harbor. They had been a part of the east coast escape and evasion net. The Chendo Gyo were vehemently anti-Communist and very nationalistic. They had started fighting in 1928 against the Japanese, and then the North Korean Communists in the late 1940s.⁶³ They also worked with the 441st Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment SALAMANDER operation.⁶⁴ The Chendo Gyo were not irregulars or mercenaries, but armed members of a very strong theocratic political movement intent on free government in a modern Korea.⁶⁵

After the Saipan training, the Chendo Gyo were moved to a camp south of Sak-cho-ri on the east coast for advanced training. There, they learned of the pending cease-fire. The guerrillas became very upset and frustrated. They would not be able to retaliate against the NKAFF for the abuses suffered by their people. On a cold, rainy day they refused to train and began drinking. That night, SSG Blake had to wrench an M2 carbine from a drunken Chendo Gyo intent on killing Fosmire. That incident convinced the Milwaukee native that it was time to return to the U.S. Army and go home.⁶⁶ Fosmire was not the only American who recognized the futility of trying to organize and train guerrilla forces to fight the Chinese and North Korea Armed Forces in Korea with a cease-fire pending and the guerrilla caveats tied to the negotiations by both sides.⁶⁷

With UN ship patrols and aircraft operations limited to south of the 38th parallel, North Korean fast patrol craft essentially eliminated amphibious raids into North Korea by the fall of 1953. The escape and evasion nets had been crippled by UN naval blockade withdrawals. The cease-fire requirement to evacuate partisan-held offshore islands (reduced to five total on both coasts) was the death knoll for guerrilla operations.⁶⁸ For all intents and purposes, the JACK maritime mission was over in Korea.

U.S. Navy RH-5 Sikorsky helicopter effecting pilot rescue with sling and "horse collar."



Of all JACK covert operations against North Korea, those of the Maritime Section were the most successful. Which coast proved more productive is difficult to assess. While the west coast had more beaches, operations were hampered by the enormous tides (thirty-two feet) and resulting far-reaching mudflats. The west coast was home to a greater number of North Korean partisans and more islands were available to base forces and launch forays against North Korea military and country infrastructure. Human intelligence was better there as result.

East coast raids were conducted primarily by the SMG elements (trained and led by JACK personnel) and not local partisan elements. Task Force Kirkland (8240th Army Unit) partisans did raid the mainland. Many of these raids proved to have only nuisance value.⁶⁹ However, the JACK military advisors with the SMG, like those Army advisors coordinating Kirkland activities, routinely conducted joint operations—without a joint command or joint organization. CCRAK was only a U.S. Army-dominated staff organization with the services represented.⁷⁰ Amphibious operations conducted by Far East Command via 8240th Army Unit partisans and JACK maritime guerrilla operations had the highest agent return rates and most tactical successes of the covert war in Korea.⁷¹

When the Chinese entered the war, the North Korean military and local commissars gained control of the population, severely hampering infiltration of agents, successful overland escape and evasion of downed pilots, extraction of agents and downed pilots, and minimized the effects of coastal infrastructure raids. The relative stabilization of the front that followed the peace talks gave the North Koreans the opportunity to consolidate their holdings.⁷² The strength of enemy troops postured along the coast fluctuated in direct proportion to partisan strength and activity.⁷³ If a strange Korean or former resident showed up in a village, he was immediately suspect. He was either an infiltrator or a deserter and the local security police were notified.⁷⁴ Because JACK operations were regularly conducted during dark-of-the-moon periods, the North Korean military could schedule temporary shifts of force along coasts without significantly reducing those on the main line of resistance.

Because there were so many different UN elements as well as the CIA and South Korea conducting special operations in Korea, and because almost all were classified, collectively they received little fanfare. Therefore, a mysterious aura obscured actual effectiveness while serving to promote mythology and legends. Thus, during Vietnam, all U.S. Defense services and the CIA conducted covert special operations in Southeast Asia. And, as they did in Korea, various covert operations and intelligence efforts regularly bumped into one another causing jurisdiction fights and creating considerable confusion. The relevant question was who was the more confused—the enemy or the friendlies.⁷⁵

This account of maritime operations conducted by JACK during the Korean War was to present some realities, dispel a few legends, and to part the constantly shift-

ing mythological fog that surrounds special operations in Asia before the Vietnam War. The Korean War established CIA jurisdiction in Asia and provided the foundation for paramilitary activities employed by the Agency for more than twenty years.⁷⁶ Guerrilla and intelligence operations, however, become creatures of a particular war, much as they are today in Afghanistan and Iraq.

What worked in Korea might be applicable in the future, but there are no “cookie cutter” insurgent war models that will fit all wars and conflicts. The counterinsurgency plan for Afghanistan is considerably different from that being applied in Iraq. Various American counterinsurgency campaigns in the Philippines (the Spanish-American War, the Philippine Insurrection, and the Moro War) differed considerably from Filipino-American guerrilla operations against the Japanese in WWII, and the Philippine internal fight against the communist HUK insurgents in the postwar years and combating terrorist groups in the southern archipelago now. However, each analyzed in context has factors relevant to counterinsurgency operations prosecuted in conjunction with JACK successors today. ♣

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Charles H. Briscoe has been the USASOC Command Historian since 2000. He earned his PhD from the University of South Carolina and is a retired Army special operations officer. Current research interests include Army special operations during the Korean War, in El Salvador, and Colombia.

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
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Catch as Catch Can:

Special Forces and Line Crossers in the Korean War

by Steven F. Kuni and Kenneth Finlayson



THE Korean War (1950–1953) was the first combat employment of Special Forces. Sent to Korea in 1953 in the late stages of the war, Special Forces soldiers participated in two distinct unconventional warfare operations. Some of the Special Forces troops were assigned to work with the North Korean partisan units conducting raids behind the enemy lines from bases on the islands off the coast of Korea. The second mission Special Forces soldiers participated in involved the handling of agents sent behind enemy lines to gather tactical intelligence. This article will examine the role of the organization tasked with conducting the gathering of tactical intelligence, the Tactical Liaison Office (TLO), and the experiences of the Special Forces soldiers serving with the TLO.

Military operations on the Korean peninsula were the responsibility of the United States Far East Command (FEC). Established after World War II, FEC was a joint headquarters located in the Dai'ichi Building in Tokyo, Japan. Since its inception, General Douglas MacArthur commanded FEC as well as being “dual-hatted” as the commanding general of the U.S. Army Forces, Far East, (USAFFE).¹ Prior to the war, the G-2 (security) of FEC, Major General Charles A. Willoughby, established the Korea Liaison Office (KLO) to gather intelligence about North Korea.² At the start of the war, the KLO was virtually the only operational human intelligence asset in Korea. Throughout the war, the KLO provided strategic intelligence for FEC, primarily by inserting agents deep behind enemy lines.

Captain Chester Carpenter was stationed in pre-war Korea with the 671st Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) detachment. He initiated a program that inserted agents into North Korea that provided virtually the only source of information. Some of his agents reached as far north as Manchuria, where they identified the 8th Route Army, a unit of the Chinese Army composed of North Koreans

who fought alongside the Communist Chinese against the Japanese in World War II. Carpenter returned to Japan before the start of the war, but returned when hostilities commenced.³

With the start of the war, the KLO remained the primary agency for gathering intelligence at the strategic level. For the acquisition of battlefield intelligence at the tactical and operational level, the U.S. combat divisions initially depended on combat patrols and their own agent programs. Later on the TLO program augmented their efforts.

Timely and accurate intelligence of the composition and disposition of the enemy is a crucial component of conducting combat operations. During the Korean War, both sides depended on infiltrating agents to gather this information. On the United Nations' side, these “line crossers” were exclusively Korean or Chinese because a Caucasian would have no chance of keeping his identity secret. Women, often with young children or babies, proved to be very effective agents, as did older males. Young, healthy men were in danger of being forcibly conscripted into the North Korean Army if caught in the enemy rear area. Chinese and North Korean defectors in military uniform were often used as line crossers. At different times in the conflict each of these groups made effective line crossers.

The rapid movement of the armies up and down the Korean peninsula characterized the first months of the war. During this period of flux, the presence of large numbers of refugees on the battlefield permitted the insertion of agents, notably women, into the flood of displaced persons. They readily blended into the displaced population and could move with relative ease around the battlefield.⁴

Sim Yong Hae was a 16-year-old South Korean girl from Suwon. She stayed in her town and witnessed the



Post-1951 Far East Command shoulder patch



Suwon, Sim Yong Hae's hometown, in September 1950.

carnage as the Chinese attacked through it in early 1951. After the UN forces pushed the Chinese back, an American sergeant and a Korean interpreter drove through the town recruiting for the TLO. Patriotism motivated her to join as an agent.⁵

Sim and three other girls went to the U.S. 25th Infantry Division headquarters at Munsan. She joined a TLO group of thirty to forty people, most of them women. Her particular team was made up of five women and three

men. She received rudimentary training on what intelligence to gather. Sim, dressed in civilian clothes and posing as a refugee, went deep into enemy territory and remained there for an extended period.⁶ She served with the 25th Division TLO as an active agent conducting missions until the spring of 1954.

Captain Chester Carpenter was assigned to the 971st Counter Intelligence Corps detachment before the war and returned to run agents for both the 25th and 2nd Infantry divisions. With

one U.S. enlisted man, his Korean interpreter "Ramrod," and twenty-five North Korean defectors, Carpenter conducted some of the earliest line-crossing operations in the war.⁷ He moved north out of the Pusan perimeter as the

UN forces drove back the North Korean Army. Carpenter and his agents retreated south with the 2nd Infantry Division in the face of the Chinese onslaught in November of 1950. He conducted line-crossing missions until he rotated back to Japan again in June 1951.⁸

After a fast-paced twelve months of attack and retreat up and down the Korean peninsula, the battle lines hardened along the 38th Parallel in the late spring of 1951. From this point onward, refugees disappeared from front line areas and the insertion of agents through the "No-Man's Land" between the forces became more difficult. The American units turned to Chinese and North Korean "turncoats" and South Korean civilians, mostly refugees, and dressed them in military uniforms to perform the line-crossing mission.

You Duk Ki fled from Chinnamp'o, North Korea in 1950. He was recruited into the TLO and received a month of training in Taegu. He was sent initially to the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division TLO near Young-gu on the east coast.⁹ He quickly learned that crossing into enemy territory was often the easiest part of his task.

Returning to friendly lines could be the most hazardous part of the line crosser's mission. The agents would crawl up in front of the American lines, take off their enemy uniforms, put their underwear on a stick and wave it as they stood up. When the American soldiers responded, the line crossers declared themselves as TLO agents and showed the soldiers strips of cloth which were sewn inside their garments identifying them. In many cases, the American infantrymen did not know what TLO meant. Once, You Duk Ki was sent to a prisoner of war compound. He was released back to his unit after he convinced the interrogator that he was an agent of the TLO.¹⁰

You Duk Ki, by his own estimate, did nearly one hundred missions between early 1951 and the summer of 1952, working in the sectors of the U.S. 2nd and 45th Infantry Divisions. On his last mission, he was wounded in the hand by a Communist grenade during a Chinese attack. He stayed between the lines until the 2nd Division forces counter-attacked and overran his hiding place. He spent the rest of the war procuring material to make North Korean Peoples Army uniforms for use by other TLO line crossers.¹¹

In November 1951, the TLO

2nd Infantry Division shoulder patch



45th Infantry Division shoulder patch



25th Infantry Division shoulder patch






Diagram showing the relationship between TLO agents, the divisions they supported, and the presence of other partisans gathering intelligence on the battlefield. Source: Garth Stevens, Frank Bush, Robert Brewer, Jefferson Capps, and Charles Simmons, "Intelligence Information by Partisans for Armor." 2 Volumes (Fort Knox, KY: Armored Officer Advanced Course, 1952), 29.

started sending small teams of partisans to each U.S. division to act as line crossers. Advised, supported, and controlled by U.S. personnel, these partisans were sent across the lines on foot dressed either as Communist soldiers or in civilian clothes to collect tactical intelligence. Every agency involved in intelligence collection recruited agents primarily from the same source: North Koreans who had fled south or defectors from the Chinese forces. As the pool of North Korean and Chinese defectors dried up, increased use was made of South Korean civilians.¹² The mission of agent handling was one of the special operations missions that eventually involved the Special Forces soldiers.

Control of special operations was problematic throughout the war. Far East Command in Japan controlled all U.S. and UN forces on the peninsula. FEC attempted to exercise control over all special operations (including those of the Central Intelligence Agency and Korean civil and military intelligence) through the Combined Command Reconnaissance Activities-Korea (CCRAK) located in Seoul. Activated on 10 December 1951, CCRAK was a coordinating headquarters with no command authority. The organization, therefore, could do little to prevent each service—as well as agencies such as the CIA, the South Korean Government, and even individual units—from conducting unilateral and uncoordinated special operations. CCRAK's only real leverage was the apportionment of UN air and naval assets that fell under FEC control. The 8240th Army Unit, a subordinate element of CCRAK,



8240th Army Unit headquarters in Seoul, Korea.

conducted most of the Army's special operations. It was to the 8240th that most of the Special Force soldiers were assigned in 1953.¹³

On the Army Staff, the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OPCW) was the agency responsible for getting the Special Forces personnel involved in Korea. In September 1952, OPCW sent a staff element to Korea to find missions and to determine the feasibility of employing the newly formed Special Forces. Afterward, OPCW urged FEC to request Special Forces to conduct unconventional warfare missions on the peninsula. On 24 November 1952, the Department of the Army offered to send "specialized personnel" to FEC. This offer was forwarded to CCRAK, who accepted in January 1953. FEC formalized the request for sixty officers and fifteen enlisted men from Special Forces. They were to be sent directly from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to CCRAK.¹⁴

Between February and September 1953, five groups of 10th Special Forces Group soldiers—totaling ninety-nine officers and enlisted men—were sent to Korea. The Special Forces soldiers were sent over as individuals, not in operational detachments. Department of the Army orders sent them initially to Camp Stoneman, California, where



The Airborne Command shoulder patch worn by the 10th Special Forces Group in the 1950s.



Special Forces officers at the replacement depot at Camp Drake, Japan, April 1953. Left to right: First Lieutenant Sam C. Sarkesian, First Lieutenant Warren E. Parker, Captain Francis W. Dawson, Second Lieutenant Earl L. Thieme, and First Lieutenant Leo F. Siefert.

they were processed for overseas movement. Some men traveled by plane, others went by ship to the Far East.¹⁵

While a few Special Forces soldiers went directly to Korea, the majority went to Camp Drake, near Tokyo, Japan. Here they received training from the FEC G-2 section. Descriptions and opinions about the training vary among personnel who arrived at different times. Captain Charles Bushong, in the first group, attended a three-week FEC intelligence course. "It scared the bejesus out me because of all the emphasis on security."¹⁶ Master Sergeant John Kessling, in the second group, described his two-week's of training as a "gentlemen's course."¹⁷ The training programs varied in length from two to four weeks and included such subjects as escape and evasion, intelligence gathering, weapons familiarization with North Korean and Chinese small arms, demolitions, and agent handling.¹⁸ Special Forces officer Captain Reuben Mooradian remembers, "two ridiculous weeks of intelligence training and a mission planning exercise to snatch a North Korean General," (a mission that was actually in the planning stages until killed by General Matthew Ridgway).¹⁹ While at Camp Drake, the men received specific unit assignments.

Once in Korea, most of the Special Forces soldiers were assigned to the 8240th Army Unit in Seoul. The 8240th controlled, supplied, and advised partisan units operating off the Korean coast. The unit had an airborne training and aerial delivery unit (code-named AVIARY) and furnished U.S.-controlled Korean agents to American divisions as line crossers on the front lines. The majority of the Special Forces men assigned to the 8240th were sent to advise the partisan units on the offshore islands. Others served on unit staffs or with AVIARY. A few men from each group went to the TLO to run agents.²⁰

Before 1953, the agents' advisors were conventional soldiers, most with just on-the-job-training as agent handlers. As some of these early advisors from the conven-

tional army accumulated sufficient points to rotate home, Special Forces soldiers that arrived in 1953 replaced them. The assignment of Special Forces soldiers did not cause significant changes to the TLO operations. What had changed was the nature of the battlefield. Since mid-1951, the defensive lines of the opposing forces had become increasingly static. Both sides improved and hardened their positions, constructing camouflaged bunkers with stout overhead cover. The permanence of the positions allowed both sides to rotate forces off the line for periods of rest, training, and rebuilding. Forward of the main line the units emplaced barbed wire and mines. In front of this was the Combat Outpost Line (COPL), positions occupied temporarily by up to a platoon to give early warning in case of attack. Between this and the enemy's COPL, was "No-Man's Land" where patrols from both sides probed for weaknesses in the defenses and tried to capture prisoners for intelligence purposes. While the defensive positions on both sides were much more consolidated and interlocking than they were in the early phases of the war, gaps still existed where TLO agents could slip through. The job of the Special Forces handlers was to assist the TLO agents in getting through those gaps and to recover them when they returned to friendly lines.

Captain Charles Bushong was assigned to the TLO in March 1953 and worked with turncoats, Chinese soldiers

A group of North Korean Partisans who conducted line crossing operations with front line divisions. Some of these men also jumped behind enemy lines.




A black and white photograph of a mountainous landscape. In the foreground, there are several pine trees on a hillside. In the middle ground, a small, dark, rectangular structure, possibly a building or a bunker, is visible on a slope. The background shows rolling hills and mountains under a hazy sky.

convinced that the agents would “go a short way past friendly lines, hide, make up stories, and return.”²⁴ Bushong recalls that his agents did not bring back any viable intelligence and he knows of only one case in which any of the civilian TLO agents brought back valuable information. In that instance in May 1953, agents reported large numbers of Chinese forces massed in the vicinity of T-Bone Hill in front of the US 7th Division and the UN Ethiopian forces. When the Chinese attacked the Ethiopians, UN air power used this intelligence to break up the assault and killed an estimated 600 Chinese. Bushong worked with TLO from March through May 1953 and was then assigned as an advisor to the 6th Partisan Infantry Regiment on the east coast island of Cho-do.²⁵

lasting one to two months. He deployed three teams through the U.S. 7th Infantry Division lines during his time with the TLO. The length of these missions precluded the agents from returning to their entry point. As a consequence, Bushong did not see his Chinese agents if they returned. He heard of some turncoats returning successfully, but not many. He also heard of teams making it as far as Manchuria before returning. His Chinese agents were trained to stand up and yell "TLO!" to alert American soldiers that they were coming through the lines. Bushong said the turncoats were ". . . damn good . . . these guys were true heroes who did great service for us."²²



as “. . . a flat failure.”²³ These teams also consisted of three people, but instead of veteran Chinese soldiers, the agents were generally refugees from Seoul. Bushong was

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The quilted cotton uniforms worn by these captured Chinese soldiers illustrate one type of uniform supplied to the Tactical Liaison Office agents advised by Special Forces soldiers.

not employed as teams did not impact adversely on their mission.²⁶

His TLO team was initially assigned to the U.S. 7th Infantry Division. Later, the team worked for the U.S. 2nd and 40th Infantry Divisions. Kessling trained his agents on map reading, obstacle courses, and low crawling through barbed wire while under live fire. As many of the agents had prior military experience, they took to the training "pretty good."²⁷ Lacking Korean language skill, he relied on demonstrations and hand and arm signals to communicate.

When Kessling brought his teams to TLO headquarters for mission briefings, they were separated to ensure compartmentalization. Then they returned to the division sector, coordinated with the G-2 and the forward line unit, and dispatched the teams through the lines. He normally sent out multiple teams of two or three agents each. They were dressed in North Korean or Chinese uniforms and carried documents obtained from prisoners of war or enemy casualties. Kessling led his teams out through the COPL in daylight to avoid fratricide. To move his agents through the line, one American would lead, followed by the agents, with another American trailing to guard against the possibility of an armed double agent. Americans never accompanied them beyond the COPL on missions.²⁸ Having accomplished their missions, the agents would approach the American lines and yell "TLO!" to the observation/listening posts beyond the



First Lieutenant Earl F. Thieme and an enlisted team member conduct a map reconnaissance for a suitable location for a cache. The plan to hide caches for stay-behind agents proved impractical.

COPL. Kessling says he never had any casualties as they returned through friendly lines. The American unit on the line would then bring the line crossers back to Kessling. Following a debriefing with the division G-2, he transported them to Seoul for further debriefing.²⁹

Kessling continued operations after the armistice agreement was signed on 27 July 1953 and actually sent more teams through the lines after the final cease-fire. While overt hostilities had ceased, large numbers of forces still faced each other across the 38th Parallel and the need for intelligence collection remained constant. Special Forces advisors and TLO agents like Kessling and Sim Yong Hae continued to provide intelligence for the UN. Kessling dispatched about a hundred teams during his tour. When he left the TLO in March 1954, the unit was still conducting line-crossing operations.³⁰ Upon returning to the United States, Kessling was not debriefed nor was his experience incorporated into postwar Special Forces training.³¹ Other Special Forces soldiers continued with their operations after the signing of the Armistice.

First Lieutenant Earl F. Thieme worked inserting agents by air and by sea as part of the 8007th Army Unit, known as Recovery Command. When combat operations ceased, the 8007th was deactivated on 30 September 1953 and reactivated as the 8112th.³² The 8112th continued to insert agents behind the lines and worked on preparing for stay-behind operations in the event of the resumption of hostilities. The stay-behind plan called for Thieme and his team to establish caches of weapons, ammunition, radios, and food for the use of agents. As Thieme and his team soon realized, it proved impossible to dig caches undetected and the plan was abandoned.³³

Other than to validate the individual training given to Special Forces soldiers, the actions of Special Forces personnel assigned to TLO and other unconventional warfare efforts in Korea had little impact on Special Forces training. Even though a small "hot war" raged in Korea for over three years, the attentions of the nation, the Army,

and the Special Forces were focused on Europe and the Cold War with the Soviet Union. In retrospect, Bushong was critical of the TLO. “Programs ranged from magnificent with the Chinese to imbecilic with what we tried to get the Koreans to do.”³⁴ Kessling had a different opinion, “Our operation was rather simple. Not glamorous. In our little area, we did our job.”³⁵ First Lieutenant Sam Sarkesian characterized the TLO operations as, “Catch as catch can.”³⁶

The mission to gather tactical intelligence remained a constant requirement throughout the war. The changing nature of the Korean War battlefield, from a fluid war of movement to one of rigid defensive lines, changed the character of the TLO operations. The task of handling agents caused the Special Forces soldiers to be innovative and creative to accomplish their missions. Special Forces agent handlers in the last stages of the war demonstrated that they were “up to the task” and performed well in Korea. ♣

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Endnotes

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- 22 Bushong interview.
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- 24 Bushong interview.
- 25 Bushong interview.
- 26 Kessling interview.
- 27 Kessling interview.
- 28 Kessling interview.
- 29 Kessling interview.
- 30 Kessling interview.
- 31 Kessling interview.
- 32 Thieme interview.
- 33 Thieme interview.
- 34 Bushong interview.
- 35 Kessling interview.
- 36 Sarkesian interview.

Major (R) Herbert R. Brucker, DSC

Special Forces Pioneer

SOE France, OSS Burma and China, 10th SFG, SF Instructor, 77th SFG, Laos, and Vietnam

by Charles H. Briscoe

THIS photo essay introduces an early Special Forces pioneer, Herbert R. Brucker, former radioman of a three-man Special Operations Executive team that operated in France before D-Day. British special operations unlike the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Jedburgh and OG (Operational Groups) had been working behind German lines since late 1940. Technical Sergeant Four (T/4) Brucker was detailed to the SOE in England as "Herbert E-54," because he had been raised from infancy in the bilingual Alsace and Lorraine provinces of France.¹ On 26 May 1944, Second Lieutenant "Albert Brunion" (code-name "Sacha") and Second Lieutenant Roger B. Henquet jumped into France to establish the "Hermit" circuit, replacing "Prosper" that had been "rolled up" by the Germans. Their third teammate, Frenchman Henri Fucs, a surgeon recovering from a bicycle injury, joined them later. Having attributed the majority of the "Hermit" team success to "Albert Brunion," Brucker was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.²

After returning to England in September 1944, the U.S. Army second lieutenant agreed to another OSS assignment in the Far East. 1LT Brucker was first attached to

Detachment 101 in the Naga Hills of North Burma. "The weather was wet and your clothes, boots, and equipment quickly mildewed. That place was full of termites, leeches, and scorpions. Since most of Detachment 101 were with the Kachins fighting there was little for us to do with the Naga tribesmen. They shipped us to Detachment 202 in Kunming," said Brucker. "However, I did run into Major Aaron Bank in Burma. He chewed my butt for having a goatee and mustache."³

Team Auk in China was led by Major Alfred C. Rogers with Captain Leon Demers as second in command. Auk's mission was to reconnoiter the Mongolian border in anticipation of Russia's entry into the war against the Japanese. Having successfully completed that mission Demers and Brucker became Team Ibex. After training fifty Chinese warrant officers as guerrillas, they became the 4th Marauder and Brucker led them behind Japanese lines. Their eventual mission was to seize the Japanese Army records at K'ai-feng. It was a mission impossible. The Japanese controlled the city and surrounding area with two divisions (Japanese Imperial Army and a Chinese collaborator force) supported by tanks. Fortunately, the atomic bombs were dropped. That was enough to convince the Japanese to parlay with the OSS force. This mission essentially ended World War II for Brucker.⁴



Lieutenant Herbert R. Brucker and Captain Leon Demers, Team Ibex, Detachment 202, OSS China.



"Che Guevara" look alike is First Lieutenant Herbert R. Brucker leaving the OSS in China for Calcutta and his return to the States.

The "Hermit" radio section of SOE France. They were north of Vendôme. Lieutenant Brucker (in uniform) indicates that this picture was taken after D-Day.





Captain Herbert R. Brucker wearing the Airborne Command patch (10th SFG) at Fort Bragg before leaving for Germany.

After returning to the United States, 1LT Brucker was reassigned to Europe. He served three years with the Army Counter Intelligence Corps in Passau and Munich, Germany. Then, the highly decorated veteran was assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division. Captain Brucker was at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, when the North Koreans invaded the south on 25 June 1950. As the commander of Headquarters Company, 2nd Battalion, 505th Infantry he learned that Department of Army was seeking volunteers for Special Forces.⁵

Despite a war going on in Korea, it took an old OSS connection to break his application clear of the 82nd Airborne Division personnel freeze. "America's Guard of Honor" was part of the Army strategic ready force. Second Lieutenant Caesar J. Civitella, one of the early officers assigned to Special Forces, had served the OSS in an Ital-



1955 Black Forest 10th SFG left to right: Major John L. Striegel, U.S. Air Force Major Richard Grant, Gasthaus owner/agent wearing the "AB" sign (because he looked like Aaron Bank), Master Sergeant James A. Tryon, Gasthaus waitress, Captain Herbert R. Brucker, and Master Sergeant Myron A. "Mumbles" Johnson.


ian Operational Group during the war. Sent on a recruiting mission by Colonel Bank, the former 505th Airborne Infantry Regimental intelligence sergeant went to the officers club. There he met Brucker, who told him that his request was being "stonewalled." Less than two weeks later Brucker received orders from Washington.⁶

Escape and evasion course lesson plan sketches drawn by Captain Herbert R. Brucker to illustrate various aspects associated with successfully evading and escaping with assistance. These techniques came from his OSS and SOE training. Brucker conducted this course several times for NATO airmen between January 1954 and April 1957.

Contact Signals



Finding the Signal



Verification Interview



Safe House



Colonel Bank, Commander of Special Forces, Psychological Warfare School, made Brucker the acting S-2 (security), responsible for processing all Special Forces security clearances, a major job, and the chief of clandestine operations training. "Bank realized that he had a 'jewel' in Herb based on his OSS and SOE training and experience. He set up the first escape and evasion training for the U.S. Navy at Camp Mackall, 'Operation Tenderfoot I.' Instead of getting in their aircraft the 'ready alert' pilots were taken directly to a waiting transport plane and flown to Camp Mackall. It was so realistic and professional that it became part of the Special Forces qualification course," said Civitella, one of the original course instructors.⁷

When Special Forces (by 1953, it numbered over 1200 soldiers) was divided into two tactical commands—the 10th Special Forces Group for Europe (first slated for Aviano, Italy, and ultimately Bad Toelz, Germany) and the 77th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, Colonel Aaron Bank kept Brucker with him. Lieutenant Colonel Jack Shannon, the deputy commander of Special Forces, initially assumed command of the 77th Group.⁸ Thus, CPT Herbert R. Brucker became one of the Special Forces pioneers. The photos and sketches reveal his important role in early Special Forces training. Future *Veritas* articles will chronicle the contributions made to the Army SOF community by retired Special Forces Major Herbert R. Brucker, DSC. ♠

Endnotes

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- 2 Major (Retired) Herbert R. Brucker, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 27 March 2006, Fayetteville, NC, digital recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 3 Brucker interview, 27 March 2006.
- 4 Major (Retired) Herbert R. Brucker, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 20 March 2006, Fayetteville, NC, digital recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 5 Brucker interview, 27 March 2006.
- 6 Major (Retired) Herbert R. Brucker, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 14 November 2005, Fayetteville, NC, digital recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Major (Retired) Caesar J. Civitella, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe and Dr. Kenneth Finlayson, 19 January 2001, Fort Bragg, NC, tape recording, USAJFKSWCS Archives, Fort Bragg, NC; Major (Retired) Caesar J. Civitella, telephone interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 14 April 2006, Fort Bragg, NC, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.



Captain Herbert R. Brucker with several of his Special Forces team conducting a field exercise in a German forest in 1955 (Neue Illustrierte, Cologne, Germany). Brucker had received 25 sets of U.S. Marine Corps camouflage fatigues for providing escape and evasion training to U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps pilots at Camp Mackall. Left to right: Captain Brucker, Master Sergeant Anthony Kuselka, Master Sergeant Myron "Mumbles" Johnson, Sergeant First Class Clyde "Doc" Knox, and Sergeant First Class Robert Stedman.



Captain Herbert R. Brucker applies camouflage before conducting a field exercise in a German forest in 1955 (Neue Illustrierte, Cologne, Germany).

After cutting through a barbed-wire fence Captain Brucker and his Special Forces team attack their target (Neue Illustrierte, Cologne, Germany).



Exfiltration



Task Force 160 in Operation URGENT FURY

by Kenneth Finlayson



THE first operational test of the Army's Special Operations aviation capability came in Operation URGENT FURY, the 1983 rescue of American students on the Caribbean island of Grenada. Formed in the aftermath of the failed 1980 Iranian hostage rescue, Task Force 160 was the result of the Army's quest to build an aviation unit specifically designed to support special operations. The 101st Airborne Division provided the elements that composed the organization. Originally called Task Force 158 when formed in 1981, the unit was later designated by the Army as the 160th Aviation Battalion and eventually grew to become the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, the Night Stalkers.¹ Companies C and D of the 158th Aviation Battalion of the 101st Aviation Brigade

provided the Army's newest helicopters, the UH-60 Black Hawk. OH-6A Cayuse (referred to as Little Birds in the 160th) came from the 229th Attack Helicopter Battalion and medium lift CH-47 Chinooks came from the 159th Assault Support Helicopter Battalion. All units were headquartered at Fort Campbell, Kentucky.² Events in the Caribbean initiated the first combat test of TF 160. In less than ninety-six hours, the Task Force would alert, deploy, and conduct combat operations in a hostile environment.

Located 100 miles north of Venezuela, Grenada is the most southerly of the Caribbean island chain known as the Lesser Antilles. Roughly twice the size of the Washington DC metropolitan area (131 square miles), Grenada is a densely populated island with nearly 90,000 inhabitants.³ It was part of the British Commonwealth, with the Queen represented by a Governor-General. Enrolled in the St. George's University Medical School on the island were over 600 Americans. The American student population was largely composed of individuals who had not gained entrance into medical schools in the United States and were trying to improve their chances.⁴ Their presence was a significant factor when political unrest rocked the island.

On 19 October 1983, a coup led by General Hudson Austin overthrew the government of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop. The People's Revolutionary Army (PRA) replaced Bishop's Marxist government with a more virulent Marxist regime. The PRA executed Bishop and a number of his top political allies. Austin and a sixteen member Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) swiftly took control of the country. Monitoring the situation on the island, the United States intelligence community was aware of a large number of Cuban military on the island. They were engineers primarily engaged in the construction of a 10,000-foot concrete runway capable of handling heavy military planes. The runway represented an opportunity for the Soviet Union to extend the range of their Tupolev "Bear" reconnaissance aircraft into South America. This upgrade of the island's landing facilities, coupled with

Map of Grenada.





Map of Caribbean region showing the flight routes of the C-5s carrying the UH-60s into Barbados and of the C-130s that carried the Little Birds into Grenada.

the uncertainty over the safety of the American medical students on the island, was sufficient for President Ronald Reagan to authorize the use of military force in a non-combatant evacuation operation.

When alerted in the middle of the night on 21 October, Chief Warrant Officer Dave Bramel and the other Task Force 160 UH-60 Black Hawk pilots and crewmembers initially believed that this was another exercise. The crews loaded the nine Black Hawks on the C-5 aircraft at Fort Campbell for transport to Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, and then on to the staging area on Barbados. It quickly became clear to all that this was not a routine exercise. Other elements of the Task Force were also on recall.

On 22 October at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, instructor pilot Chief Warrant Officer 2 Jim Dietderich was flying an MH-6 with student pilot Warrant Officer Mike Gwinn in the Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course when they were notified to return immediately to Fort Campbell. On the plane flying back, Dietderich noticed the news headlines about the bombing of the

Marine barracks in Lebanon and assumed that this was where they were headed. The two MH-6 Little Bird pilots grabbed their personal equipment at Fort Campbell and caught a flight the next morning to Fort Bragg, North Carolina.⁵ There they linked up with the other elements of the Task Force.

"When we got to Fort Bragg, there was a distinct sense of urgency," David Bramel recalled.⁶ Bramel and the other pilots went into the mission briefing. "The G-2 (security) guy giving us the intelligence briefing told us that there were 'no more than six Cubans on the island. You guys will have the people waving at you as you come on shore.' The mission was to kick the Cubans off Point Salines Airfield. There was no mention of medical students."⁷

The lack of potential opposition was accentuated when Bramel and the other pilots were issued .38 caliber pistols as side arms. "The guy issuing the weapons gave me six rounds and told me I needed to return them after the mission as it [the ammunition] was all from a single lot and accountable."⁸ On the UH-60s, two pintle-mounted M60 machine guns manned by the aircraft crew chiefs provided the protection for the aircraft. After the mission briefing, the pilots went back to the flight line where they linked up with the special operations troops that would ride in on the helicopters. "Before we left, we all got down and drew some sketches in the dirt to get a basic idea of how we were going to execute this thing," Bramel thought to himself that it "was just like when I was in Vietnam."⁹

At Pope Air Force Base, the nine UH-60's were on the C-5 aircraft of the 436th Military Airlift Wing that picked them up at Fort Campbell for the flight to their destination on the island of Barbados. At the same time, two AH-6 and six MH-6 Little Birds were loading on four C-130s.¹⁰ The C-130s were to fly directly into Point Salines Airfield on the heels of the Ranger parachute assault. The Rangers who would ride the MH-6's loaded onto the



The mission of the MH-6 Little Bird was to insert combat troops on missions requiring speed and precision.




The Little Birds were flown directly to Grenada aboard the Air Force's workhorse C-130 Hercules.

The C-5 was the largest transport in the Air Force inventory. This aircraft carried the Black Hawks to Barbados.



The powerful UH-60 Black Hawk was relatively new in the Army inventory. URGENT FURY was to prove the toughness of this versatile aircraft.





Map St. George's and surrounding area.

aircraft with the Little Bird crews. All the C-5s with the Black Hawks were airborne by 2000 hours on 24 October, less than forty-eight hours after being alerted. The C-130s with the Little Birds followed in the early morning hours of the 25th, headed directly to Point Salines.¹¹

Task Force 160 had three primary objectives in the invasion of the island. The UH-60 aircraft were to insert special operations forces at Richmond Hill Prison; at the Governor's mansion to rescue Sir Paul Scoon, the Governor-General; and at the island's radio and television broadcasting station at Beausejour. The MH-6s would insert the Rangers at secondary targets in the city of St. George's. The original mission called for the insertions to occur at 0100 on the 25th, five hours after leaving Pope Air Force Base, to take full advantage of the darkness and TF 160 pilot expertise in flying with night vision goggles. Delays with the Air Force aircraft, chaotic pre-mission planning, and inter-service staff inefficiencies caused the time schedule to unravel. The three C-5s landed on Barbados between 0250 and 0330 and despite an all-out effort by TF 160 to get the UH-60s built-up and ready to go, the helicopters did not depart until 0530, as daylight was spreading over Barbados.¹² By the time the helicopters lifted off on the 45-minute flight to Grenada, the invasion by conventional forces was underway; the special operations forces would not catch the enemy by surprise.

As the aircraft raced toward Grenada, the pilots tuned in to the local radio station where, to their dismay, they heard the announcer telling the local populace to get their weapons and shoot down the American helicopters that were approaching.¹³ Despite a prohibition against test firing the weapons on the run in to the targets, the



Richmond Hill Prison. The Black Hawks sustained considerable damage from the intense fire when they tried to insert troops at the prison.

pilots immediately had their crews fire their M60s in preparation. They discovered that the ammunition for the machine guns was regular link instead of the required mini-gun ammunition, which caused the weapons to jam.¹⁴ As the nine aircraft neared the island, five Black Hawks headed for Richmond Hill Prison initially followed by the two aircraft assigned to carry troops to the Governor's mansion. These two then broke off short of the prison and headed for the Governor's mansion. The remaining two Black Hawks headed toward the radio station as the flight came onto the island.

Richmond Hill Prison represented a formidable target. Perched on a high ridge that ran like a spine north and south a kilometer above the capital city of St. George's, the prison boasted walls twenty feet high, topped with barbed wire and watchtowers. There were no landing zones on the narrow, twisting ridge and the intent was to insert the special operations troops using the fast roping technique pioneered by TF 160. The intelligence report was that the prison was serving as the headquarters for General Austen's RMC and likely to be well guarded. To make matters worse, 500 meters to the east and 150 meters above the prison loomed Fort Frederick, headquarters for the People's Revolutionary Army.¹⁵ The positioning of the two compounds caused the helicopters to fly through a gauntlet of fire. As the flight of Black Hawks in trail rounded a large hill and began their approach, they came under withering fire from troops in and around the prison. All helicopters sustained damage with virtually every crewmember being wounded.

"They were ready for us," Bramel recounted. "We stabilized to fast rope, but never did execute. I looked down to my right and there was a Cuban guard with an AK-47 and he was just ripping my aircraft apart. . . . We were there for about five seconds, maybe ten seconds, and I said 'Don't go, don't go.' We went back around and, I'm not sure if we got this from the ground commander, but we went back in. They had more people waiting for us this time. We went back to the same spot and the same guard is there hammering my aircraft."¹⁶ Bramel took a round in the leg that knocked his foot from the pedal. Major Larry Sloan, the company commander, was in

the jump seat and was hit in the back by a round that would have caught Bramel in the head. One of the special operators leaned out of the doorway and shot the Cuban guard.¹⁷ The Black Hawk pilots frantically cleared the area without discharging any passengers.

Bramel recalls, "The fire was unbelievable. I made a call over the radio and said 'I'm gone' and out I went." The Black Hawk flown by Chief Warrant Officer Paul Price and Captain Keith Lucas headed away from the prison at the same time. Bramel remembers his exit from the scene, "I must have passed low and quick by the ADA site [on Fort Frederick] and they didn't see me. They picked up Price's aircraft. I could see dirt coming off the aircraft from all the rounds hitting it. It just inverted and went into the trees."¹⁸

Captain Keith Lucas aboard the downed aircraft was killed by gunfire on the run past Fort Frederick. Three other soldiers were killed when the aircraft crashed on Amber Belair Hill. The rest of the passengers and crew struggled under heavy enemy fire to get away from the aircraft. Navy helicopters later evacuated them after the Rangers and more special operations personnel came in

to secure the crash site. Lucas proved to be the only fatality suffered by TF 160 during URGENT FURY.¹⁹

The other four aircraft repulsed from the prison headed out to sea full of wounded. When safely offshore, the pilots spotted a Navy warship, the USS *Guam* and the flight headed for it. The helicopters circled the ship and Bramel landed his Black Hawk on the deck despite the frantic attempts by the vessels' crew to

wave off the helicopter. "I landed and the 'air boss' came storming over ready to tear a piece off of me and these wounded guys just came falling out. With that they got the medical teams involved and each aircraft landed in



UH-60s land along Point Salines Airfield.

turn."²⁰ The helicopters, at this point barely airworthy, headed back to Point Salines Airfield. They were too badly damaged to make the flight back to Barbados.

Point Salines had not been secured at the time the Black Hawks arrived. The pilots parked their aircraft on the left side of the airfield by a sand berm and shut down. The helicopters immediately attracted small arms fire, and Bramel and the other aircrews did what they could to take a defensive posture. "We took our M60s and deployed them and, of course, I had my .38 with six rounds. About that time I looked up and here comes this big formation of C-141s carrying the Rangers in for the drop on the airfield."²¹ With the Rangers on the ground controlling the airfield, the flight of four Black Hawks from the mission at Richmond Hill Prison remained on the airfield. The other TF 160 Black Hawks fared somewhat better with their missions.

Sir Paul Scoon, the Governor-General of Grenada, and his wife and staff were awakened early on the morning of the 25th by the sound of approaching helicopters and the rattle of small arms and air defense artillery fire. Two helicopters of TF 160 arrived overhead carrying special operations troops. On the first attempt to fast rope the troops on to the mansion grounds, intense fire forced the pilots to abort and return to the carrier USS *Guam* and off load a number of wounded.

They then made a second attempt; twenty-two special operators successfully fast roped onto the grounds of the mansion and secured the building and the Governor-General. The plan called for the team to await the arrival of ground forces later in the day rather than try to evacuate the Scoon party by helicopter.²² The ground team soon


found itself in a pitched battle with the PRA who moved an armored personnel carrier up to the gates of the mansion grounds. An AC-130 Spectre gunship arrived on station to even the odds and hold the attackers at bay. As with the special operations forces on the ground, the AC-130 was operating in daylight due to the late start of the operation. The special operators held on through the night and were relieved the next day. The two Black Hawks returned to Point Salines Airfield. Things did not go so well for the team inserted to seize the radio transmitter.

The remaining two Black Hawks of the task force carried special operators whose mission was to land and secure



The USS Guam was the flagship of the invasion fleet.

Point Salines Airfield with sketch indicating line-up of TF 160 helicopters.





The AC-130 Spectre gunship provided tremendous firepower in support of the ground troops on the island.

the Beausejour radio and TV station. The pilots had no difficulty identifying the target that was set a few hundred meters up from the beach. The troops exited the aircraft and dashed in to secure the building. Holding the building proved difficult. The team encountered heavy resistance throughout the day, and eventually was driven off the site by an armored personnel carrier. They abandoned the transmitter building and worked their way down to the beach, where after dark they swam back to the destroyer USS *Caron*.²³ The two Black Hawks returned to Point Salines and remained with the other six on the island as night fell.

At the airfield, the Rangers methodically expanded their holdings and steadily pushed the PRA back. The Black Hawks waited out the rest of the night at Point Salines. The next day they were joined by the Little Birds, the other task force element heretofore not engaged.



The AH-6 is the attack version of the Little Bird and can be configured with a variety of weapons systems.

On the 25th of October, two AH-6 and six MH-6 Little Birds were unloaded from the four C-130s at Point Salines near the Air Terminal. Prior training sessions with the Rangers on build-up procedures paid off as the Little Birds were quickly made combat ready. The Black Hawk pilots warned their Little Bird counterparts of the hostile environment over the city. The Little Birds' first mission

was short-lived. As the two AH-6 aircraft crested the hills above Point Salines and headed out over the bay, they encountered intense fire and quickly returned to the airfield. Fully alert, they used a different approach route and subsequently provided very effective suppressive fires during the recovery of the men and equipment from the downed Black Hawk on Amber Belair Hill.²⁴ The volume of fire encountered by the AH-6's over the city caused the Ranger insertion mission by MH-6's to be cancelled.

Chief Warrant Officer 2 Dietderich and the MH-6 teams displaced from the airfield apron where they had off-loaded, and moved their helicopters and the Rang-



The C-130s landed on Point Salines Airfield and the Little Birds were unloaded.

ers to a more protected position in a draw at the far end of the airstrip. One MH-6 was damaged in the maneuver when the tail rotor hit on the uneven ground. With their pre-planned mission scrubbed, the MH-6 Little Birds remained on the airfield as the Rangers and then the newly arrived troops of the 82nd Airborne Division expanded the perimeter around Point Salines.²⁵ Two of the AH-6 crew chiefs, Sergeant Steven R. Nelson and Sergeant David L. Godsey, hot-wired a bulldozer on the airfield and built a berm to store the AH-6 ammunition.²⁶ The Little Birds remained in place until the next day when they assisted the medical personnel of the 82nd by evacuating wounded from the airstrip.

On the morning of 26 October, the second day of operations, the MH-6 pilots responded to the 82nd's request for evacuation of several wounded soldiers. The pilots loaded up the wounded and flew them out to the USS *Guam*. "The *Guam* was supposed to be our support ship, but we didn't know where it was and we did not have the proper frequencies to talk to the Navy," recalled Jim Dietderich. "Once the *Guam* moved in and we could see it, we flew out there and off-loaded the wounded. We hadn't trained on the protocols for landing on a carrier and to me it looked like a long floating runway, so I came in from the rear and just set down in the middle of the deck."²⁷ The five MH-6s made three round-trips before they were pulled off the mission to reload their helicopters aboard two C-141s for a flight back to the United States.²⁸ The UH-60s also received the word that they were return to Barbados.

In the afternoon of 26 October, the Black Hawk pilots were told to fly back to Barbados that night. Five of the aircraft were badly damaged and required extensive repairs. They did receive one replacement rotor blade via a C-130 to replace one severely damaged over the prison. By parking a hot-wired steamroller alongside the aircraft, they were able to get the blade installed that afternoon.²⁹ Despite the battle damage to the helicopters and low fuel levels, particularly in Bramel and Chief Warrant Officer 4 Marc Moller's aircraft, the flight of eight Black Hawks left that night for Barbados. Unescorted by safety aircraft, the flight had no self-recovery capability. With damaged instrumentation and little in the way of functioning navigation systems, the flight followed a rough azimuth until they saw the glow of the lights of Barbados. Bramel's aircraft crossed over the shore on the verge of running out



Chief Warrant Officer 4 James Dietderich and Warrant Officer Mike Gwinn made three round trips to the USS Guam ferrying wounded out to the ship. Jim Dietderich is employed as the USASOC Safety Officer.

of fuel. He quickly looked for a suitable landing spot. As the aircraft came to a hover, one engine flamed out, and as the helicopter settled down, the second engine died.³⁰ Later, they loaded the aircraft on C-5s and returned to Fort Campbell.

For Task Force 160, Operation URGENT FURY validated the training programs that produced the most experienced professional pilots and crews to survive in the hostile environment over Grenada. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry H. Shelton, described the Night Stalkers: "Throughout the short history of the 160th, its aviators have pioneered night flight tactics and techniques, led the development of new equipment and procedures, met the call to duty wherever it sounded, and earned a reputation for excellence and valor that is second to none."³¹ ♠

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160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment Distinctive Unit Insignia

Lieutenant General William P. Yarborough

by Kenneth Finlayson

WHEN Lieutenant General William P. Yarborough passed away on 6 December 2005, he left a remarkable legacy of innovation, creative intellectual energy, and professional accomplishment. In a career that spanned thirty-seven years of service to the Army, and more as a civilian consultant and lecturer, LTG Yarborough made an indelible mark in the airborne, psychological warfare, and special operations arenas. The visible signs of his impact on the Army special operations forces community—the Green Beret, the Yarborough Knife, and the Parachutist Badge—are the physical manifestations of a career made noteworthy by his insatiable pursuit of improved doctrines and equipment for the soldiers with whom he served. As described by Brigadier General John Mulholland, Commanding General of United States Army Special Forces Command, “He was one of our titans.”¹

LTG Yarborough graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1936. Among his classmates were William Westmoreland, Creighton Abrams, and Benjamin O. Davis. His first assignment was in the Philippines where he served with

the 57th Infantry, Philippine Scouts. In 1940, he returned to the United States to Fort Benning, Georgia, where he joined the 501st Parachute Infantry as a company commander and test officer in the fledgling Provisional Parachute Group.²

Shortly thereafter, while awaiting his Russian visa to be assigned as a military attaché in Moscow, he received orders to report to England as the airborne planner on the staff of Major General Mark Clark. The staff was engaged in planning Operation TORCH, the Allied invasion of North Africa. Yarborough later recalled, “I was picked by General Mark Clark to become part of the London Planning Group to address airborne operations.” In the early years of the war, Yarborough was one of the few officers with sufficient background in airborne operations and Clark intended to conduct an airborne “insertion” as part of the invasion. “I suppose because I was extremely enthusiastic about airborne operations, and maybe having been one of the early officers in this activity, he felt I was qualified to do this.”³

Joining Clark’s staff at #1 Cumberland Place, London, in July 1942, Yarborough was caught up in the feverish planning for the invasion. The first U.S. combat parachute assaults ultimately proved to be some of the longest and the most complex airborne operations of the entire war. Operation TORCH called for the Parachute Task Force led by Colonel William C. Bentley Jr., Army Air Corps, to fly 1,500 miles at night from England across Spain and the Mediterranean Sea to airdrop on the airfields of Tafaraoui

Major General William P. Yarborough models the first version of the Army’s jungle fatigues.



57th Infantry
Distinctive Unit
Insignia



Operation Torch included two parachute jumps around Oran, Algeria.

and La Senia near Oran, Algeria. Major Yarborough was to be the “eyes” of MG Clark and accompany the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Edson D. Raff.⁴

It was during the pre-invasion training and the chaotic operations in Algeria that Yarborough formed his strong opinions about the role of airborne and Ranger forces. These opinions became part of his core philosophy and he applied them in his later assignments. “Paratrooper is a frame of mind . . . Being surrounded by the enemy doesn’t in the least mean that the game is up.”⁵

He saw the distinct roles of the Rangers, the airborne, and what would eventually become Special Forces in the operations behind the lines:

When we first began the parachute units, when we had the 501st Parachute Battalion, we considered that more in the line of a combination of Ranger–Special Forces than we did straight-leg infantry arriving by air. The philosophy we built into those outfits was that wherever you land, you are liable to land in the wrong place. It’s a coin flip. You are to do the kind of damage to the enemy that you are trained to do and don’t let it worry you that you may end up in two’s and three’s or a half a dozen.⁶

MG Clark next sent Yarborough back to the United States, ostensibly to command a battalion in the 101st Airborne Division. Major General Matthew B. Ridgway, the commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, rather summarily diverted him to Fort Bragg, North Carolina. In retrospect, Yarborough felt his experience in airborne operations was being ignored by the planners of the 82nd. As a result, he deployed to Tunisia for the airborne assault into Sicily with a significant chip on his shoulder. “I was sort of a young man’s prima donna, felt kind of dumped on, and my feelings were hurt . . . I was assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 504th, which I commanded and went back overseas with the 504th. [COL] Reuben Tucker was the Regimental Commander and he had been an old friend

of mine, but I was so intractable and so impossible that even Reuben Tucker felt that he had a burr under his saddle.”⁷

During the operations in Sicily, Yarborough ran afoul of MG Ridgway on several occasions. His actions and attitude caused him to be relieved by Ridgway. When his unit reached Palermo, he was told to report to the commanding general. Ridgway told him, “Your services are no longer required. You’re a pain in the a—, excuse me, but you go back to Mark Clark and tell him that he should find another job for you.”⁸ In retrospect, Yarborough said, “I had paid the price for my high-spirited stupidity. Challenging authority in [that] way . . . no outfit can work on that basis . . . It was with me, not Ridgway or Tucker.”⁹

Eventually Yarborough was given command of the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion and led that unit during the fighting around the Anzio beachhead. His leadership style epitomized the “spit and polish” of the airborne and was in stark contrast to that of another elite unit commander, Colonel William O. Darby of the Rangers. “I had known Darby before and had a high regard for him. But mixing paratroopers and Rangers was like mixing oil and water. Here we went in for the traditional esprit of the soldier based on the customs of the service, even in the shell holes. Every man shaved every day no matter what. Our people looked sharp. I required it and they took pride in the parachute uniform and the badge they had. Darby’s guys looked like cutthroats. They looked like the sweepings of the bar rooms.”¹⁰

Contrasting his unit and Darby’s, Yarborough explained the differences between elite units and how



82nd Airborne Division shoulder patch



504th Parachute Infantry Regiment pocket patch



Lieutenant Colonel Yarborough and Major General Mark Clark in Italy. Clark brought Yarborough to England to be his airborne planner for Operation TORCH.

leadership approaches and specialized techniques are required to effectively lead each. "Darby and I used to sit around and talk about this phenomenon and we both agreed that one should approach leadership from two points of view when we have an extraordinary kind of a mission to perform. One was the traditional one, which I preferred, and the other was his approach which offered only blood, sweat, and tears for the right kind of guy."¹¹

With the end of war, Colonel Yarborough faced a situation entirely different from leading paratroopers in combat. His next assignment was as the Provost Marshal of the American forces in the divided city of Vienna, Austria.¹² He moved from the hot war against the German *Wehrmacht* to the Cold War against the Soviet Union. His experiences in Europe over the next decade helped to shape his perception of unconventional warfare and codify his perception of the role of Special Forces.

Post-war Austria and its capital city of Vienna were

Troops of the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion landed on 22 January at Anzio. Lieutenant Colonel Yarborough's battalion was in combat for seventy-three days at Anzio.



divided among the four Allied powers—Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States—like in Berlin. As the American Provost Marshal, COL Yarborough dealt daily with the problems of rebuilding Austria amid the turmoil of U.S. Army demobilization and the intransigence of the Soviets. Yarborough recognized from the beginning of his tour the need to have highly-qualified soldiers in the ranks of his constabulary force. These men were required to deal with the most sensitive and highly charged situations on a daily basis. Maturity and intelligence were critical for Constabulary troops.

However, soldiers of this caliber were not readily available. Yarborough recalled, "The American troops that had been in combat were pretty well behaved and pretty amenable to discipline, but when the replacements began to come in and the occupation troops began to arrive, then crimes of all kinds began to rise on the part of the Americans." In an effort to improve the quality of his force, Yarborough explained his case to the Adjutant General of the American Forces, asking that "in view of the fact that Vienna was a political sharp edge, . . . that it was essential that we send ideal representatives of the country so we wouldn't be judged on the basis of individuals who had no right to act or speak for the country." His request fell on deaf ears. "I was told in no uncertain terms, 'You take your share of the people just like everyone else!'"¹³

His experiences in post-War Vienna and a subsequent assignment in 1958 as the commander of the 66th Counter Intelligence Corps Group in Europe were instrumental in shaping Yarborough's intellectual development in

Colonel Yarborough as the Provost Marshal for the American Forces in Vienna.



509th Parachute Infantry Battalion shoulder patch





American Armed Forces
Vienna shoulder patch



U.S. Army Special War-
fare Center and School
shoulder patch

American, British, French, and Soviet Military Police
patrol in Vienna. Yarborough knew that high-quality
troops had to be assigned this sensitive mission.



the area of unconventional warfare. He read widely on guerrilla warfare and actively sought information and intelligence on insurgencies worldwide. This stood him in good stead when he arrived at Fort Bragg in 1961 to take command of the U.S. Army Special Warfare Center.

I felt that to some degree I understood the nature of the guerrilla problem. . . This was the period when there was an awakening at the highest level as to the nature of a new kind of threat, which was invading the power structure of the world. This was a kind of 'slow-burn warfare,' a kind of warfare that didn't ignite into hostility until after extensive preparation had been undertaken by irregular forces.¹⁴

Yarborough's assumption of command came during the Presidency of John F. Kennedy. This proved fortuitous for Special Forces. A man of wide-ranging intellect served a Commander-in-Chief who recognized the value of the Special Forces as an instrument of national policy. "I think it

[the guerrilla phenomenon] was understood by the President himself. My orders and instructions for the philosophy that was to form the Special Warfare Center, I always believed, came from the President of the United States."¹⁵

The late 1950s and early 1960s saw the proliferation of insurgencies around the globe. Yarborough recognized, as did Kennedy, that the communist insurgencies in Indo-China were the paradigm of "slow-burn" warfare. In describing this problem, President Kennedy said, the nation faced " . . . another type of warfare, new in its intensity, ancient in its origins—war by guerillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration instead of aggression; seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him."¹⁶

Yarborough rejected the notion that Vietnam was a conflict that the Army could deal with in the traditional manner. "I became absolutely convinced through and through that it was essential that only picked men be allowed into those arenas. . . To assume that one could cut out of the vast body of the Army, just an ordinary slice, and send it to Vietnam in an atmosphere that was designed to prey on political differences, on class struggle, on all the intangibles that characterizes Mao's way of warfare, to me was a folly."¹⁷

In his effort to restructure training at the Special Warfare Center to develop the right kind of soldier for the arena of counter-insurgency, Yarborough drew on his readings of guerrilla warfare by Mao Tse-Tung, Truong Chinh, and Vo Nguyen Giap. He also discussed these ideas with OSS Detachment 101 veteran Roger Hilsman and Air Force Brigadier General Edward Lansdale who worked with the Philippine guerrillas against the Japanese.¹⁸ He was convinced that the instrument to combat guerrilla warfare was the Special Forces soldier and he worked to spread his vision to the rest of the Army.

In 1961, a board of general officers was convened to come to the headquarters on Smoke Bomb Hill. I was to brief them on my views of Special Warfare. My end product was a plea for a new kind of vision. We needed to develop a new breed of man that could be sent out into the boondocks without supervision, who would continue to carry his nation's objectives in his mind.¹⁹

Portraying the Special Forces soldier in much the same way he did the paratrooper—as a highly-trained specialist capable of independently completing his mission—Brigadier General Yarborough began to implement his vision at the Special Warfare Center. Just as he had developed the airborne insignia and parachute uniform as a means to instill pride and esprit, he looked for equipment to provide the Special Forces soldiers a unique identity. He tried to have a Bowie Knife issued to each Special Forces soldier, but that was rejected by the Army. "I mention this because little things like this were looked upon with disdain because our Army, as far back as I can remember, has always rejected the intangible things and gone for the meat and potatoes . . . Well this same kind of philoso-



Brigadier General Yarborough briefing at the Special Warfare Center. He sought a new vision for the conduct of counterinsurgency warfare. The chart depicts the organization of the Special Warfare Center.



Illustration by Frank Allen

President John F. Kennedy's visit to Fort Bragg in October 1961 resulted in the Green Beret becoming the officially recognized headgear of Special Forces.

phy rejects the little things like the kind of intangibles that I was looking for."²⁰

His next opportunity came on 12 October 1961 when President Kennedy visited Fort Bragg for a review of the 82nd Airborne Division and Special Forces. The President's military aide, Brigadier General Theodore Clifton, was a West Point classmate and close friend of Yarborough. The two planned to present the capabilities of Special Forces in a series of floats that passed in front of the reviewing stand at McKellar's Pond.²¹ In addition, "one of the things that Clifton wanted me to put across most to the President was that these people were the 'PhD's of irregular warfare,' and that their professional cap was the green beret." The Special Forces troops reviewed by Kennedy wore green berets. "When the President went back home that evening, I got a telegram from the White House mentioning that the green beret would now be a mark of excellence among the Special Forces. So there wasn't a thing that the Army could do."²²

The United States entry into Vietnam put increasing demands on the Special Warfare Center to ramp up the number of Special Forces troops. Yarborough credited his predecessor at the Center, Colonel George M. Jones for this. "Things had been gotten into high gear by my predecessor George Jones, who incidentally is an unsung hero. Jones was a guy who did an awful lot to get Special Forces going. He sold personnel policies to the Department of the Army against their will to allow a grade structure which was out of line with anything the military had known otherwise."²³

Yarborough structured Special Forces training around his vision of their role in a world increasingly beset with insurgencies. "I didn't see the Special Forces soldier as a direct combat instrument. I saw him as a catalyst that could gather around him those that he would train and lend help to lead, to show the essence of leadership, provide staff instruction and communication skills, and all of that. What he carried in the way of a weapon was not important. As a matter of fact, I felt in some ways if the American had a superior weapon and he was out among guerrilla forces that had something else, his own credibility suffered a little."²⁴

In keeping with his philosophy that made the Special Forces soldier the interface between the local population and the Army, Yarborough put increasing emphasis on individual skills training of the detachment personnel. Most importantly, he put a premium on the training of the Special Forces medic, whom he viewed as a crucial element of team interface with indigenous forces. In describing his view of the role of the Special Forces medic, Yarborough said, "the medical man especially had to be trained to a degree that was unknown in Corpsman's channels in the military. . . . The training revolved mostly around making the individual realize there were upper limits to his skills that he was not at liberty to try to transgress. His first charge was that he should do no harm and thereafter treat within the skill level that he had."²⁵

At the end of his tour as commanding general of the

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 11, 1962


TO THE UNITED STATES ARMY:

Another military dimension -- "guerrilla warfare" -- has necessarily been added to the American profession of arms. The literal translation of guerrilla warfare -- "a little war" -- is hardly applicable to this ancient, but at the same time, modern threat. I note that the Army has several terms which describe the various facets of the current struggle: wars of subversion, covert aggression, and, in broad professional terms, special warfare or unconventional warfare.

By whatever name, this militant challenge to freedom calls for an improvement and enlargement of our own development of techniques and tactics, communications and logistics to meet this threat. The mission of our Armed Forces -- and especially the Army today -- is to master these skills and techniques and to be able to help those who have the will to help themselves.

Pure military skill is not enough. A full spectrum of military, para-military, and civil action must be blended to produce success. The enemy uses economic and political warfare, propaganda and naked military aggression in an endless combination to oppose a free choice of government, and suppress the rights of the individual by terror, by subversion and by force of arms. To win in this struggle, our officers and men must understand and combine the political, economic and civil actions with skilled military efforts in the execution of this mission.

"The green beret" is again becoming a symbol of excellence, a badge of courage, a mark of distinction in the fight for freedom. I know the United States Army will live up to its reputation for imagination, resourcefulness, and spirit as we meet this challenge.



renamed John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center, Major General Yarborough was disappointed that he was not going to Vietnam. Instead, he became the Senior United Nations representative to the Military Armistice Commission in Panmunjom, Korea.²⁶ His approach to the task of representing the United Nations when faced by the bombastic propaganda and outright lies of his North Korean counterpart, General Pak Chung Kuk, was typical Yarborough. "I felt that research was the thing and I spent all of the time between meetings delving into the back issues of the transcripts and reading the *P'yongyang Times* and listening to broadcasts from P'yongyang and trying to get a fix on the personalities of the people who were opposite me at the table."²⁷

Then forearmed with this knowledge, Yarborough turned the tables on the North Koreans on numerous occasions, calling attention to their fabrications and tangling them in the inconsistencies of Marxist doctrines. His actions caused consternation among the State Department officials in the country, but the American soldiers in Korea strongly approved of his actions and encouraged him to stay on the offensive.²⁸ One of his crowning achievements in this area came near the end of his tenure:



Illustration by Frank Allen

Brigadier General Yarborough conducting a parachute jump as the Commander of the Special Warfare School.

One of the cases where I felt that humiliation or ridicule was an effective tactic stemmed from their introduction of three spies up the Han River in a homemade submarine. The submarine ran aground on a sandbar in the Han River and our security forces succeeded in killing two and capturing one, and capturing all of the equipment. I took the equipment and the submarine, a miniature submarine,

Brigadier General Yarborough envisioned the Special Forces medic as a key member of the Special Forces team and worked to upgrade the skill levels in medical training.





Eighth U.S. Army shoulder patch



The United Nations shoulder patch worn by members of the Armistice Commission.

put a dummy in the wet suit of one of the dead infiltrators, put the North Korean flag in his hands, put him in the conning tower of the submarine and hauled the whole thing up to Panmunjom where I had it on display out in front of the meeting room, knowing full well that Pak Chung Kuk would deny the whole thing, but I had the evidence there. People were wandering around and beginning to laugh about it, even the North Korean soldiers. Well, I left this thing until the last part of the meeting, going through a lot of other materials, counteraccusations, and whatever leading up to the big punch. In doing this, I went through the history of the submarine . . . all the way up to nuclear submarines. I said, 'now this remarkable piece of North Korean ingenu-

ity shows that you people have really come a long way. If you had kept it simple like my imperialistic forebears did in the Civil and Revolutionary Wars, the thing might have made it.' Pak Chung Kuk didn't know what to make of it and finally he said, 'The next time you come in here, somebody's going to come in with you in a white coat. Obviously, you are off your rocker.' And then when we went outside to see the submarine there, his embarrassment was very great indeed.²⁹

After his Korean tour, General Yarborough was assigned to the Army General Staff in November 1966 as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations with Army special operations as his responsibility. Next he became the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, and in July 1968, returned to Korea and to command I Corps. He worked diligently to improve the defense fortifications of the UN forces and elevated the morale and esprit of the troops in his command. He ended a distinguished military career as the Deputy Commander in Chief and Chief of Staff of United States Army Pacific Command. He retired on 31 July 1971 and returned to the Fort Bragg area to live in Pinehurst, North Carolina.

In retirement, he wrote on a variety of military topics and became a consultant to a number of government boards and organizations. He detailed his experiences in early World War II in his book, *Bail Out over North Africa: America's First Combat Parachute Missions 1942*. He wrote the sections on Low Intensity Conflict and Unconventional Warfare for the *International Military and Defense Encyclopedia*. Yarborough was a regular contributor to *Special Warfare* magazine and other publications well into his eighties.³⁰



The North Korean mini-sub at Panmunjom. Note the man in the wetsuit in the conning tower.

LTG Yarborough held true to his core beliefs concerning leadership and the role of special operations. Always a proponent of those measures that generated esprit and enhanced morale, he wrote and spoke widely on the ethical, moral, and professional commitment required of Army service. When contacted in retirement by General Richard Stilwell for his thoughts on the Army's proposed Regimental System, Yarborough responded: "The U.S. Army's enormous computer-based capacity to cope with the nuts and bolts of personnel, supply, and logistics is not in question. On the other hand, the Army has failed to recognize, nurture, honor, and safeguard those innumerable intangibles which have meant even more than pay to generations of soldiers."³¹

LTG Yarborough was recognized for his life-long dedication to the Army and Special Operations in 2000 when he received the Bull Simons Award from the United States Special Operations Command. Today's graduates of the Special Forces Qualification Course each receive a fighting knife fittingly called the Yarborough Knife in recognition of his contributions to the command. General Bryan D. Brown, Commanding General of United States Special Operations Command, noted, "He worked diligently to increase the professional and academic standards of the JFK School, resulting in the development of courses that are still relevant today. His foresight was instrumental in the success of today's spe-



I Corps shoulder patch



U.S. Army Pacific Command shoulder patch


cial operations soldiers.³² Truly a thinking man's soldier, LTG William P. Yarborough was one of the renowned figures of the special operations community. ♠



The serial numbered Yarborough Knife that is awarded to each graduate of the Special Forces Qualification Course.

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- 28 Yarborough, interview, 23 April 1975, 10.
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Special commemorative poster created by Earl J. Moniz of the USASOC History Office.

Amputee Soccer and Prosthetics:

El Salvador Scores National PSYOP Victory

by Charles H. Briscoe



HELPING the government end the eleven-year war in El Salvador was the major COIN (counterinsurgency) success story for Army special operations forces after Vietnam. Congress imposed severe limitations (“55 Man Rule”) on the training efforts of U.S. Military Group–El Salvador, and the American role was not a popular one. The fast-growing, around-the-clock news agencies focused U.S. national attention on the negative aspects in their eagerness to win audiences and gain commercial advantage. El Salvador, a developing nation, was the smallest country in Central America with the largest population.

Its neighbor Nicaragua had fallen to Sandinistas in 1979, and was being supported by Cuba and the Soviet Union. In the 1980s, COIN was considered a “bad word” because the Army leadership in Washington was trying to bury Vietnam. Thus, lukewarm would be a polite description of how the ARSOF mission in El Salvador was accepted and supported by the Fort Bragg commanders during the war. However, all the negatives became the impetus to challenge special operations majors and below to insure that the American military contribution enabled the government to survive in El Salvador. The following article explains how the results of the war had positive impacts on veterans and civilians that could not be refuted by rebellious FMLN (*Farabundo Marti National Liberation Movement*) because they had perpetrated the damages.

The *Veritas* 2:1 article, “*Los Artefactos Explosivos Improvisados*: Spanish for IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices),” discussed field expedient explosives and mines that were employed by the FMLN during the eleven-year war in El Salvador. Loss of limb casualties, Salvadoran military and civilian, from mines called *quita patas* (foot poppers) and IEDs numbered nearly 10,000 in 1990. In 2003, Colombia had the third largest number of mine victims in the world (Afghanistan and Cambodia were first and second respectively). While land mine use in other countries has dropped significantly, more IEDs and mines are being used now in Colombia than ever before. In the first

three months of 2005, one of every three soldiers killed in Colombia was a mine or IED victim.¹

The purpose of this article is to explain how U.S. Military Group–El Salvador (MILGP-ES), Army “trainers” (military and civilian), and the Salvadoran military dealt with loss-of-limb casualties at all levels and to show the impact that rehabilitation programs had afterward. The Salvadoran military ranks were filled by one-year national service conscripts from poor rural areas (*campesinos*) who were barely literate. “Home away from home” during national service was the regional military barracks (*cuarteles*). Most ambulatory battlefield casualties were returned to their *cuarteles* after hospital treatment to live until the end of their national service. Only the capital city, San Salvador, had hospitals during the war; space was reserved for initial recuperation from surgery and multiple amputees. Veterans missing a leg came back to their *cuarteles* on homemade crutches to await construction of prostheses.

Tactical commanders faced dilemmas: the armless and legless veterans continued to be carried on the rolls negating replacements; combat requirements never subsided during the war; the limbless veterans’ presence was bad for morale because they represented



El Salvador national seal



Unofficial U.S. Military Group–El Salvador scroll patch

the physical price of war; no medical specialists were in the provincial *cuarteles* to promote physical therapy; and the limbless, unable to contribute much to the mission, suffered serious morale problems while languishing about the *cuarteles*. The primary focus of Salvadoran commanders was fighting the war. Working the issue of the amputees fell by default to the American trainers and the USMILGP staff. The assigned medical service corps staff officer, Army Lieutenant Colonel Fred A. Thill, coordinated orthopedic surgery assistance and follow-on long-term prosthesis help with the Army Surgeon General, Walter Reed Army General Hospital in Washington DC, and Brooke Army Medical Center in San Antonio, Texas.

Specifically, Thill was arranging two-week TDY (temporary duty) rotations of orthopedic and emergency medical personnel to El Salvador. The sheer volume and variety of limb injuries caused by battle provided a ready-made advanced trauma learning center for orthopedic doctors. This opportunity had not been available to U.S. Army physicians since the Vietnam War. During one of these trips, Thill came across a possible solution to fill the four-six months gap between orthopedic surgery and the construction of a prosthetic.

An Associated Press (AP) article in the San Francisco *Examiner* covering an amputee soccer league organized in Seattle, Washington, got the proverbial “ball rolling” for a different *fútbol* in El Salvador. Lieutenant Colonel

Leonard I. Cancio, an occupational therapist on a medical mobile training team (MTT) assigned to work with the amputees at the military hospital, felt that the opportunity to play the national sport of El Salvador could motivate the veterans, restore lost dexterity, strengthen upper bodies, and help these young war victims (mostly fifteen to nineteen year olds) regain confidence in themselves and their future by “doing something meaningful and fun.”² In early 1986, Cancio wrote a letter to Bill Barry, the Seattle league organizer and coach, to obtain the rules.

Barry—an inter-collegiate soccer champion and, captain of the premier state league team for

founded Amputee Soccer International.⁴ The USMILGP in El Salvador had discovered a goldmine in Barry. Now, Thill had an all-encompassing medical program that addressed the physical and mental issues of military IED victims. But the progress in prosthetics and rehabilitation was slow until an Army civilian prostheticist from Walter Reed accompanied a medical MTT to El Salvador.

James W. Cloud from Pemberton, West Virginia, was what was needed to “kick start” the prosthesis and rehabilitation program among the veterans and medical staff in the armed forces of El Salvador. Cloud had lost both legs, the right leg above and the left leg below the knee, as a fourteen year old trying to “hop a rolling gondola car” to steal coal for his needy family. That 21 October 1953 night radically changed the life of the high school dropout. Relegated to Morris Memorial Hospital for Children in Milton, West Virginia, Cloud learned to walk on prosthetic legs as he pushed child polio victims in wheelchairs. His father’s coal miners union had paid for this first pair of legs.

However, hallways and sidewalks did not build strength and balance, both of which were needed to climb the hills to reach his house back home. And he had to climb high school stairs when he returned. Cloud said, “It takes a year for an amputee, who really works at it, to learn to walk confidently, as he had before and where he had before—on all surfaces, steps, and over all terrain.”⁵

After high school, Cloud began a four-year apprenticeship in prosthesis construction at the West Virginia Vocational Rehabilitation School. The program director, Fred Thompson, thought that he might make a good “leg” man. He then worked for several years at the J.E. Hanger Company, today’s premier prosthetic manufacturer. Within ten years of his accident, the young West Virginian was a “leg man” at Walter Reed Army Hospital, just prior to the peak of the Vietnam War with its plethora of arm and leg injuries.⁶

The Vietnam War “jump-started” Jim Cloud’s career when he became lead prostheticist on the amputee surgical-rehabilitation-recovery team at Walter Reed. He



Seattle Sounders soccer team logo



Vancouver Whitecaps soccer team logo



Medical Mobile Training Team insignia

Amputee Soccer Rules in addition to FIFA Rules

1. No one is allowed to intentionally strike or direct the ball with their crutches, or residual stump, in any way.
2. Throw-ins shall be replaced with kick-ins.
3. Goal keepers shall not be permitted to leave the Penalty Area.
4. The referee’s judgment regarding the facts of the game shall be final.
5. Games will consist of four 12-minute quarters with 2-minute quarter breaks and a 5-minute half-time break.³

eight years, and former director of operations and general manager of the Seattle *Sounders* and Vancouver *Whitecaps*—had organized Seattle’s Amputee Soccer Team and

demonstrated the value of getting the prosthetics specialist involved before, during, and after surgery. That way he knew what he had to work with from the beginning, instead of having to rely on X-rays and descriptions by the orthopedic surgeons afterward.⁷

His reputation for practical prosthetic solutions, based on his personal experiences, was why Cloud was asked to build a prosthetic leg for the president of Peru, Juan Velasco Alvarado. While the United States was deeply involved in Vietnam, Peru had accepted large military arms packages and training teams from the Soviet Union and had been sending pilots to American and Russian flight schools. However, despite the best efforts of Soviet bloc prosthetic specialists, the Peruvian president could not walk properly.

Cloud took a very direct approach. After introductions to President Velasco, the Chief of Orthopedics at Walter Reed, Colonel George I. Baker, was taken aback when Cloud hiked up his trouser legs to reveal his artificial legs. But, Baker was flabbergasted when the feisty West Virginian said, “*Por favor,*” stooped, and quite matter-of-factly pulled down the pants of the Peruvian chief executive and began to examine his stump, prosthesis, and body harness construction. When he was satisfied with his examination,

Cloud pulled up the trousers of the president, nodded, smiled, and said matter-of-factly, “Please tell the President that I can build him a top-notch leg that will allow him to walk properly instead of having to swing his leg around to the side (like “Marshal” Matt Dillon’s deputy Chester Good in the television series *Gunsmoke*).” And, Cloud succeeded . . . much to the chagrin of the East Germans, Russians, and Cubans who had failed.⁸ In 1985, he took a similar

approach with Salvadoran amputees with the help of one of his earliest Vietnam War patients, a Special Forces sergeant named Carlos Parker.

Master Sergeant Carlos Parker, 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group, Panama, and Jim Cloud had become close friends over the years. Parker had lost a leg as the



Jim Cloud in the president’s wheelchair with General Velasco Alvarado after he walked without crutches wearing his new Cloud-built leg.

South Carolina reconnaissance team leader in CCN (Command and Control North), MACV-SOG (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Special Operations Group) on 7 September 1969.⁹ It was no surprise to either that both had work to do in El Salvador. Speaking no Spanish, Cloud enlisted his friend to accompany him on his first visit to the amputee wards in the *Hospital Militar*. The Peruvian-born Parker readily agreed.¹⁰

However, it would take more than language skills to gain the attention of the Salvadoran amputees in the military hospital. Realizing that his Spanish-speaking friend Parker was being ignored by the amputees, Cloud bent over and began rolling up his trouser legs to clearly reveal his prostheses and told Parker to do the same. Then, the two “*gringos mecánicos*” reached the end of the second amputee ward, the “Pied Pipers” had an eager, interested following of amputees behind them.¹¹ The “*gringos mecánicos*” had gotten the attention of the Salvadoran veterans and Cloud knew that he could help these young men “get on with their lives.” However, medical facilities in the smallest of the Central American countries were quite limited.¹²

While the heaviest fighting occurred during the 1980s, El Salvador was then, and still is today, a developing country. It is the smallest country in Central America and has the largest population in the isthmian region. During the war El Salvador only had two major hospitals, both in the capital, San Salvador. The *Hospital Militar*, the older and smaller of the two, was originally built to house 300 patients. At the height of the war in the fall of 1989, more than 2,000 wounded soldiers were jammed into that facility; the overflow was housed in the likewise-crowded civilian hospital—the only advanced medical care facility available to the entire Salvadoran populace. Beds in the military hospital wards were jammed together with a narrow aisle down the center. It was not uncommon for two amputees to share a bed.

Recall the Civil War movie scenes of the Confederate hospitals in Richmond and Atlanta (*Cold Mountain* and



General Juan Velasco Alvarado, President of Peru, standing with Canadian arm crutches next to Jim Cloud before receiving his new prosthesis.

Photo courtesy of J. Cloud

Gone with the Wind). Then, to compound those visions, remember the early Federal Army field surgery scene in *Dances with Wolves* where amputated arms and legs, thrown out the open operating room window, formed a large, gruesome pile. Unbelievable as that might seem, that was reality at the *Hospital Militar* in San Salvador during the 1980s. “You detected the smell of blood, carnage, and death almost two blocks away,” remembered Major Cecil Bailey, former USMILGP operations officer.¹³ The hospital for the civilian public, the Rosales Hospital, was not much better. It had been described as “a deteriorated facility that owes more to the 19th century than to the 20th” by a Baltimore *Sun* reporter.¹⁴ (See sidebar for a comparison with the state-of-the-art U.S. Army amputee treatment facilities). Fellow soldiers administered emergency field medical treatment and evacuation to San Salvador was primarily by truck.

The Salvadoran infantry brigades and battalions did not have assigned doctors. Better-educated soldiers were trained by Special Forces soldiers to be emergency field medics. These men would do initial medical treatment and evacuate the wounded back to the *cuarteles*. There, the senior “medic” would triage them and telephone the nearest civilian doctor on government contract to come to the *cuarteles* as soon as possible. The vast majority of the evacuations to the *Hospital Militar* in the capital—from infantry brigades and by separate battalions—was done by ground transport.

While the El Salvador Armed Forces had a small fleet of UH-1 Huey lift and attack helicopters (about twenty) that could be used for air medical evacuations, medical evacuation was not a high priority. And, the helicopter operational ready rate rarely surpassed 70 percent. After combining all these elements, a serious shrapnel [improvised explosive device (IED)] or gunshot wound to an arm or leg incurred outside of the capital usually led to an amputation—gangrene, infection, etc. While accepted as normal by Special Forces soldiers experienced in the developing world, the situation in El Salvador was far worse than Vietnam where air medical evacuations were routine. MASH (mobile army surgical hospital) units were located in every province, Army field hospitals were centrally located, and Navy hospital ships rotated in-and-out of Cam Ranh Bay. Such was not the case in El Salvador because the American military was limited to the “fifty-five man rule” by Congress. Under that mandate, U.S. trainers had to accomplish their mission within the capabilities of the El

Salvador government. This constraint forced the Army Prosthetic Mobile Training Team to work in the crowded confines of the *Hospital Militar*.

Available space to house a prosthetic construction shop and a rehabilitation clinic was limited. Thus, the two elements were colocated in the mortuary. Because city funeral homes (*funerarias*) daily removed the war dead from the hospital, this area was available. During his initial assessment, Jim Cloud found the morgue in a dingy green building “filled with metal lathes and sledge hammers out the ‘kazoo.’ Sanitation was really bad and the pungent smell of urine dominated. Many amputees wore diapers. Bandages were sorely needed. There were a lot of gangrene cases; Band-Aid-type wounds often killed. Sanitation was not a priority. It was pitiful and put a lump in my throat the size of a softball because they had no help.”¹⁵

Still, he believed that he could do something for these men. First, the Salvadoran victims needed smaller than U.S.-standard feet for their prosthetics and simple rather than sophisticated solutions were needed. Second, surgical, prosthetic, and therapy staffs had to work together. Not all amputations had to be radical—above the elbow or knee; American orthopedic surgeons like Colonel Hudson Berry at Walter Reed could train Salvadorans to do the Symes (leaving the heel bone) and other procedures that kept joints intact. Cloud’s “down-to-earth” assessment of needs and solutions that would work in

Brooke Army Medical Center shares the mission of optimizing care for patients with limb loss with Walter Reed Army Medical Center. Lieutenant Colonel James R. Ficke at Brooke was a member of the fifteen-person Amputee Center team that operated a gait laboratory and other rehabilitation equipment. “The center, typically, has about ten outpatient clients at any one time with another ten to fifteen outpatients who are continuing their treatment. The primary mission of the Amputee Center is to get soldiers back on their feet and, in some cases, back to duty. This has been facilitated by the use of both state-of-the-art prosthetics and rehabilitation.”¹ U.S. Army amputees leave the hospital wearing at least one state-of-the-art prosthetic (\$30,000) and two spare prosthetics per limb.² Contrast this with the photo of a Salvadoran military amputee with his “state-of-the-art” prosthesis.



Salvadoran military amputee with a Tinker Toy-like prosthesis in the late 1980s.

- 1 Chris Wolski, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: Over Here: The war in Iraq is providing challenging cases for military orthopedists, both in the field and at home,” *Orthopedic Technology Review*, Vol. 6 No. 5, July/August 2004, www.orthopedictechreview.com/issues/julaug04/pg16.htm.
- 2 James W. Cloud, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 29 December 2005, Lanham, MD, digital recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

El Salvador helped LTC Thill begin networking military and civilian medical systems and recruit orthopedic specialists for humanitarian work as well as solicit prosthetic support from private companies in the United States.¹⁶

Accelerated prosthetic specialist training programs complemented the renovation of the rehabilitation center and accumulation of prosthetic tools and equipment. In lieu of a six-year apprenticeship program typical in the United States, the first six Salvadoran trainees completed an accelerated course in eighteen months. Another twelve students started training in September 1986. Among this



Photo courtesy of J. Cloud

Jim Cloud with the first graduates of the accelerated prosthetic technician course.

group were amputees. "Before, all they had to construct prosthetics was heavy plastic, pieces of pipe, or wood. The men were carving their own legs. These expedient prostheses would last maybe two or three months before they started failing. The small lab could not keep pace with the casualties making only sixty devices a month," said Thill.¹⁷ A thousand soldiers and more than six hundred civilians were still waiting for a prosthesis.

For the average Salvadoran civilian, the cost of artificial limbs (\$120–\$300) was too great and the wait too long. Daily life with its many responsibilities continued, and these people made do with crutches and homemade plaster and hand-carved wooden legs.¹⁸

In 1986, the military prosthesis workshop had only built eighteen artificial limbs. The two private factories in San Salvador were several months behind on orders for patients who could afford them according to a U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) report. USAID, working with various Salvadoran civic groups, planned to dramatically increase the funding, distribution, and fitting of "Third World Limbs"—prefabricated, adjustable, prosthetic devices developed in the United States.¹⁹ Designed by Americans, these pre-fab, artificial limbs required significant modification to fit the much smaller Salvadorans—from arm and leg lengths to hand and foot sizes. Joints not protected against water quickly eroded in the humidity and rainy seasons common to Central America.²⁰ In the midst of resolving these difficulties, LTC

Thill's second front against the amputee problem, rehabilitation and improving morale, moved from the informal recreational pastime of a few veterans into the established rehabilitation program.

With a translated version of amputee soccer rules from LTC Thill, the recreation director of the *Hospital Militar* officially "got the ball rolling." He solicited funds from the officers wives club for uniforms and soccer balls. Thill special-ordered Canadian "forearm" crutches. Fourteen soldiers with lower extremity amputations and one with an upper extremity amputation (goalie) were selected. Initially, the veterans hesitated, but once they saw that they could handle the ball, they took turns passing and dribbling. Smiles appeared and laughing began as everyone struggled to become a "player" again.²¹ And the initial volunteers quickly acquired a growing audience of other amputees. Before the Canadian crutches arrived, the young men used their own handmade wooden crutches and team practice sessions quickly escalated from an hour to as many as six hours . . . to the extent of severely bruising underarms and injuring good limbs.²² As the team's proficiency improved the spirit of competition grew. It was the Army medical MTT that challenged the Special Forces on the Operational Planning Assistance Training Team (OPATT) assigned to the ESAF 1st Brigade (*La Primera Brigada*) to field an amputee team to play against the hospital.²³ It quickly became a media event for the ESAF and hundreds of soldiers cheered their friends. The personal endorsement of the Salvadoran Minister of Defense Colonel René Emilio Ponce insured ESAF support. And, as a good friend of Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Gilberto Rivera, *Hospital Militar*, Ponce and the American ambassador, David B. Dlouhy, attended to award medals to the game winners.

The soccer match proved to be very intense. Most players were young men, seventeen to twenty years old, and the teams had developed considerable pride in their abilities. A last minute supply run provided the hospital team with forearm crutches. This gave them more mobility, but the 1st Brigade players were determined. As bodies collided and crutches were lost, one forward hopped on one leg, forcing the ball towards the goal.²⁴ Major Cecil Bailey described the competition as "a thing of awe."

Those guys could probably have held their own against non-handicapped players. The veterans were aggressive, fast, agile, and frankly—with the crutches—quite dangerous. If you could do it with a leg, they did it with crutch-



Lieutenant Colonel Fred Thill, USMILGP–EI Salvador Medical Service Corps MTT Coordinator.



ESAF 1st Brigade crest



A Salvadoran amputee soccer team captain leads the charge down-field in 1984.



José Vladimir "Rambo" Melgar Maravilla was wounded on 11 April 1986 on the Guazapa volcano during Operation FENIX.



CENPROFA Hospital Militar player smiling proudly after receiving the first victory medals awarded amputee soccer players in El Salvador.

es—which might break, but did not bleed or require healing. They showed each other no mercy on the field. The crutches were both transportation and weapons—the rules were loose. Conjure up your own image of a man with one leg and two crutches moving at a full sprint coming towards you. It was that intense.²⁵

In the end, the hospital team's star player, nicknamed "Rambo," José Vladimir Melgar Maravilla, scored the winning goal. A landmine cost Rambo his leg on Guazapa volcano on 11 April 1986 during Operation Fenix. That was two months before his twentieth birthday. Coach Bill Barry, the standard bearer for the program, described Rambo as "lightning fast, a blistering shot, who always played 'balls out,' and who probably soldiered the same way."²⁶ Though only the Hospital Militar players received medals, both teams celebrated afterwards—everyone had won. An Amputee Soccer League had been born in the midst of war-torn El Salvador.²⁷

A Betamax videotape of that first amputee soccer game in El Salvador was made. LTC Thill sent a copy to Bill Barry to thank him for the idea. The tape revealed "two things: first, it showed the U.S. Army's concern for El Salvador, and second, the Salvadoran soldiers' attempts to overcome physical handicaps." Thill's last sentence in his 21 July 1986 thank

you note to Barry said, "I hope we can someday play a match between our two countries," further energized an already enthusiastic soccer coach and teacher.²⁸

With the support of the U.S. Embassy, the ESAF Commander, and the USMILGP interest throughout the armed services, Bill Barry, as a volunteer, conducted amputee soccer clinics in *cuarteles* all over El Salvador, carrying fifteen sets of donated, used Canadian crutches in duffle bags along with a bag of soccer balls from brigade to brigade, accompanied by the CENPROFA (*El Centro de Rehabilitación de la Fuerza Armada*) personnel. Barry quickly became known as *Doctor Fútbol*. As the program escalated, morale in the brigades—soldiers and amputees—improved and the publicity spread nationwide. The Amputee Soccer program proved to be a PSYOP success story that the FMLN could not refute . . . because



Dolores "Dee" Malchow controls the ball against a Caldwell Banker player on 13 August 1983. Games against able-bodied soccer teams reminded players and observers how exciting and physically demanding the game was. Media coverage brought the sport into a more mainstream environment.

they were responsible for it. The rehabilitation effort transcended sports and politics that could not be argued against.²⁹ Still, the FMLN persisted with land mine warfare.

By April 1987, the landmine [called the "popular armament" (*armamento popular*)] campaign started by the FMLN rebels had made amputees of 2,000 Salvadorans, 25 percent civilians. "Radio Venceremos openly acknowledged responsibility for indiscriminate land mine warfare, declaring it to be an integral part of their revolutionary strategy. It works. The only problem is that a mine cannot tell the difference between a six-year-old child and an armed combatant."³⁰ Small as they were, the prosthetic and orthopedic surgery MTTs were making progress and garnering considerable outside support. But, amputee soccer had become an even greater success.

Since Bill Barry had organized Amputee Soccer International, an annual international tournament had evolved. As the Salvadoran players competed for positions on a national team with hopes of playing in the 1987 World Cup, it was Barry who organized the competition and arranged the financial support and logistics that would bring the Salvadorans to his home city, Seattle, Washington. This was the venue for the first three international




Bill Barry, "Doctor Fútbol," observes amputee soccer practice.



Salvadoran veteran amputees practice fútbol dribbling.



Salvadoran veteran amputees "shooting."



CENPROFA logo

the military prosthesis clinic, and the amputee soccer program for several years.³² Thus, in August 1987, the Salvadoran All-Star team was able to compete in the World Cup Challenge Tournament in Seattle.

The 1987 World Challenge Cup U.S.A. tournament for Amputee Soccer International took place 5–7 September 1987, Labor Day weekend. The Championship game was played at Shoreline High School Stadium on the last day. Four American teams (Seattle, Portland “Team Oregon,” “C.W. Hogs” from Idaho, and the Los Angeles “Orthomedics”) joined two Canadian (Calgary and the Vancouver “Unipeds”) groups to compete with the Salvadorans. According to Dolores “Dee” Marchow, a member of the Seattle team, “the Salvadorans were young, fast, and very smooth, determined athletes. Soccer was their national sport and all played from an early age. They were half our age, but were real gentlemen in the game.”³³ Nightly, the Salvadoran contingent was hosted by the local Salvadoran community, the Seattle Amputee Soccer Club, and

challenges.³¹ Ernesto Cano, *Consultores Seguros*, and Dr. Ernesto Borgo, TACA International Airlines, provided several free round-trip tickets, discounted tickets for the national All-Star team, funded other costs, and got insurance coverage. After a 1987 visit to El Salvador, Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh Jr. used discretionary funds to support CENPROFA,

Bill Barry.³⁴

The Salvadoran All-Stars won the 1987 World Challenge Cup tournament. The players were ecstatic. The game of soccer had restored esteem, sense of dignity, pride, self-confidence, and given purpose to their lives after being maimed by the war as young men. These Salvadoran amputee veterans had demonstrated on the playing field how much was possible.³⁵

The team’s triumph at the World Cup in Seattle spread like wildfire in El Salvador. When the Salvadoran team returned home they were met at Ilopango Airport by nearly twenty thousand people who had braved the precarious twenty-mile

drive (the FMLN dominated the countryside) from the capital to cheer the victors. The spontaneity of this gesture demonstrated that the people of El Salvador had regained hope—there was life after war.

While the Salvadoran amputee veterans would win the World Challenge Cup twice more (1988 and 1989), it was the 1987 victory that restored real hope to the casualties of the war. The publicity surrounding the Salvadoran military team victory prompted an expansion of the soccer program to include civilians, increased international interest in helping amputees in the war-torn country, and prompted a commemorative postal stamp.³⁶ Popular sports writer Carlos Guillermo “Chiqui” Fernández of *El Diario de Hoy* in San Salvador, who publicized the program’s progress from a competitive, sporting viewpoint, rather than a humanitarian activity, garnered very strong support from the public. By 1990, national teams from seven nations were fielded for the World Cup: the United States, Canada, Guatemala, Brazil, England, the Soviet Union, and El Salvador.

When the Soviet Union hosted the 1991 challenge, official American funding for Salvadoran participation could not be provided. However, President Alberto Cristiani had become a staunch supporter by then and the Salvadorans competed and placed second.³⁷ In April 1991, the ESAF capitalized on the negative PSYOP aspect of an FMLN bombing attack against 1st Brigade while it hosted the national team preparations for the World Cup in Russia.³⁸ Though soccer dominated the limelight, progress continued to be made in the local manufacture of prosthetics.

From 1986 through 1992, Jim Cloud spent two to three months a year TDY working in El Salvador. The original “tree of death” in the rehabilitation clinic courtyard on which the amputee veterans had hung their broken, worn out, and first-generation prosthetic limbs had been replaced by a massive heap of discarded hand-carved wooden crutches and makeshift canes. With classes of twelve prosthetic specialists graduating semi-annually the waiting period for artificial limbs in the *Hospital Militar* had been reduced to two months . . . the normal amputation healing time . . . and sanitary conditions had greatly improved. By then, LTC Fred Thill had rotated; his replacement, Lieutenant Colonel Teofilo Ortíz, carried on the great effort.

Fortunately for Salvadoran veterans, Jim Cloud came to believe in 1953, that his purpose in life was to help “his amputee brothers” deal with their circumstances.

A prosthesis is an acceptable necessity. Regardless of how good the technology gets, it will never be comfortable . . . it will be simply more bearable. You want to ‘kick your shoes off’ and relax, but you cannot. The time for full recovery—about ten years—is not unreasonable because it is mental and physical,” reflected Cloud. “What must be remembered is that amputee health care is continuous.



Photo courtesy of W. Barry

El Salvador wins the world championship again!!



Photo courtesy of W. Barry

The El Salvador National Team after winning the 1987 Amputee Soccer World Challenge Cup in Seattle, Washington.



World Challenge Cup logo



Photo courtesy of J. Cloud

Jim Cloud and chief Salvadoran prosthesis technician in the patio of the shop with the "tree of death" behind them to the left.

Prosthetics break down from wear, weather, and living conditions and aging affects leg and arm stumps as well as strength and balance. Even here in America, our Veterans Administration medical system lacks the capability to sustain artificial limbs. So, for countries like El Salvador, prosthetics and stump socks have to be inexpensive, readily available, and tough enough to withstand rural life in the countryside . . . much like living in the hills of West Virginia . . . not our large cities with paved streets, sidewalks, and handicap ramps everywhere.³⁹

The lasting effects were substantial in El Salvador. Disabled veteran treatment after the Salvadoran eleven-year war with the FMLN rebels was radically different than that provided to veterans after the war with Honduras in 1969. Then, disabled veterans were given a one-time severance payment like the stipend given to widows who had proof that their husbands had died in action. Prosthetic access and medical care for veterans were the same as that given all bonafide citizens. But, eleven years of war instead of the three months in 1969 had created an enormous veterans population.

The publicity accorded the amputee soccer program raised awareness at all levels. The ESAF medical department developed a scaled veterans pension plan based on disability levels, arranged occupational and vocational training for disabled veterans (much like the US Army "Project Transition"), and continued medical care.⁴⁰ These ESAF and government initiatives prompted the FMLN to add a vocational training proviso in the peace negotiations as well as a severance and disarmament stipend and the typical parcel of land.⁴¹

The humanitarian initiatives to treat IED/land mine victims in El Salvador are viable for Afghanistan, Iraq, and Colombia today. Soccer is the most popular sport in Colombia. Sports, since the end of the Cold War, are regarded as apolitical. Since the FARC in Colombia, like the FMLN in El Salvador, is responsible for employing field expedient explosives or IEDs against the Colombian armed forces and police, the collateral damage to civil-

SFC Carlos Parker

SERGEANT Major (Retired) Carlos Parker has been a Department of the Army civilian in USASOC G-8 Force Development since 1989. As the 3rd battalion, 7th SFG S-3 Operations Sergeant from 1980–1984, Parker planned the deployment of the initial Special Forces ODAs to El Salvador. While the 7th SFG S-3 Operations sergeant major, he had a major part in planning and organizing the training of the Belloso battalion at Fort Bragg, creating the Regional Military Training Center in Honduras, and the basic training center in El Salvador. After an Army National Guard artillery beginning in 1956, Parker was a border scout in the 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment in Germany, a reconnaissance platoon scout with the 3rd Battalion, 508th Infantry (Airborne) in Panama during the 1964 riots, and a communications chief in the 77th Field Artillery Battalion with the 11th Air Assault airmobile tests at Fort Benning, Georgia, before going to Vietnam with the 1st Cavalry Division. After being a drill sergeant at "Fort Lost in Woods" (Fort Leonard Wood), Parker volunteered for Special Forces in 1967.



Sergeant First Class Carlos Parker with reconnaissance team "South Carolina," CCN, MACV-SOG, in Kontum, Vietnam, before he lost his leg. To the right is Master Sergeant Carlos Parker, 7th SFG, in El Salvador.



Photos courtesy of C. Parker

ians is quite high. All government-sponsored rehabilitative programs—from orthopedic surgery to prosthetics to amputee sports to occupational transitions—that are in response to insurgent-caused casualties are non-refutable PSYOP victories for the regime in power. The sheer numbers of Colombian IED casualties support more specialized medical MTTs like those deployed to El Salvador for more than six years.

The Colombian military has begun supporting rehabilitative efforts for its amputees. On 30 September 2004, three amputee professional soldiers—Diego Mazorra, Federmán Trejos, and Edgar Cardona—summitted the peak of Nevado del Tolima (5,280 meters) in northern Colombia. Cardona had completed the New York and

Miami marathons before the mountain climb. Their accomplishment was publicized in the October/November 2004 issue of *Ejército*.⁴² Imagine how low-cost amputee soccer could benefit the Colombian veterans and people. It did for the victims of *armamento popular* during the Salvador war. Only the setting has changed. The necessity for positive national PSYOP cannot be overemphasized. ♣

This article would not have been possible without the contributions of Ms. Hilda Guerra, former Medical MTT coordinator, USMILGP–El Salvador during the war, and now a Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy, San Salvador, Mr. Bill Barry, El Salvador’s “Doctor Fútbol,” the organizer and founder of Amputee Soccer International, and Jim Cloud, certified prostheticist.

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- 2 Leonard I. Cancio, “Rambo,” in Deborah R. Labovitz, ed. *Ordinary Miracles: True Stories About Overcoming Obstacles and Surviving Catastrophes* (NY: Slack Incorporated, 2003), 307.
- 3 Amputee Soccer International 1987 World Challenge Cup U.S.A. program courtesy of Bill Barry, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 4 Bill Barry, Amputee Soccer International, telephone interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 30 June 2004, Shoreline, WA, digital recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Mrs. Dolores Marchow, telephone interview by Dr. Briscoe, 21 June 2004, Shoreline, WA, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. Mrs. Marchow had become an amputee skier and with some like-minded amputees was looking for an off-season sport. Bill Barry, who was conducting soccer trials at Mercer Island, agreed to develop rules that would insure the safety of the players without being too restrictive. That led to the formation of the Seattle Amputee Soccer Club. It was more about exercise, fun, and camaraderie than serious competition for the older Americans that formed the club. Marchow interview.
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- 36 Major Paul Mouritsen, U.S. Military Group–El Salvador, accompanied the 1987 team to Seattle. There were fourteen military amputee soccer teams in El Salvador in 1987. Unfortunately, the eligibility list kept expanding; he believed that there could be twenty-two teams by the end of the next year. Though started for the military, Mouritsen said that there could be a league just as large for civilian victims, who also walked blindly into mines with tragic frequency. Bob Sherwin, “Soldiers of Misfortune: Amputee league is special help to Salvadorans,” *Seattle Times*, 7 September 1987, Sec. B, 1.
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Logistical Support to Task Force Viking:

Task Force Support in Northern Iraq

by Kenneth Finlayson



THE responsibility for the conduct of the campaign in northern Iraq in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM belonged to the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-North (CJSOTF-N). Known as Task Force Viking, the mission of the CJSOTF was to leverage the support of the various Kurdish factions in order to disrupt the Iraqi Army arrayed along the northern political boundary known as the Green Line. In concert with the operations in the western desert and the support to the conventional

Map of Iraq depicting the political demarcation line known as the Green Line. The Green Line represents the ad hoc political boundary established between the traditional Kurdish strongholds and Saddam's Iraq in the northeastern part of the country. Since 1991, the Kurds patrolled the Green Line which corresponded to the boundaries of the provinces the Iraqi army had left at the end of the Gulf War.



forces, the mission of TF Viking was a vital aspect of the Coalition Campaign Plan.

The core of TF Viking was 10th Special Forces Group, commanded by Colonel Charles T. Cleveland. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 10th SFG, the 3rd Battalion of the 3rd SFG, and the 10th Group Support Company formed the nucleus of the task force. Other units incorporated into the task force included the Joint Special Operations Air Detachment, North composed of the Air Force's 352nd Special Operations Group; the 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry of the 10th Mountain Division; D Company of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion; the 404th Civil Affairs Battalion; Bravo Forward Support Company of the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion; B Company, 112th Special Operations Signal Battalion; and an element of the Joint Communications Support Element.

The size of the task force exceeded the capacity of the Group Support Company. COL Cleveland and his staff adopted an innovative solution to meet the vastly increased logistics requirements. They formed Task Force Support to encompass the support elements in the CJSOTF. Cleveland explained the rationale for TF Support. "We felt that we needed an 'umbrella organization' to handle the C² (command and control) functions and make stuff happen. We needed an organization to move, build, and tear things down for us.¹

In late October 2002, COL Cleveland appointed Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Hurst to be the TF Support commander. Major Gordon Barrett*, the 10th SFG Group Support Company commander, was Hurst's executive



Task Force Viking Logo

**Pseudonyms have been used for all military personnel with a rank lower than lieutenant colonel.*



Constanta Romania became the location of choice for the staging of TF Viking when Turkey was unavailable.

officer. Functionally, “we used the forward support battalion as a template,” Hurst related. “We established a support operations section, but we had difficulty filling both the CJSOTF J-4 (logistics) staff and the task force staff out of hide.”² As the personnel issues were resolved by moving personnel and adding augmentees from the Joint Manning Document, the staff focused on the single greatest unknown, the location of their final staging base for the move into Iraq.

CJSOTF-N was the supporting effort in the Coalition campaign plan for Iraq. The original plan called for TF Viking to move into northern Iraq from Turkey. When

Mikhail Kogalniceanu Airfield, Romania, location of the intermediate staging base for TF Viking.



Turkey balked at the transit of Coalition forces on 1 March 2003, the CJSOTF scrambled madly to find an alternate location for staging. Their solution was in Europe, where the 10th SFG routinely operates.

The European Command staff began to search for alternatives. Fortunately, Special Operations Command European Command had recently invested \$300,000 in an extensive survey of Constanta, Romania, to support a regional special operations forces training exercise. “We looked at a variety of locations in the region,” recalled COL Cleveland. “There had been a PDSS [pre-deployment site survey] at Constanta, Romania, and it became the choice.”³

Brigadier General Gary M. Jones, Special Operations Command European Command commander, contacted the Joint Chiefs of Staff to gain permission to approach his Romanian military contacts. When the Romanians responded positively, the European Command staff took over the negotiations. “[Romania] promised 250 percent support including force protection for U.S. forces. Constanta was a resort city on the Black Sea with plenty of empty hotels during the non-peak tourist season. The Romanian Air Force said that they would make an airfield available and arrange fuel,” remembered Jones. Since it had no forward basing site until January 2003, the 10th SFG lost its original position in the airflow queue. It was not until early February 2003 that the two Colorado-based battalions of the 10th SFG arrived in Constanta.

Mihail Kogalniceanu Airbase, near the resort town of Constanta, possessed the requisite capabilities to handle the aircraft and tonnage needed to support the task force. It created a 1,000-mile long Air Line of Communication, but choices were limited and time was rapidly slipping away. The decision to stage from Romania had repercussions up and down the logistics chain.

“We never anticipated going into Romania,” said Lieutenant Colonel Jobie Roach, the chief of plans for the J-4 of Special Operations Command, Central Command. “This meant we could not mass logistics into one area, but had to flow things in from various locations.”⁴ The uncertainty about Turkey reverberated throughout the logistics chain. “Higher headquarters were withholding forces and materials from the TPFDD [Time Phased Force Deployment Data] flow anticipating that Turkey would open up. We

The Movement Control Teams of the 528th were a key component of TF Support.



depended on the CENTCOM (Central Command) SOTSE (Special Operations Theater Support Element) to act as the ARSOF (Army special operations forces) logistics integrator with the theater components.”⁵

For TF Support, the move to Romania first meant establishing liaison with the Special Operations Theater Support Element at the main staging locations in Germany. Sergeant First Class Wilson Richmond* and Sergeant First Class Lincoln Belfair* were dispatched to Rhein Main Airbase in Frankfurt and European Command headquarters in Stuttgart, respectively. Other personnel deployed to Ramstein Air Base near Kaiserslautern. They played an increasingly important role by setting the priorities and facilitating the movement of materials forward as the campaign unfolded.⁶ The loss of the materials prepositioned months before in Turkey meant more materials had to flow through Germany en route to Romania.

Once the decision was made to stage into Iraq from Romania, the CJSOTF began the process of moving forward. In early February, B/528th Company commander Major Randall Griswold* dispatched a two-man movement control team to Fort Carson, Colorado, to assist the 10th SFG with its air movement to its intermediate staging base in Stuttgart.⁷

In the past, the 10th SFG had deployed a relatively small number of people and depended upon the installation movement control team for assistance, but the deployment of the 10th Group plus other units at Fort Carson exceeded the installation’s capabilities. First Lieutenant Carlton Howard*, a veteran of operations in Afghanistan, headed up the movement control team sent to help the 10th SFG deploy.⁸ Once the airflow was underway, Major Griswold dispatched another team to Germany to assist with the reception of the unit personnel and equipment. Stuttgart was intended to be an intermediate staging base until the political issues with Turkey were settled. Then everything would flow into the planned intermediate staging base at Diyarbakir Air Force Base, Turkey.⁹ When this did not resolve itself, Constanta became the final destination for the 10th SFG elements flowing through Stuttgart.

Bravo Forward Support Company helped set up the CJSOTF-North Operations Center at the Constanta airfield and established the power to run the myriad of lights, computers, and other electronic devices in the headquarters. The company’s mechanics worked long and hard to make sure that all the deploying vehicles were modified to carry the increased amounts of equipment, fuel, and weapons needed to operate independently in northern Iraq. As was typical for Bravo Forward Support Company soldiers, power generation expert Specialist Charles Olmstead* ended up helping prepare equipment pallets, set up heaters, and pitch tents. Olmstead noted, “I even helped some Croatian contract technicians set up the Titan system (radio frequency tagging system) used to track our pallets and containers of equipment.”¹⁰ State-side elements of TF Viking began flowing into Constanta beginning on 3 March.



The Joint Operations Center in Constanta was the nerve center for TF Viking’s forward deployment.

B Company, 112th Signal Battalion, established the primary communications support when the CJSOTF began operations in Constanta. Their TSC-85 systems went into operation to provide the satellite data downlink and switching networks that were the heart of the CJSOTF communications architecture.¹¹

More units arrived throughout the month of March to swell the ranks of the CJSOTF. The 404th Civil Affairs Battalion and A Company, 9th Psychological Operations Battalion arrived to join TF Viking in Romania. With negotiations with Turkey at an impasse, TF Viking chose a bold course to insert its elements on 21 March. This was the circuitous, two-day infiltration route that became known as the “Ugly Baby.” Nineteen Special Forces operational detachment alphas (ODAs) and four company-sized headquarters elements (ODBs) were inserted to link up with their Kurdish counterparts. An aircraft damaged during Ugly Baby caused the Turkish government to reconsider its ban on overflights and on 23 March, three MC-130s organic to the CJSOTF were granted permission to transit Turkish airspace and open the way for regular flights into northern Iraq.

With the CJSOTF now flowing directly into its operational area, TF Support was supporting from four distinct logistics nodes. The logistics chain began at Fort Carson,

The parachute insertion and resupply of the 173rd Airborne Brigade (-) tied up a significant portion of the C-17 airlift as TF Viking was getting its operations underway.





The future site of Camp Loki. The abandoned airfield soon became a thriving logistical base.

Colorado, and the task force had elements in Germany, Romania and at Bashur Airfield outside Irbil in Iraq. The demand for personnel and materials continued to increase. It was during the airflow immediately following Ugly Baby that the bulk of the Air Force aircraft for transport disappeared.

Recalcitrance hurt the insertion of TF Viking in its effort to support the Kurds, but it also eliminated staging the U.S. 4th Infantry Division from Turkey. In an effort to get the maximum number of combat soldiers on the ground in the early days of the campaign, the 173rd Airborne Brigade (-) was to parachute into Bashur Airfield. The drop occurred on 25 March, and sustaining the 173rd became a major requirement for TF Support. With eighty-nine sorties of C-17s diverted during the 96 hours of the of the 173rd's insertion, TF Viking was forced to reconfigure its loads for transport on the few MC-130s of the



Build-up of Camp Loki. At its peak, the camp supported over 5,000 special operations forces.



352nd.¹²

The six MC-130's of the 352nd Special Operations Group became the primary lifeline for TF Viking until the 26th.¹³ Once the jump was made, more C-17 aircraft became available. On the 29th, TF Support shifted twenty troops forward. Then the build-up at Bashur Airfield began in earnest.¹⁴

LTC Hurst said, "We lost a lot of aircraft when the 173rd mission came up. Sergeant First Class Wilson Richmond*, Sergeant First Class Lincoln Belfair*, and Major Curtis Layton* were physically grabbing aircraft crew chiefs to make sure our stuff got on the birds."¹⁵ Staff Sergeant Martin Dumont*, usually in charge of maintaining an ammunition dump, remembered that the airflow and the type of aircraft were constantly changing: "We would build a pallet for a C-17, and two hours later we would be told we were getting an MC-130 and we'd have to tear down the pallet and rebuild it [to fit the new aircraft]. You didn't know what bird [the equipment] was leaving on until it showed up."¹⁶

In the austere environment at Bashur, the forward elements of TF Support established Camp Loki (named for the mischievous Norse God) which ultimately supported over 5,000 Coalition forces of CJSOTF-N, who in turn were advising and assisting over 60,000 Kurds.¹⁷ Major Miles Carswell* selected the site lay-out plan for housing the troops and the non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the 528th and the 10th SFG translated the plan into reality. Major Timothy Wynegar*, the contracting officer, set-up the numerous contracts that provided vehicles and services to get the camp up and running.

TF Support was constantly juggling priorities to provide the right logistical support to sustain an ever-increasing population at Camp Loki and the proper mix of supplies for fifty-one ODAs operating along the Green Line. "This was not a well-developed area. We were constantly in communication with our elements in Germany and Romania telling them what was needed. Loads changed constantly, sometimes with the aircraft propellers turning," LTC Hurst commented on the build-up of forces at Camp Loki. "We went from 1,500 to 5,000 personnel in one week."¹⁸ The resourcefulness of the task force was again stretched tight when the city of Mosul

The TF Support operations refueled aircraft as required. Refueling a CH-47 helicopter of the 101st Airborne Division.



fell on 11 April.

The control of the traditionally Kurdish Democratic Party city of Mosul by the Kurdish forces from both the KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan caused a very tense and volatile situation in the city ethnically divided between Kurds and Arabs. COL Cleveland recognized that the thinly dispersed Special Forces teams were not going to be sufficient to keep the peace and he requested additional forces be sent to the city. The first troops to arrive at Irbil were the Marines of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) from the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group. LTC Hurst now had a much more complicated support requirement.

"We were notified about 0800 that they would be coming in that day. We had no supply for them, no tents, food, or anything. They came right off the ships by helicopter that afternoon, about 300 of them. We had the tents and all ready for them when they came. The word to us was COL Cleveland needs these guys, and the Marine lieutenant colonel was very professional. He told us they could move that night, [they] just needed food and ammunition to supplement their basic load."¹⁹ After a quick resupply of these items, the first half of the MEU moved on to Mosul in helicopters. The remainder of the MEU, another 300 Marines, arrived that night in Marine aircraft.

"The plan was to bus them to Mosul. [MAJ] John Galoway* went into Irbil and got the KDP (Kurdish Democratic Party) leadership to get buses. Those guys were stopping buses in the street, pulling people off, and contracting the drivers right there. We got twenty-one buses and the 10th Mountain guys for security and moved the Marines down to Mosul."²⁰ The presence of the Marine forces proved to be key to controlling the city.

The mission to support the 26th MEU best illustrates how Task Force Support did the job of keeping CJSOTF-North supplied at all times. Expansion of a Special Forces group headquarters into a CJSOTF necessitated a support battalion-like structure in terms of grade and organization. The success of TF Support can be attributed to its functional design and, as always, to the dedicated effort and ingenuity of the ARSOF soldiers.

Endnotes

- 1 Colonel Charles T. Cleveland, 10th Special Forces Group, interview by Dr. Kenneth Finlayson and Lieutenant Colonel John Katz, 26 June 2003, Fort Carson CO, tape recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 2 Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Hurst, 10th Special Forces Group, with Task Force Support staff, interview by Dr. Kenneth Finlayson, Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones Jr., and Lieutenant Colonel John Katz, 25 June 2003, Fort Carson, CO, tape recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 3 Cleveland interview.
- 4 Lieutenant Colonel Jobie Roach, Special Operations Command Central Command, interview by Dr. Kenneth Finlayson, 12 August 2003, Tampa, FL, tape recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 5 Roach interview.
- 6 Hurst interview.
- 7 Major Randall Griswold*, Bravo Forward Support Company, 528th Special Operations Support Battalion, interview by A. Dwayne Aaron, 9 June 2003,



The ability of TF Support to maintain the flow of logistics was critical to the success of TF Viking in northern Iraq. Speaking here is General Charles R. Holland, former commander of USSOCOM.

Fort Bragg, NC, summary, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

- 8 First Lieutenant Carlton Howard*, 528th Special Operations Support Battalion, interview by A. Dwayne Aaron, 18 June 2003, Fort Bragg, NC, tape recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 9 Lieutenant Colonel Mark Edwards, Special Operations Support Command, interview by A. Dwayne Aaron, 5 June 2003, Fort Bragg, NC, tape recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 10 Specialist Charles Olmstead*, Bravo Forward Support Company, 528th Special Operations Support Battalion, interview by A. Dwayne Aaron, 27 August 2003, Fort Bragg, NC, tape recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
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- 13 Cleveland interview, 26 June 2003.
- 14 Hurst interview.
- 15 Hurst interview.
- 16 Olmstead interview.
- 17 Cleveland interview, 26 June 2003.
- 18 Hurst interview.
- 19 Hurst interview.
- 20 Hurst interview.

One Piece of the Puzzle:

Setting up Civil Affairs in Gardez, Afghanistan

by Robert W. Jones Jr.



A large part of the work in Afghanistan centered on Civil Affairs (CA) teams working in remote locations and hazardous conditions. This article is a “snapshot” of one location—Gardez, Afghanistan—and some of the situations in which CA teams found themselves while trying to accomplish their missions. The incidents and conditions discussed in this article occurred in 2002, but are representative of the difficulties still faced by CA teams performing the ongoing mission in Afghanistan, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. The majority of long-term CA support for OEF has come from a variety of U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command units, building on the initial missions undertaken and fulfilled by the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (CAB).

While the U.S. Army Special Forces and the Coalition supported the Northern Alliance fight against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, CA units moved into the war-dev-

astated country to begin the rebuilding process. By early November 2001, the 96th CAB deployed two CA companies (C and D companies) to the theater. The companies supported the two special operations task forces (Dagger and Kabar) fighting the Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan.

The 96th CAB teams began to fill the humanitarian aid void in parts of Afghanistan at war. It was much like inserting critical pieces into a large, complex jigsaw puzzle. Within days of arrival, the four-man Civil Affairs Team—As (CAT-As) (twelve teams, six per company) were conducting humanitarian assessments throughout the country. The initial data collected helped the Coalition establish priorities for aid and assistance. In order to accomplish their missions, the CA soldiers established what became known as Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLCs) throughout the country, operating primarily with Special Forces teams.¹

As the 96th CAB established the CHLCs in key coordination hubs throughout Afghanistan, a new CA headquarters, the Coalition Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF), was established. By December 2001, the advance party of the CJCMOTF had arrived in Kabul to begin operations. While the 96th CAB's CHLCs conducted operations, a larger Army Reserve force was mobilizing at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. On 18 February 2002, the first echelon (thirty-eight soldiers) of the 489th CAB (Knoxville, Tennessee) arrived at Bagram Air Base to replace the 96th CAB. In the weeks that followed, the rest of the battalion arrived in Afghanistan. The 489th CAB was augmented with thirty-one soldiers from the 401st CAB (Webster, New York) in order to expand operations and provide support to the U.S. Army units operating throughout the country. The 489th CAB “fell in on” the established Civil Mili-



Map of Afghanistan showing Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells.

tary Operations Centers (CMOC) in Bagram and Karshi-Karnabad, Uzbekistan (the base commonly referred to as “K2”), to provide command and control as well as logistics support to ten CHLCs as they deployed to replace the 96th CAB teams throughout the country.²

Gardez, the capital of Paktia province, is important because of its strategic location. It is a major crossroads for the north-south and east-west road system. The province sits astride the major routes in and out of eastern Afghanistan. Nestled along the Pakistan border, the area is easily accessible to al-Qaeda and Taliban forces who regularly slip from the frontier region into Afghanistan. Although located only sixty miles south of Kabul, it is separated from the capital by a major mountain range. The sixty miles that would take an hour and a half to drive in most Western countries, would take convoys anywhere from two and a half to six hours, if the convoy could get through at all. The two-lane road snaked through a mountain pass that rose from 6,000 to 9,000 feet above sea level before dropping down to the valley floor. Gardez sits at 7,053 feet.³ The task was daunting because the CHLC had to cover an area the size of South Carolina with three to five personnel on a team.

The entire Paktia province, including Gardez, was a contested area. On

Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cell (CHLC) was a new term (non-doctrinal) used to identify Civil Affairs teams. The term was “invented” to mollify civilian aid agencies wary of working with the military and Civil Military Operations Centers (CMOC). The three to five man teams covered large areas of Afghanistan well beyond the typical capabilities of a Civil Affairs team.

the outskirts of town, the Special Forces had established a forward operating base during Operation ANACONDA and the Shah-e-Khot Valley fighting in 2002. It was home to various Special Forces operational detachments alpha (ODAs) from January 2002 to August 2002. An ODA from 5th Special Forces Group and ODAs 394 and 395 (from 3rd SFG) operated from the Gardez compound in the spring and summer of 2002. They were replaced by an ODA from 20th SFG in the summer of 2002. Captain Ken Harrison* moved his CAT-A 56 (Company E, 96th CAB) to Gardez on 7 February 2002, established a CHLC, and conducted assessments.⁴ After coordinating humanitarian deliveries of food and blankets to villages in the Shah-e-Khot Valley following Operation ANACONDA, the team moved back to the Special Forces compound. During the deliberate assessment of Gardez in support of Advanced Operating Base 390, Harrison and his team discovered that political infighting between two warlords had divided the city. With weapons pointed against them everywhere, humanitarian assistance to the city was impossible. Gardez was regarded as a “no win” situation. Protecting the limited CA assets, the team moved to Khowst on 29 March 2002

to conduct operations.⁵ This caused a gap in the area’s CA coverage, although the Special Forces ODAs in Gardez had conducted some civic action projects as part of their missions. The absence of a CHLC and dedicated CA assets sent the message to the competing factions in Gardez: cooperate with the Coalition or the aid coming into Afghanistan would bypass Gardez and be sent to more friendly areas.⁶



Afghan Militia Forces on Operation ANACONDA-1 March 2002.

CJCMOTF planners continually reassessed the security situation throughout Afghanistan. In June 2002, additional CA assets from the 360th Civil Affairs Brigade arrived in Kabul. This freed up the 489th CAB soldiers for duties outside of the capital. One of the CJCMOTF priorities was to set up a CHLC in Gardez. This posed a challenge. There was no CAT-A designated for Gardez. To fill the gap, soldiers from the 489th CAB’s Public Health Team were formed into an ad hoc CHLC under Major James Collins*.⁷

The newly formed CAT-A/CHLC 13 moved by ground convoy from Kabul to Gardez on 18 September 2002.⁸ Almost immediately, the CA team began providing support and humanitarian assistance throughout the province. The four-man team had a daunting task and CHLC 13 needed the cooperation and support from the population. To achieve this, it had to aggressively interact with the provincial governing officials.⁹

To accomplish its mission, the soldiers of CHLC 13 established two priorities: the first was to assess needs and propose Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) projects with local input; the second, to work with the non-governmental organization/international organization (NGO/IO) community. This part was key. Accurate, up-to-date humanitarian assistance and security assessments of the area were needed to support NGO/IO return to Paktia Province. The CHLC assessed the towns of Gardez, Zormat, Mihlan, Dara, and some smaller villages in the Shah-e-Khot Valley. Based on the assessments, it prioritized eleven high impact OHDACA Projects to be started in the first thirty days and then the projects were submitted to the CJCMOTF. These included the construction of new schools, health clinics, and the drilling of water wells. Project selection and priorities were closely coordinated with Provincial Governor Dalili and the Paktia Province Departments of Education and

*Pseudonyms have been used for all military personnel with a rank lower than lieutenant colonel.



CHLC soldiers conducting an assessment in Gardez.

Health to inculcate local participation.¹⁰

The CHLC was very aggressive. It had to quickly meet and coordinate with the few NGOs and IOs operating in Gardez and in the rest of the Paktia province. The CHLC office in the Special Forces compound often became the coordination center for local humanitarian assistance actions. There, CA soldiers provided the NGOs/IOs a daily province situation and threat briefing to strengthen their commitments.

Getting the NGO/IO to be more proactive in Paktia province became a priority for CHLC 13. In October 2002, the CHLC briefed the humanitarian assistance needs and current status of Paktia Province at a NGO/IO meeting in the Kabul CJCMOTF. The briefing fostered more meetings with high-level United Nations officials who were keenly interested in returning to Gardez and Paktia Province to implement development programs. Increased NGO/IO activity was designed to achieve a fundamental CA goal—to work the CHLC out of a job.

While the 489th CAB continued its mission in Afghanistan, an even larger CA force was mobilizing at Fort Bragg in September 2002. The 450th CAB (Riverdale, Maryland) arrived in Afghanistan in October 2002 to replace the 489th CAB. To expand the CA mission in Afghanistan, two other CA battalions “plussed up” the 450th CAB. The 403rd CAB (Mattydale, New York) and the 414th CAB (Utica, New York) each sent thirty soldiers.¹¹ As the new units arrived in Afghanistan, they helped the CAT-As by establishing a CMOG for command, control, and coordi-

Civil Affairs conducting negotiations with local contractors.



Kabul traffic after leaving the CJCMOTF compound. Convoys had to move amongst erratic civilian drivers. As conditions improved in Kabul traffic congestion hindered CA missions.

nation, as well as to reduce administrative requirements for the operational teams. At some sites another CAT-A was added to expand the Coalition presence. Gardez was one of these areas.

A convoy of four non-tactical vehicles, Toyota “Hilux” trucks, left the CJCMOTF compound in Kabul about 0900 on 21 November 2002, headed to Gardez an hour later than planned. One of the trucks, with three Afghan civilian mechanics to repair rented vehicles, was originally slated to be the last truck. However, since the Afghans had no communications or weapons, they became the third vehicle for security and control.¹²

The Gardez-bound convoy from the CJCMOTF was typical of many that left Kabul. Personnel with different missions were regularly combined for security reasons: an inspection of several humanitarian assistance projects, final payments for the completed projects, vehicle repair and maintenance, and an assessment of a new “home” for the CA in a walled compound adjacent to the Special Forces facility in Gardez. This new site for CA was slightly bigger than the Special Forces compound—a 200 square-foot area—but made of the typical mud brick common to Afghanistan. Ten-foot high thick walls contained many rooms. However, the majority of CA soldiers would live in tents reinforced with wooden floors in the compound. Prior to habitation, several trips had to be made to determine equipment and construction requirements in the compound.¹³

The compound used by the Special Forces detachments was bursting with soldiers. The Special Forces facility was a basic, rectangle structure with mud brick walls and guard towers about twenty feet tall on the four corners surrounding a central open area. To many Americans, it resembled the Alamo. At any given time, two to four ODAs, a Psychological Operations team, intelligence teams, and Coalition SOF teams lived in the rented compound where an extended Afghani family of ten people and a few animals had previously resided comfortably.

The convoy worked its way south from Kabul without incident. A few miles from Loghar, when the second vehicle turned a corner in the road, an improvised explo-



Crowded interior of the SF compound. There was no additional space in this facility to increase CA presence in Gardez.



Outside of the SF compound in Gardez.

sive device (IED) was set off triggering an ambush.¹⁴ A large white cloud of smoke and dust obscured the blast area. The first and second trucks sped out of the kill zone. In the last vehicle, Second Lieutenant Charles Kramer* was speaking with another occupant when the concussive force of the explosion startled him. Then, the vehicle lurched to a sudden halt to avoid rear ending the third vehicle carrying the Afghan mechanics that had stopped abruptly in front. Driver Staff Sergeant Peter James* slammed on the brakes, forgetting the clutch. His truck stalled in the kill zone. At first James thought that the Afghans had been hit; but they had simply panicked and stopped. Both Hilux trucks were enveloped by a thick cloud of smoke and dust. Since the truck was stopped, Kramer grabbed the door handle to dismount and return

fire. "... I remember, because we were not going anywhere, and I knew that, from all the training, that we were sitting in the middle of a kill zone."¹⁵ His M16A2 was too long to be employed from the back seat of the cramped Hilux truck. Dismounting seemed to be the only option.¹⁶

The four Americans and the Afghani mechanics found themselves suddenly left behind. The first two vehicles had bolted down the road at breakneck speed. In what was seconds, but seemed like hours, Sergeant James restarted his truck and yelled to Kramer, "Stay in!" He hit the gas, intent on ramming the stalled Afghan truck, to knock it out of the way. But, then the Afghan truck began moving. James careened his truck around them while Kramer waved to the Afghans to fol-

low. When the two trucks had escaped and were speeding down the road, the convoy commander, Lieutenant Colonel Joe Sykes, who was riding with James, used his Motorola radio to halt the two lead vehicles. Over two miles down the road, the trail vehicles saw the first two trucks stopped in an open area. The four vehicles "circled the wagons" to check for injuries and inspect the trucks for damage. Using an Iridium satellite telephone, the only equipment in the convoy capable of reaching the CJCMOTF, the convoy commander called in the ambush location. A reaction force from the 772nd Military Police Company (Massachusetts National Guard) responded, but after a thorough search found no enemy at the ambush site. There was only a crater where the IED had exploded. Luckily for the soldiers, the IED was improperly aimed. The majority of the force had gone upward instead of laterally into the vehicle sides. With no injuries and only minor damage to the last two trucks, the convoy continued on to Gardez, alert for another ambush. The soldiers still had missions to accomplish in Gardez and a new CA concept to test.¹⁷

This new CA concept, the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), was to be evaluated in Gardez. Once validated, it would become the model for Coalition CA efforts in Afghanistan. The PRT was to be a self-contained civil

The Toyota "Hilux" truck is the export version of the Toyota Tacoma and widely used throughout the developing world for its dependability and toughness. The Hilux is a right-hand drive standard shift. This is a problem for American drivers because they have to shift gears with the left hand and many "younger" drivers have never driven a standard shift. Until sufficient drivers could be trained, senior sergeants and officers often drove the trucks.






Diagram of ambush area.





PRT organization diagram.

military task force composed of CA, security, and government agencies (including the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development). The PRTs were to expand the reconstruction and recovery effort throughout Afghanistan. Manpower and resources limited CHLC effective coverage because province efforts centered around several major towns. A PRT was designed to expand reconstruction to the provincial or even multi-province level.

Once it was determined that Gardez was to be the first PRT site, the team had to arrange logistics support and collect supplies to become operational. That task was assigned to Second Lieutenant Kramer, 401st CAB, and a small group of experienced noncommissioned officers. Equipment was requisitioned in Bagram and Kabul, but most was purchased on the local economy. The team—armed with a list, cash, and an interpreter—went shopping to obtain the necessary equipment by visiting several shopping districts in Kabul known simply by what they sell, i.e., “Metal Street,” “Electric Street,” etc. (all in accordance with the pertinent regulations). Engineer renovations were made to the new PRT compound in Gardez while Kramer’s team gathered supplies and equipment. Then, a convoy of NTVs (non-tactical vehicles), HMMWVs (High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles), and two LMTVs (Light Medium Tactical Vehicles) was organized to deliver everything to Gardez. The vehicles were loaded the previous night to save time in

The convoy stopped in the flatlands for a communications check unaware that there was a blizzard raging just miles up the road. The vehicle closest to the camera, with the satellite communications antenna on top is a Toyota Hilux.



the morning.¹⁸

The seven-vehicle CA supply convoy left the CJCMOTF compound at 0800 on 23 December for Gardez. The chill of the Afghan winter night gradually dissipated into a pleasant, sunny day. After wending its way through Kabul’s traffic without incident, the convoy headed south. They made one scheduled stop on the plain before heading up to the mountain pass. “Everything was fine until the mountain pass. Then, I think about four or five miles before the pass, at one of our [radio] checkpoints, it started really snowing. I took a small video picture for Sergeant Paul* [at the last stop], and it was typical desert conditions: sand and sun. Then the next thing up the road, five or ten minutes later, it was a white out.”¹⁹

The convoy commander in a NTV stopped to render assistance to a United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) Land Rover stalled along the side of the road. He signaled that the rest of the convoy should continue up the mountain. However, the road became extremely hazardous as the snow continued, narrowing the road to less than one and one-half car widths. Compounding the situation was the road itself. It had been cut into the side of the mountain with only a very small shoulder on the right with a sheer drop off on the left. Assistant drivers constantly watched the left while looking up to guard against a dropped grenade or rolling rocks intended to knock them over the cliff.²⁰

Instead of the enemy, the primary threat became the weather. The road soon accumulated a layer of ice with two to three inches of powdered snow on top. Vehicles started to slip and slide on the ice and snow—chains had not been part of the deployment package. The convoy of CA tactical and non-tactical vehicles soon became separated by intervening Afghani cars and trucks. 2LT Kramer, riding in the lead HMMWV, and one LMTV surged ahead in an effort to reach the final hump of the mountain pass before the road descended down into Gardez. But a half a mile from the top, his way was blocked by a “Jinga” truck jackknifed across the road. Based on the weather, the convoy commander cancelled the mission and ordered them to regroup for a return to Kabul. Kramer thought that it would probably be best if his two vehicles continued on

As weather conditions in the pass continued to deteriorate the civilian traffic compounded the problem. Here, the convoy was more than a mile from the summit.



to Gardez. They were already more than three quarters of the way up the pass, almost beyond the summit where the gradient was a lot less steep. The convoy commander appreciated his effort but decided it was not worth the risk.²¹

The colorful cargo trucks seen around Afghanistan are “Jinga” (brand name) trucks although some soldiers call them “jingle” trucks because they have ornate designs and jingling bells attached everywhere.



LT Kramer faced the problem of turning his two vehicles around to make the trip back down the mountain. Luckily, they were at a wider spot with just enough solid, flat land on the right to make a three-way turn. Both truck drivers, fortunately, were from upstate New York and were experienced winter drivers. Sergeant Hallam*, the LMTV assistant driver, ground-guided the truck at five miles per hour in and out of the many stalled civilian vehicles. Some Afghans were trying to put chains on; others were wrapping rope around the tires to gain traction. The return trip down the mountain took more than ninety minutes.

Normally it took fifteen minutes. Safely at the bottom of the pass, the convoy reassembled. The CJCMOTF was informed that the convoy was returning to Kabul.²²

The convoy succeeded getting to Gardez on 28 December after the weather had cleared in the pass. This experience was typical of the problems CA soldiers faced simply moving about Afghanistan, much less accomplishing missions. Every day was some new challenge.

A combination of factors made Gardez the ideal testing ground for the new CA concept for Afghanistan, the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). CHLC 13 operations in Gardez became a model for Civil-Military Operations and demonstrated that Coalition military units and the NGO/IO community could work together to stabilize a troubled region. Based on their success in Paktia Province, Civil Affairs received a friendly reception and the cooperation of a local population that had earlier supported the Taliban. Ultimately the PRT concept was

Convoy commander and his CSM waiting for the rest of the convoy to regroup before returning to Kabul.



expanded across Afghanistan during 2003–2004 to manage reconstruction and stabilization at the regional level. The PRTs became another key part of the reconstruction puzzle that is Afghanistan today. ♠

Endnotes

- 1 Major George Jensen*, Commander, Company D, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, interview by Staff Sergeant Patrick Jennings, 126th Military History Detachment, 14 May 2002, Fort Bragg, NC, digital recording 126-OEF-I-004, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg; Major John Bowman*, Commander, Company C, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, interview by Sergeant First Class D. J. Moriarty, 126th Military History Detachment, 10 May 2002, Fort Bragg, NC, digital recording 126-OEF-I-003, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 2 Lieutenant Colonel Roland d’Marcellis, Commander, 489th Civil Affairs Battalion, interview by Major Paul Landry, 126th Military History Detachment, 22 October 2002, Kabul, Afghanistan, digital recording 126-OEF-I-039, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 3 US Army Center for Military History, *The United States Army in Afghanistan. Operation ENDURING FREEDOM October 2001–March 2002* (CMH Pub 70-83-1) (Center for Military History: Washington DC, 2005), 30.
- 4 Captain Ken Harrison*, CAT-A 56 team leader, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, interview by Dr. Richard Kiper, 11 May 2002, Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, tape recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Charles Briscoe, et. al, *Weapon of Choice, U.S. Army Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 328.
- 5 Harrison interview; Briscoe, et. al, *Weapon of Choice*, 328.
- 6 Briscoe, et. al, *Weapon of Choice*, 328.
- 7 Major James Collins*, 489th Civil Affairs Battalion, interview by Staff Sergeant Patrick Jennings, 126th Military History Detachment, 29 October 2002, Gardez, Afghanistan, digital recording 126-OEF-I-087, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 8 Major James Collins*, 489th Civil Affairs Battalion, interview by Staff Sergeant Patrick Jennings, 126th Military History Detachment, 29 October 2002, Gardez, Afghanistan, digital recording 126-OEF-I-087, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 9 Collins interview.
- 10 Collins interview.
- 11 Department of the Army, U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command G3 Mobilization Section, *Request DA Mobilization Order to conduct Normal Rotation for a Civil Affairs Battalion ISO CJTF-180 (090049)JUL02*, dated 16 July 2002, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; The 403rd Civil Affairs Battalion element was activated as “Company D, 403rd Civil Affairs Battalion” under the command of Major McClellan, author’s notes, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 12 Second Lieutenant Charles Kramer*, 401st Civil Affairs Battalion, interview by Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones Jr., 27 December 2002, Kabul, Afghanistan, tape recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 13 Kramer interview; Captain Donald McCluskey*, CJCMOTF Staff Engineer, interview by Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones Jr., 28 December 2002, Kabul, Afghanistan, tape recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 14 Loghar is also spelled Lowgar.
- 15 Kramer interview.
- 16 Kramer interview.
- 17 Kramer interview.
- 18 Kramer interview; Staff Sergeant John Parnell*, 401st Civil Affairs Battalion, interview by Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones Jr., 24 December 2002, Kabul, Afghanistan, tape recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 19 Kramer interview.
- 20 Kramer interview.
- 21 Kramer interview; Parnell interview.
- 22 Kramer interview; Parnell interview.



Books

in the Field

“Books in the Field” provides short descriptions of books related to subjects covered in the current issue of *Veritas*. Readers are encouraged to use these recommendations as a starting point for individual study on topics related to Army Special Operations history.

William R. Peers and Dean Brelis, *Behind the Burma Road: The Story of America's Most Successful Guerrilla Force* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1963)

The exploits of Detachment 101 of the Office of Strategic Services mirror in many ways the missions of today's Special Forces. The detachment worked with the Kachin hill tribes of northern Burma in operations against the Japanese Army in a classic unconventional warfare scenario. Lieutenant General (Retired) William R. (Ray) Peers commanded OSS Detachment 101 from December 1943 to July 1945. Dean Brelis served as a lieutenant in the field for Detachment 101. The book recounts the exploits of the detachment as they supported the Allied Forces in Burma desperately trying to push back the Japanese in order to open the vital Burma Road to China. This book is currently out of print.




William P. Yarborough, *Bail Out over North Africa: America's First Combat Parachute Missions, 1942* (Williamstown, NJ: Philips Publications, 1979)

Lieutenant General (Retired) William P. Yarborough recounts the exploits of the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion in America's first combat parachute jump in Algeria on 8 November 1942. This book details LTG Yarborough's experiences as the executive officer and primary airborne planner for the Parachute Task Force and his jump into Youks les Bains, Algeria, as part of Operation TORCH. The book is an accurate portrayal of the difficulties and successes of one of the longest parachute insertions ever conducted by the United States. This book is currently out of print.


Mark Adkin, *Urgent Fury: The Battle for Grenada* (New York: Lexington Books, 1989)

This book is a comprehensive account of the United States' operations on the island of Grenada in 1983. It covers the overthrow of the Grenadian government of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop by Deputy Prime Minister Paul Coard and General Hudson Austin and the subsequent invasion by the United States to rescue American citizens. Operation URGENT FURY was the first major post-Vietnam operation for the Army and Army special operations forces were a significant part of the campaign. The experiences of the newly formed Special Operations Aviation Task Force 160 and the Rangers are well documented.



Joseph A. Springer, *The Black Devil Brigade: The True Story of the First Special Service Force, An Oral History* (Pacifica, CA: Pacifica Military History, 2001)

This book is not a definitive history of the First Special Service Force (FSSF), the unique Canadian-American unit of World War II. It is an oral history of the FSSF, based on interviews conducted over four years, starting with a FSSF reunion in 1996. The author, Joseph Springer, was drawn to the subject matter because his uncle, John Springer, was a member of the Force and was killed in action at Anzio, Italy, on 20 February 1944. Springer organizes the book chronologically following the Force from recruitment and training, to the Aleutians, through Italy, and into southern France. The book does not have footnotes and has a rather small bibliography. However it has several appendices that not only show the organization of the FSSF, but also list the men who gave their lives and the campaigns in which the Force participated.



Other Recommended Books on Topics Covered in this Issue:

- ♣ Edson Raff, *We Jumped to Fight* (New York: Eagle Books, 1944)
- ♣ Michael E. Hass, *In the Devil's Shadow: UN Special Operations During the Korean War* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000)
- ♣ Lee E. Russell and M. Albert Mendez, *Grenada 1983* (London: Osprey Pubs, 1985)
- ♣ Kermit Roosevelt, ed., *War Reports of the OSS* (2 volumes) (New York: Walther, 1976)
- ♣ Richard Dunlop, *Behind Japanese Lines: With the OSS in Burma* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1979)

Historical Snapshot

The Flying Boxcar Crash on Smoke Bomb Hill



The C-119 known as the "Flying Boxcar" was a workhorse of the Air Force's transport fleet. It was this model of aircraft that crashed into the mess hall on Smoke Bomb Hill shortly after take-off from Pope Air Force Base.


THE pictures in this photo essay document a tragic accident fifty-two years ago. On the morning of 30 March 1954, a twin-engined C-119 "Flying Boxcar" aircraft plunged through low-hanging clouds shortly after taking off from Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina. Billowing smoke from its left engine, the aircraft clipped the top of one of a row of Bachelor Officer's Quarters, skidded across the parade field, and crashed into a mess hall belonging to the Psychological Warfare Center. That mess hall was located approximately a hundred yards east of Reilly Road, not very far from today's Burger King.

Of the nine crew and passengers in the airplane and seven men on duty in the mess hall, seven were killed. The pilot, First Lieutenant Albert W. Parks, was rescued from the burning wreckage by cooks in a neighboring mess hall. Unfortunately, he died that afternoon in the hospital. Other fatalities aboard the aircraft: Army Corporal Osman S. Palmer, Corporal Robert Dervan, Private Albert G. Marin Jr., and Airman First Class Rudolph V. Short. Those killed in the mess hall were Corporal Donald F. Greenlee and Private First Class James A. MacRe.

As tragic as the accident was, service to one's country, whether during peace or during war, is always a dangerous proposition. Soldiers and airmen risk their lives everyday. We salute those who endeavor to fulfill their commitment to the nation with superior service and faithful sincerity. 📌



Looking northwest at the crash from the parade field near Gruber Road.





Soldiers in the company street with the crash site in the background, wreathed in smoke.




Many pitch in to keep the area secure; a few administer medical aid.



Soldiers sit on the steps of the mess hall, virtually all that is left after the crash. With the typical gallows humor of GIs, they are waiting for the mess hall to brew some fresh coffee.



The plane stopped just a few feet short of crippling the entire fire hydrant system.



The crash totally destroyed the mess hall but left the adjacent buildings undamaged.

In the Next Issue of Veritas

SOD-JF in Iraq: A "Total Force" Success Story

By Major Alan D. Meyer

In this article Major Alan D. Meyer explains the mission and deployment of Special Operations Detachment–Joint Forces Command, one of several SODs in the Army National Guard. SOD-JF deployed to support the 5th Special Forces Group mission in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and the stand up of Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–Arabian Peninsula (CJSOTF-AP).



The Early Years of Special Forces in Vietnam: A-312 in Buon Brieng 1964

by Robert W. Jones Jr.

The image of Special Forces in the Vietnam War is one of an enormous 5th Special Forces Group conducting specialized and covert operations throughout the country and cross border operations into Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam. However, the early days of Special Forces in Vietnam were far more austere and the development was slow. Then it centered around 12-man "A" teams training Montagnard Civilian Irregular Defense Groups. This article covers the experience of team A-312 in Vietnam.

The Failures of Detachment 101 and its Evolution into a Combined Arms Team

By Troy Saquety

From its foundation in early 1942 until its disbandment on 12 July 1945, Detachment 101 not only racked up an impressive wartime record, but also served as an OSS test bed combining the branches in the field under one commander. Detachment 101 basically adopted a combined arms approach to missions. The Detachment 101 commander had access to everything he needed for a particular mission, be it air, naval, or ground—without having to solicit support from outside of his organization. Thus OSS Detachment 101 employed a variety of operational forces, much like today's special operations units do.



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